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Dissertation under the direction of  Professor Jane Landers 
This dissertation argues that rather than making a concerted effort to stabilize the 
Spanish-indigenous frontier in the south of the colony, colonists and indigenous residents 
of 17th century Chile purposefully perpetuated the conflict to benefit personally from the 
spoils of war and use to their advantage the resources sent by viceregal authorities to 
fight it.   
Using original documents I gathered in research trips to Chile and Spain, I am able to 
reconstruct the debates that went on both sides of the Atlantic over funds, protection from 
pirates, and indigenous slavery that so defined Chiles formative 17th century.  While my 
conclusions are unique, frontier residents from Paraguay to northern New Spain were 
also dealing with volatile indigenous alliances, threats from European enemies, and 
questions about how their tiny settlements could get and keep the attention of the crown.  
I also hope to shed new light on what the residents of the frontiers themselves were 
saying about their world, rather than relying on the important but somewhat muddled 
impressions of historians and statesman who have national legacies in mind.   
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For more than three hundred years, the Araucanian indigenous group in southern 
Chile remained unconquered by both Spanish and later Chilean authorities.1  
Araucanian resistance began almost immediately after the Spanish arrived in the 
region in the 1540s and did not end until the 1880s when Chilean soldiers returned 
from the War of the Pacific to put down the last major Araucanian offensive. 
This War of Arauco as it would come to be called took its name from the region 
where most of the conflict would center.2  Not satisfied with decreasing spoils from 
the conquest of Peru, a number of Spaniards and their indigenous auxiliaries marched 
through the forbidding Atacama Desert and founded Santiago de Chile in 1541.  After 
finding gold in rivers near Santiago, a smaller group of Spaniards moved steadily 
south in search of more placer mining possibilities, erecting first a fort then the town 
of Concepción near the mouth of the Bío-Bío River in 1550.  It was at the Bío-Bío 
                                                 
1
 The Araucanians are also known as Mapuche, and now refer to themselves as such.  Mapuche 
means people of the earth in Mapudungun, but the term only sporadically appears in 16th and 17th 
century sources.  The Spanish had various terms to refer to these Indians, usually based on the region 
from whence they sent representatives in peace talks, but the most universal term was Araucano or 
Auca.  In a recent article Guillaume Boccara correctly pointed out that both Mapuche and 
Araucano are flawed, and instead uses the term reche meaning true people to refer to the 
inhabitants of this area. Guillaume Boccara, Etnogénesis Mapuche: Resistencia y Restructuración 
Entre los Indígenas del Centro-Sur de Chile (Siglos XVI-XVIII), Hispanic American Historical 
Review 79:3 (August 1999).  Reche was used and understood by the Spanish, but it too is imperfect as 
it refers to the masses or individuals and does not include this regions political or religious leaders.  
Tomás Guevara, Historia de la civilización de Araucanía, Tomo I, Antroplojía Araucana (Santiago: 
Imprenta Cervantes, 1900), 186.  Reche is becoming more widely used among Chilean historians, 
but Araucanian remains more universal. 
2
 The colonial Province of Arauco was bordered by the Pacific and the Andes to its west and east, and 
by the Toltén and Maule Rivers on the north and south.  I will also use the more loosely defined 
Araucanía in this study.   
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River where this steady movement southward would stall, and the Spanish war of 
conquest would become one of Araucanian resistance.3   
Two main factors prompted this development.  First, no significant deposit of 
precious metals was discovered in Chile, immediately relegating the new colony to 
the Spanish Empires economic periphery.  The aforementioned placer mines were 
quickly exhausted, and no major gold vein was ever discovered.  In the meantime, the 
discovery of the silver mountain of Potosí in 1545 soon would help triple the 
amount of silver arriving in Seville.4    This meant that although the crown had no 
intention of abandoning Chile (it had potential as a breadbasket for Perus silver 
mines), it would see only modest settlement and few resources.  By 1549, there were 
only 500 colonists in all of Chile.5  Second, Araucanian resistance had stopped the 
advance of the Inca Empire at the Bío-Bío and a century later the river and the 
residents to its south thwarted another empire. (See map below.)  However, lacking 
large scale political institutions, the scattered Araucanians had no territorial 
aspirations north of the Bío-Bío. Therefore, with neither the Spanish nor Araucanians 
enthusiastic about penetrating the Bío-Bío, something of a permanent frontier began  
 
 
                                                 
3
 The Spanish spiritual conquest also slowed at the Bío-Bío.  There were members of a number of 
regular orders in Chile by the 1550s, but their work was concentrated near Santiago.  The founding of 
the Dioceses of La Imperial (1560) and  San Bartolomé (Chillán) (1590) produced few results.  In the 
1590s, the newly-arrived Jesuit order began to seek a more active role.  In 1595 two Jesuits set out for 
the Araucanía under the government of Martín de Loyola, who believed the Jesuits could aid in the 
pacification of the region.  Rolf G. Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 1593-1767 (Santiago, Chile: 
Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1996), 48-50. 
4
 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World: 1492-1700  (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), 229. 
5
 Tracing population numbers for the rest of the century becomes a difficult task with miscegenation 
and the abandonment of Spanish settlements.  The most reliable numbers are those of Spanish arrivals, 
but it becomes more difficult to track their movements and offspring once they set foot in Chile.  
Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile: Tomo I (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1999), 263. 
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Figure 1.  Extent of the Inca Empire6 
 
 
to straddle the river.  Soon, what began as a skirmish line had become a region of 
frontier negotiation where trade flourished.  Strawberries, lima beans, corn, potatoes, 
blankets, feathers, and metal trinkets had begun to change hands in regular Spanish-
Araucanian trade fairs as early as the 1550s.7  Miscegenation also brought the Spanish 
and Araucanians closer, as Spanish women were scarce.8  This contact was facilitated 
by the presence of Spanish towns in Araucanian territory and by the forced settlement 
of Araucanians in pueblos de indios or reducciones near Spanish towns or forts.9 
                                                 
6
 Adapted from: <http://www.peru-explorer.com/history.htm> 
7
 Leopoldo Saez-Godoy, ed.  Géronimo de Vivar: Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los 
Reinos de Chile (1558)  (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1979), 164. 
8
 Sergio Villalobos cites the percentage of Spanish female settlers arriving between 1536 and 1565 as 
23%.  Sergio Villalobos, Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza,in  Relaciones fronterizas en la 
Aracanía , ed. Sergio Villalobos et al. (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1982), 39 
9
 Ibid.  The Spanish established towns like Valdivia (founded in 1552), Osorno (1558) and Castro 
(1558) as part of the initial conquest and their economic role within the empire was still unclear.  Forts 
like Tucapél (1552), and Purén and Arauco (1553), and Lebu (1557) were constructed to protect these 
tenuous settlements.  Osvaldo Silva Galdames, Atlas de Historia de Chile (Santiago: Editorial 
Universitaria, 1983), 45. 
 11 
In the first decades of Spanish settlement, surviving on the frontier was the priority 
for these small towns even if it meant trading with the indigenous enemy. By 1565 
Chile had seen the arrival of only 1,500 Spaniards, who dotted settlements over the 
1,000 kilometers between Coquimbo and Concepción.10   (See map below). 
Without frontier exchange, this scattered colonization of the Araucanía likely 
would not have escaped the fate of Nombre de Jesús and Rey Don Felipe.  These two 
settlements in the Strait of Magellan were never re-supplied and disappeared soon 
after their 1584 founding.11  With colonists recognizing their weakness, modest 
efforts to forge a frontier economy in the Araucanía began to bear fruit.  It even 
appeared that the consistently frustrated attempts of the Catholic Church to 
evangelize the Araucanians were having some success.12   
However, all belief that the frontier would evaporate a generation after the 
conquest was dashed by massive Araucanian rebellions in 1598 and again in 1655 
which returned an air of instability to the region.  It is my goal to address the 
connection between these rebellions and the fact that both the Spanish and 
Araucanians cultivated and benefited from the simmering war of resistance on the 
frontier.  
Most of Chiles southern settlements had existed only a generation when they 
were attacked by the Araucanians in 1598 and subsequently abandoned.  While there  
 
                                                 
10
 Tomás Thayer Ojeda, Formación de la sociedad chilena y censo de la población de Chile en los 
años de 1540 a 1565 (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1939), 320.   
11
 Silva Galdames, Atlas de Historia de Chile, 44. 
12
 The founding of the Dioceses of La Imperial (1560) and  San Bartolomé (Chillán) (1590) produced 
few results, but the newly-arrived Jesuit order began to seek a more active role in the 1590s.  In 1595 
two Jesuits set out for the Araucanía under the government of Martín de Loyola, who believed the 





Figure 2. Cities and forts founded in 16th-century Chile.  (Cities are 
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 Silva Galdames, Atlas de Historia de Chile, 45. 
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were many peripheral, or frontier areas throughout the Spanish Empire, only in 
Chiles case did the crown feel it necessary to send (and fund) a permanent army.  On 
other frontiers, vecinos were expected to form militias and provide for their own 
defense.  The crown called for a professional army in Chile after the colony was 
shaken by the Araucanian assault of 1598 and a subsequent attack by Dutch 
privateers on the island of Chiloé in 1600.  While many historians have argued that 
frontiers are usually transitory,14 the presence of the permanent army would make 
Chile a notable exception.  While the 16th century was one of surviving the frontier, 
and developing patterns of interaction, the arrival of a permanent army in the 17th 
century brought major investment and significant settlement to the Araucanía.  The 
Army of Arauco as it became known, was established in the first decade of the 17th 
century and established forts at different points along the Bío-Bío River.  The army 
had two primary functions, to protect Chiles tenuous frontier estancias and missions 
from any Araucanian advance and to drive away pirates interested in the Peruvian 
silver that funded the army and for that matter, Spains entire American colonial 
venture.  On three occasions in the 16th century, European pirates, including Francis 
Drake, had slipped through the Strait of Magellan and threatened Chile.  These three 
breaches of the Pacific did more psychological than real damage to the viceroyalty, as 
the pirate activity was brief but served to confirm that the southern door to Peruvian 
silver could indeed be forced open.  The 1600 Dutch attack was more worrisome 
however, as it raised the prospect that European enemies would ally with the 
Araucanians and establish a stronghold in Chile. 
                                                 
14
 Bernd Schröter,  La frontera en hispanoamérica colonial: un estudio historiográfico comparativo, 
Colonial Latin American Historical Review (2001:Summer), 367. 
 14 
While the Army of Arauco was designed to drive off pirates and finish the 
conquest, its real contribution to the colony had less to do with its professional duties 
and more to do with the role of these soldiers as residents on a developing frontier. 
The crown created the army as a temporary force that would finish off the Araucanian 
threat.  However, for a number of reasons the Army of Arauco never mounted a 
significant campaign, instead focusing on smaller raids and contributing to the 
climate of negotiated violence that characterized the permanent frontier.  As the 
seventeenth century moved along, an end to the conquest seemed farther and farther 
afield and residents of the frontier and the colony in general continued to take 
advantage of this increasingly permanent frontier.  By cultivating a fear of pirates and 
to some extent of indigenous rebellion, residents of the frontier could count on more 
funds from the viceroy even as they embezzled them and used them to conduct illegal 
slave taking campaigns. 
David Weber has recently reminded us that the Hapsburg crowns lack of an 
overall strategy for its American frontiers meant that it was up to residents of far-
flung outposts like Chile to craft their own political and cultural systems.15  Through 
my research I have found that ultimately, both Spanish and Araucanian residents on 
the frontier, as well as officials in Santiago and Lima did not want to see an end to the 
War of Arauco.  The war and the frontier life that it had created benefited them too 
much.   
Frontier interaction began as a war of conquest where both parties had tried to 
eliminate one another.  However, once a balance of power was established, both sides 
                                                 
15
 David J. Weber, Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2005), 8. 
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in the War of Arauco purposefully kept the conflict simmering for most of the 17th 
century and helped make the War of Arauco a permanent one.  For the Spanish, the 
most effective way to make the frontier disappear would have been through 
settlement, yet there was neither the will nor the resources for a major colonization 
south of the Bío-Bío.  Neither was there a significant advance of a line of Catholic 
missions south of the Bío-Bío until the late 18th century.  There were Jesuits and 
Franciscans in the region during the 17th century, but their activity was limited to 
periodic excursions from larger Spanish settlements.  The Araucanians on the other 
hand also benefited from the ebb and flow that was frontier exchange.  The presence 
of the Spanish helped them financially through trade, raids and gifts, and helped their 
leaders gain power by proving that through their interaction with Spanish officials 
that they were on an equal level with their supposed conquerors.  After the 1560s 
then, neither side made a real and lasting commitment to victory, as the War of 
Arauco provided resources that would have been lacking without the attention the 
conflict brought.   
Since this frontier negotiation was not limited to Chile, studying other 16th and 
17th century frontiers has helped structure my research. New Mexico was one of these 
frontier areas that historians of the United States had disregarded as vacant during 
its colonial period.  Fortunately the work of Bolton and more recently David Weber, 
James Brooks, Dan Usner and others has revealed that there was in fact a vibrant 
exchange economy in the region.  While many have cited the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 
as evidence of a lack of Spanish hegemony in the region, only recently have scholars 
moved past that dramatic moment to truly reveal how this antithesis between the 
 16 
Spanish pick and the English hoe has been greatly overworked.16  
James Brooks multiple award winning Captives and Cousins traces several 
centuries of development in the southwest borderlands and argues among other things 
that the mountains of the region were not a barrier to societal development. Instead 
the Sierras de Sangre de Cristo, Jémez, Sandía, and Magdalena (linked) landscapes 
and societies in the southwest, much like the cordillera between Chile and Argentina 
did.17  Also important for my work is Brooks description of how frequently and how 
formally the Spanish used just war to turn indigenous slavery into a legitimate and 
lucrative staple of the frontier economy.  In Chile and in New Mexico alike, the fact 
that Spanish and indigenous residents of the frontier received little direct economic 
assistance from the crown did not preclude them from thriving as a multi-ethnic 
society, even if they had to use extra-legal means to do so.  In fact, the very lack of 
direct contact with royal authorities was what emboldened these frontier residents to 
develop permanent patterns of indigenous slave taking and trading.   
Perhaps the most well known American frontier existed in northern New Spain.  
There the Spanish set up their silver arc, a network of presidios established to 
protect the silver mining economy from the savage Chichimec peoples.  While it is 
understandable that the torture and mutilation of Spanish prisoners at the hands of the 
Chichimec are the most dominant images of this areas colonial history, the silver arc 
remains one of the earliest examples of how creole societies survived and self-
                                                 
16
 Herbert Bolton, Defensive Spanish Expansion and the Significance of the Borderlands, in The 
Idea of Spanish Borderlands, ed.  David J. Weber (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 2. 
17
 James F. Brooks,  Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship and Commmunity in the Southwest 
Borderlands  (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2002), 117.  Margarita Gascón has written extensively on the 
Cordillera de los Andes as a bridge rather than a barrier.  Margarita Gascón, Comerciantes y redes 
mercantiles del siglo XVII en la frontera sur del Virreinato del Perú, Anuario de Estudios 
Americanos, 57:2, (July/December, 2000): 413-448. 
 17 
conceptualized when they were so far from the imperial spotlight. In both Chile and 
New Spain it was frontier residents themselves who initiated dialogue with the crown 
about and sought solutions for their unique legal, military and economic 
circumstances. 18  Much as was the case in Chiles programs of reducción and 
defensive war, the mestizo warrior-diplomat (in New Spain) fashioned an 
enduring and humane peace in a unique frontier setting.19        
The so-called Guaraní frontier which developed in territory now split between 
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, also held many similarities to the Chilean case.  
Jesuits in both Chile and the River Plate area first unwittingly exposed to, then tried 
to protect Araucanians and Guaraní from slave raiders.  Aborigines in both areas were 
concentrated into Jesuit designed reducciones which made them both easier to 
catechize and unfortunately to kidnap.20  A general lack of Spanish settlement also 
characterized both Chile and the Guaraní frontier, producing an intense process of 
miscegenation and in the latter case, adoption of the native language.21  
                                                 
18
  Also see Jane Landers work on Spanish Florida.  It was at Fort Mosé near St. Augustine, where a 
group of runaway African slaves took full advantage of their liminal existence by contributing to a 
frontier militia and creating a permanent community. The uncertainty and permissiveness of living 
between two empires, near volatile Indians, and during the height of Caribbean piracy allowed free 
blacks in the area to thwart preconceptions, and become entrepreneurs and soldiers.  Jane Landers, 
Black Society Spanish Florida (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 35, 204.  See 
Alan Gallay, Jonathan Bryans Plantation Empire: Land, Politics, and the Formation of a Ruling Class 
in Colonial Georgia,  The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 1988) for 
similar economic opportunities on the neighboring Georgia frontier. 
19
 Philip Wayne Powell argues that the leadership of a handful of first generation Americans was 
essential to Spanish survival in the region.  He writes extensively of Miguel Caldera, who used his 
local knowledge to author a fragile peace with the Chichimec as the 16th century came to a close.  
Calderas plan involved protection and defense of the pacified peoples, provisioning and gift-giving, 
agricultural help to the Chichimec in an attempt to reform their nomadic existence, and religious 
conversion.  Philip Wayne Powell, Mexicos Miguel Caldera: The Taming of Americas First 
Frontier, 1548-1597  (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1977), 22, 205. 
20
 Barbara Ganson, The Guaraní Under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 45. 
21
 Ibid., 29.  Tens of thousands of Chileans still count Spanish as their second language, but 
mapudungún (the language of the Araucanians) was never used as widely as Guaraní. 
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Looking at comparative cases is however most helpful in terms of reminding us of 
the Chilean frontiers uniqueness.  First of all, Chile did not have the pressures of 
territorial competition that we saw in Louisiana or Spanish Florida.  While it is true 
that the Dutch and English occasionally appeared in Pacific waters, the Spanish-
Araucanian interaction had a longer incubation period than did that of the Spanish 
and Seminole or French and Choctaw.   Second, while the New Spanish silver arc 
moved north and paulistas (slave raiders) made the Guaraní frontier unstable, the 
story of frontier life in Chile was one of permanence.  Spanish settlement did not 
progress further south, nor did the Araucanians drive the Spanish back toward 
Santiago.  Patterns of war making, slave taking and trade, rather than disappearing 
over time became more frequent and more widespread.  Soon the frontier economy 
was not simply one of subsistence, but became integrated into the viceroyaltys all-
important silver extraction.  As Chile moved toward the 18th century, Araucanians 
and Spanish creoles defined success not as assimilation or conquest, but as a negation 
or frontier pact which bridged the physical and cultural territory between two 
societies.22         
Chile also is unique in that during the national period, the legacy of the frontier 
was not regarded as a threat.  In Argentina for example, it was not long after 19th-
century ethnographers like Lucio Mansilla reported back about little-known frontier 
groups like the Ranqueles, than these same groups were attacked in future president 
                                                 
22
 Leonardo León dedicates chapters to a handful of increasingly powerful 18th century frontier toquis 
(chieftains) in, Leonardo León, Los señores de las cordilleras y las pampas: Los Pehuenches de 
Malalhue, 1770-1800 (Mendoza, Argentina: Universidad de Congreso, 2001).  Also see Leonardo 
León, Maloqueros y conchavadores.  Kristine Jones has also written a number of articles on 18th 
century frontier raiding economies in Chile and Argentina.  See, Kristine Jones, Comparative Frontier 
Raiding Economies, North and South, in Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern 
and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire, Ed. by Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan (Tucson: 
Univ. of Arizona Press, 1998). 
 19 
Julio Rocas extermination campaign.23  In Chile on the other hand, the frontier south 
had become quite powerful politically even before the wars of independence began.  
Chiles liberator, Bernardo OHiggins was from the southern frontier town of Chillán, 
and many of the new republics leaders had earned their stripes as officers on the 
Araucanian frontier.  The Araucanian frontier was not only a source of leadership 
experience, but for some statesmen their indigenous enemy provided an example of 
democracy that Chile could follow.  After all, only the standard of Aruacanía 
opposed the banners of the House of Austria.24  Trying to be consistent with this 
rhetoric, OHiggins made overtures to the Araucanians, reminding them of their 
shared creole heritage and claiming that the Spanish were a common enemy.  He and 
other statesmen held optimism for the future in attempting to create a reformed and 
ideal state where whites and Indians could build on this common heritage.25  This 
sense of common heritage would not have existed without Chiles long frontier 
experience. 
While historians have been looking at frontier development for centuries, 
frontier studies as a sub-discipline has its roots in the writings and politics of 
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Frederick Jackson Turner. In simplest terms, for 
Sarmiento the frontier was a threat to the Republic of Argentina, while for Turner it 
was an opportunity for the United States.      
During his 1840s exile in Chile, the Argentine author and future president 
Sarmiento wrote a scathing critique of his new nations celebration of frontiersmen 
                                                 
23
 Lucio Mansilla, Una excursión a los indios Ranqueles (Buenos Aires : Editorial Universitaria, 
1966). 
24
 Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence:1808-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), 213-14. 
25
 Ibid., 215-16. 
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and argued that these American Bedouins on the outskirts of Buenos Aires were 
stifling progress.  Sarmiento added that all civilizations, whether native, Spanish or 
European, were centered in the cities and worried that Argentina was losing 
intellectual and social ground to non-urban denizens.  The statesman lamented that 
the fusion of the Spanish, indigenous and African families had produced a 
homogenous whole characterized by a love of idleness and incapacity for industry. 
For Sarmiento, only the growth of the city and education and the exigencies of social 
position could succeed in spurring (the homogenous whole) out of its customary 
pace and rescue Argentina from the clutches of the bárbaro.26   
Like Sarmientos pampa, Frederick Jackson Turners North American frontier 
was a mostly vacant area defined by its low population density.  Both authors gave 
little agency to the residents who lived outside of Turners settled area. Turner did 
concede that the frontier had some merit as a laboratory for Americanization, where 
the wilderness changed settlers of European stock through its opportunities for 
problem solving.27  In other words, neither author celebrated frontier culture, but 
Turner the historian differed from Sarmiento the statesman in his belief that the 
frontiers political and social legacies were too important to try and erase with a 
civilization campaign. 
We also have to remember that nineteenth century writers were often influenced 
by scientific racism and often engaged in stereotyping of indigenous actors on the 
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frontier.  Only recently have historians begun to refute the idea that residents of the 
frontier were stereotypes and that American residents had little to say about the 
frontier until the national period.  In fact, there are a number of other examples of 
where the fringes in the minds of statesmen and historians had actually been centers 
of economic and even intellectual activity from the early years of the Spanish Empire.  
Prominent frontier figures on both sides of the line like Miguel Caldera in Mexico 
and Pelantaro and Francisco Núñez de Pineda in Chile were the foot soldiers of 
national consciousness that liberal reformers and historians of the 19th century did not 
recognize or might not even have known about.   
Fortunately, more recent scholarship from multiple disciplines has reminded us of 
the cultural give and take of frontier life and how this played a central role in the 
development of national and regional identities.28  Herbert Bolton deserves most of 
the credit for developing the study of comparative frontiers.  He was the first to argue 
that historians of the United States and historians of Latin America had much to learn 
from sharing information about their similar colonial frontiers.29     
Study of the Chilean frontier of course began in the colonial period, and more 
recent work by anthropologists and historians has continued to probe the illusive 
question of why the Araucanians resisted conquest for centuries.  In the 19th century 
the polymath José Toribio de Medina published dozens of primary source volumes on 
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Chiles colonial past, and had thousands more documents transcribed into the archive 
that now bears his name.  The French scholar Claudio Gay made similar documentary 
contributions during the post-independence period.  Tomás Guevara opened a flurry 
of 20th-century writings on the frontier with his multivolume synthesis of Araucanian 
history, politics and culture, Historia de la civilización de Araucanía.  The historian 
and literary scholar Ricardo Latcham led the next generation, reviving interest in the 
Spanish-Araucanian epic La Araucana, and taking a closer look at the diversity of 
Chiles indigenous groups at first contact.30   
Some of the earliest work on the Chilean frontier in English came from Alfred 
Tapson, Eugene Korth and through the translation of Natan Wachtels The Vision of 
the Vanquished.31  The work of these scholars paralleled that of Chiles first 
indigenista generation, which included Alvaro Jara, Mario Góngora, and Guillermo 
Furlong.  Chiles most eminent historian, Sergio Villalobos recently lent his 
considerable prestige to the study of Chiles vida fronteriza (frontier life), and to the 
work of younger scholars like Leonardo León, Guillamme Boccarra, Margarita 
Gascón, Jorge Pinto, and Mario Orellana.32 U.S. scholars Kristine Jones and the 
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anthropologist Tom Dillehay are also doing important work on Chiles indigenous 
past.33   
It is impossible to generalize the findings of more than a century of scholarship, 
but for our purposes I will focus on one common argument about Araucanian 
resistance that helps frame my own.  Many of the aforementioned scholars have 
embraced the idea that Araucanian society went through fundamental changes in the 
16th century, allowing them to reject the Spanish advance both militarily (Wachtel) 
and culturally (Boccarra).34  I fully agree with this finding, but there is an underlying 
assumption in most scholarship that the Spanish were actively pursuing a military 
victory in their conflict with the Araucanians.  However, León, Jones and others have 
revealed that the War of Arauco was in fact composed of more trade and 
negotiation than actual battles.  My research has allowed me to take this argument a 
step further and claim that both the Spanish and Araucanians purposefully extended 
the conflict to establish a permanent frontier.  In my sources I came across repeated 
occasions where the both the Spanish and Araucanians argued in favor of maintaining 
a simmering military conflict.  Without the threat of the War of Arauco, the Spanish 
would have lost monetary support from the viceroy and the Araucanians would have 
been cut off from the gifting and trade cycle that was so important to their politics and 
economy.35  
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Chapter one of this dissertation is a discussion of how Chiles conqueror, Pedro 
de Valdivia, ironically laid the framework for the permanent frontier.  Realizing that 
Chile would not yield the quantities of precious metals that would Peru, Valdivia 
figuratively beat swords into plowshares by turning his conquerors into farmers and 
ranchers.  Valdivias hope was that Chiles rich soil and access to plentiful indigenous 
labor would attract a new generation of Spanish settlers and ensure its economic 
survival.  Lautaro, Valdivias Araucanian opponent led a stunning assault against the 
Spanish, but neither he nor his allies sought to press their advantage and take territory 
north of the Bío-Bío.   
Chapter two traces the formation of Chiles frontier economy.  Encomenderos 
rejected a less lucrative but more stable wheat economy and instead used their Indians 
in gold mining and cattle raising.  Over time both Araucanians and colonists realized 
that the War of Arauco actually brought economic benefits and both set about 
establishing patterns of war and peacemaking.  In general a permanent frontier was 
established by the turn of the century where the Araucanians and neighboring groups 
were neither to be incorporated, nor left to their own devices.  The cultural and 
economic exchange on the frontier had developed its own momentum and own rules 
that confounded the viceroy and other outsiders.     
Chapter three describes a number of experiments the crown and viceroy 
formulated to address the frustrating stalemate along the Chilean frontier.  The crown 
legalized, then abolished, then legalized again the enslavement of rebel Araucanians.  
It created a 2,000 man strong professional army along the Bío-Bío.  Spain also 
supported a Defensive War organized by Jesuits.  Finally, it sponsored expeditions 
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to the mythical city of Caesars to find and conquer an imaginary indigenous group 
that was providing aid to the Araucanians.  These experiments demonstrated that 
Spain had recognized and was willing to address the problem of the Araucanian 
frontier, but all that these changes accomplished was to reveal how entrenched the 
colonial pact had become and how difficult the economic, military and cultural 
patterns along the frontier would be to break.    
Chapter four describes how in the mid-17th century the frontier actually became 
an economic boon to powerful and unscrupulous officials who were willing to violate 
the frontiers colonial pact.  Both the Spanish and their indigenous informants 
exaggerated the presence of European enemies in Chile and the extent of their 
alliances with the Araucanians.  Sightings of Dutch or English privateers, real or 
imagined, had to at least be investigated by the viceroy.  The arrival of a search party 
meant at the very least supplies and reinforcements for the Spanish and gifts for 
information and cooperation for the Araucanians.  Under the exaggerated threat of 
European pirates, the viceroy turned a blind eye to Chilean mis- and malfeasance.  
Governors and army officials loafed, embezzled and or misused funds, and conducted 
illegal slave raids knowing that the viceroy could not risk cutting off aid to Chile.   
The avarice of one Chilean governor in particular prompted a disastrous rebellion by 
indios amigos in 1655.  This attack revealed how newly arrived Spanish officials and 
indios rebeldes alike could affect the carefully crafted colonial pact that existed 
between creole Spaniards and most Araucanians.   
This study ends in the 1680s, when a major earthquake in Peru changed Chiles 
economic role in the viceroyalty and in turn marked the beginning of a new period of 
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sedentary agriculture which brought fewer raids along the frontier.  However, I will 
explore in my conclusion how the legacy of the frontier persists even in modern 
Chile.  As a Latin Americanist in the United States I have explored the relationship 
that the Chilean frontier had to the Potosí silver mines without worrying about 
national rivalries that still exist among historians in Peru and Chile.  At the same 
time, I will argue that I am making an important contribution to the colonial 
historiography of both nations.  My interest has not been declaring a winner of the 
War of Arauco, but instead in chronicling how, and explaining why both sides wanted 
to keep it alive.   
Beyond statements affirming Spanish and Araucanian desire to maintain a 
permanent frontier, the actions of both parties also serve as evidence of their desire to 
keep the war alive.  When Spanish settlements penetrated Araucanian territory, the 
Araucanians attacked but fell back.  In response, the Spanish were understandably 
timid; their offensives rarely were more than summer raids and they failed to 
repopulate many abandoned settlements until the republican period.  Times of peace 
allowed both sides to gain strength for future campaigns, while without occasional 
military victories over worthy adversaries both sides would have been hard-pressed to 
gain the support of their peers and of their superiors alike. 
Finally, we must recognize that part of the importance of the vida fronteriza came 
in the fact that its residents found it difficult to gain credibility or notoriety outside of 
the Araucanía.  Colonists in Chile found themselves at a double disadvantage; having 
the stigma of living both in the barbarous and culturally backward Americas and 
among the savage Araucanians.   
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No one knew this better than Francisco Núñez de Pineda y Bascuñán, the most 
prominent creole of Chiles 17th century and author of Cautiverio felíz.  Núñez de 
Pineda was born in Chillán to a prominent Spanish officer and was captured by the 
Araucanians in 1629, early in his own military career.  Núñez de Pineda was the 
captive of Maulicán for a number of months where he participated in all facets of 
Araucanian life.  Decades later he published his account of his captivity in an attempt 
to defend his legacy after the story had become lampooned in a Lima theatrical 
production.  As a former captive and as a creole, Núñez de Pineda was well 
positioned to combat a growing Spanish disillusion with American reality, ...whose 
colonial societies seemed to bear little resemblance to the European utopias.36   
There was an increasing feeling in Europe and America that the colonists had 
become colonials37and were experiencing an unfortunate transculturation. The 
Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagún in New Spain mentioned that Spanish individuals 
in the colonies were beginning to act like Indians, a trend which was even truer for 
creoles.38  The Spanish feared losing their battle for America to the wild man of 
European Medieval legend, an uncultured rural dweller who was known to carry 
away women and children.  The wild man mostly reflected the Spanish view of 
savage Indians, but increasingly the Spanish were beginning to fear this character 
not only was a nemesis but also as a possible destiny.39   
Much of Cautiverio felíz then was dedicated to refuting predictions of colonial 
societys impending doom.  Núñez de Pinedas text also had to combat the 
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predominating European literary tradition that portrayed two American worlds, with 
Europe as the geo-cultural center.40  Núñez de Pineda exaggerated aspects of both 
indigenous and Spanish societies to distance creoles from the extremes and, expand 
the space in between.41  The author not only disassociated himself from 
peninsulares and their abuses and mismanagement, but also kept indigenous society 
at arms length.  He described his rejection of indigenous women as love interests and 
his disdain for the indigenous clothes he was forced to wear during his captivity, as 
evidence against the idea that Chilean culture was just a form of mestizaje.  He was 
motivated by the fear that creoles would become naked, Indianized, and white 
savages.42    Rejection of both cultures and the establishment of a third was his aim 
and the aim of many of his creole contemporaries.  
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TRABAJOS DE LA GUERRA Y TRABAJOS DEL HAMBRE.  THE 




All this was done so that messengers could be sent to His Majesty who 
would bring news of me and of this land, and to Peru so that more help would be 
sent to enter and populate it (Chile); because without gold, it has been impossible 
to bring (settlers), and even with them there has been no shortage of work here.43   
 
 
The Spanish founded Santiago de Chile in 1541, a full twenty years after Hernán 
Cortés conquered the Aztec Empire. Most of Chiles conquerors had taken part in the 
dismantling of the grand Inca Empire in Peru.  Based on this background, Chile was a 
bit of a disappointment to its first Spanish residents.  Chile had a significant 
indigenous population, but there was no empire, and little gold.44  Much of its 
territory was covered by dense forest or dry desert and a frigid and unknown ocean 
bordered all of it.  This was compounded by the fact that the Aconcagua chief and 
former Spanish prisoner Michimalongo led an attack on Santiago only a few months 
after its founding and left the settlement a smoldering ruin.45   Chiles first Spaniards 
would not have an easy time making the new colony as attractive as New Spain or 
Peru to the crown and future settlers.  However, its Spanish conquerors, led by Pedro 
de Valdivia decided to cast their lot with the new colony.   
                                                 
43
 Pedro de Valdivia, Letter to Emperador Carlos V,  Concepción, 15 October 1550, 
<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/>.  My translation. All translations are mine 
unless otherwise noted. 
44
 Recent estimates put pre-Columbian population of Chile at one million, with 500,000 living to the 
south of the Bío-Bío river.  José Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche  (Santiago: Ediciones Sur, 
1985), 15   
45
 H.R.S. Pocock, The Conquest of Chile (New York: Sten and Day, 1967), 94. 
 30 
Things quickly became even more difficult for the men who had given up healthy 
rewards in Peru for the unknown territory to the south.  When the Spanish push 
southward ran into indigenous resistance and disappointing mineral yields, Valdivia 
and his successors knew that they would have to adapt their tactics to maintain the 
interest of both the crown and the colonists in this far-flung territory.  By 1560, 
residents of Chiles south had turned the stalled conquest from a weakness to a trump 
card to play against more productive colonies in Peru, New Spain and the Caribbean.  
On the ground, the frontier where the conquest stalled became a shared means of 
subsistence between Chiles colonists and indigenous inhabitants.  In histories and 
official correspondence the precarious frontier kept Chile present in the minds of an 
insecure crown and scrambling viceroys.  This frontier life would define Chiles place 
in the Spanish Empire, in the Viceroyalty of Peru and in the minds of its own 
residents for more than a century.   
The success of Spanish conquerors in the north of Chile gave Valdivia no 
indication that his enterprise would soon experience major setbacks.  With the help of 
Prince Paullu, the Inca Manco Capacs brother, Diego de Almagro led the first 
Spanish exploration of Chile from Peru in 1535 and conquered the Andean provinces 
known to the Inca as Purumauca, Antalli, Pincu, Cauqui and Araucu.46    The Spanish 
also borrowed strategies from the Inca to quickly subdue the Atacama, Diaguita, 
Huarpe and Picunche Indians.47 (See figure 4) However, Almagro soon fell out of 
favor in the former Inca districts by bringing violence and forced labor in the newly 
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discovered territory.  Almagro responded to the murder of three of his men by 
arbitrarily (putting) to death several leading inhabitants of the district of Coquimbo 
and enslaving others.48     
At the eastern entrance to the Aconcagua valley, which would become the 
gateway to Chiles capital, Almagro decided to turn back to Peru but not before 
hearing from his scouting expeditions.  One of these expeditions reached, and named 
the port of Valparaiso, while another led by Gómez de Alvarado went southward.49 
De Alvarado reported that the further he traveled, the worse the terrain became.  Chile 
was increasingly cold, barren, and full of large and muddy rivers.  De Alvarados 
pessimism carried over into his description of the regions indigenous inhabitants. He 
said of one group, (probably the Huarpes) that they dressed in nothing but pelts and 
ate only roots.  Unwittingly building a case for their enslavement, he also likened 
them to the Arab nomads of the Moorish occupation of Iberia.50    
Alvarados opinion of Chiles indigenous inhabitants was undoubtedly worsened 
when his group met armed resistance as they moved further south in 1536.  The 
Spanish fought off an attack at the Maule River and were engaged in the skirmish 
of Reinoguelén at the junction of the Ñuble and Itata rivers.  This battle represented 
the first Spanish contact with the indigenous group that would come to be known as 
the Araucanos or Araucanians.51  The events at Reinoguelén resulted in the deaths 
of two Spaniards and the capture of scores of Araucanians.52  
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Figure 3.  Almagros route53 
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The Araucanía and Araucanians 
Less than a decade after the founding of Santiago, Pedro de Valdivia and his 
lieutenants continued south where near the Bío-Bío River they found a region that 
was more heavily populated but less politically organized than the Almagro-
conquered north. The high population density in the south was made possible by an 
abundant food supply which included fish, guanacos, pine nuts (in mountainous 
areas) seals, corn, beans and cochayuyo, an ocean plant.54  Chroniclers encountered 
Indians who feasted on shellfish, calling them savages and comilones (gluttons) 
because they ate without restraint.  Accustomed to eating pickled cod, the Spanish 
had apparently forgotten the flavor of fresh shellfish and the fact that it had to be 
eaten immediately after it was caught.55   
  The Spanish also began to understand that the regions marked geographical 
features had produced a diverse array of ethnic and linguistic groups.  Although they 
were in constant contact with one another, mountain peoples such as the Pehuenche, 
Chiquillán, and Puelche were racially, culturally and linguistically distinct from both 
the neighboring Araucanians of the plains and the Patagonians to the south.56   
                                                 
54
 Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche, 15. 
55
 Ibid., 25. 
56
 Salvador Canals Frau, Las poblaciones indígenas de la Argentina: Su origen - su pasado - su 
presente (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1953), 357.  Raul Molina, Territorio y Comunidades 
Pehuenches del Alto Bío-Bío  (Santiago, Chile: Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena, 1996), 
11.  The plains peoples include: the Araucanians, the Huilliche, and the Picunche. Territorio y 
Comunidades Pehuenches del Alto Bío-Bío, 11. 
 34 
 





Despite their ethnic differences, the geographical propinquity and mobility of 
these groups would have made it difficult for the casual observer to tell them apart.  
The Araucanía is no more than half the size of California making it very possible for 
the Spanish to encounter members of various groups in the same day.  Most Indians 
in Chiles south were divided into small, kin-based settlements, scattered seemingly 
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haphazardly about the regions green hills, making it difficult for the Spanish to 
define them politically or geographically.58  The indigenous people of Chiles south 
also had a well-developed trade network, meaning that mobility and inter-group 
contact were well established in pre-Colombian times.  Contact and mobility were 
further increased almost immediately by the arrival of Spanish horses, making the 
task of identifying, let alone controlling these groups a difficult one.59 
While the Araucanians were not the only denizens of the Araucanía, they were the 
regions most populous and most well known group.  The abundance of food and 
relative lack of precious stones and metals meant that competition for resources was 
scarce and led to the existence of a fairly egalitarian Araucanian society.  Also, the 
large-scale, empire-supporting farming that existed in the north was not necessary and 
would have been difficult to maintain in the Araucanía.  The population of the plains 
was too dense to support large tracts of land dedicated to agriculture, and the 
Araucanians practiced slash and burn (tala y roce) farming which required large 
plots to lie fallow for significant periods.   In slash and burn farming a mixture of 
small plots is required, with one always in the production stage, providing enough 
food to maintain an individual family unit.  Slash and burn economies cannot support 
the concentrated populations that sedentary agricultural can, but conceivably could be 
incorporated into a larger community with a diversified commerce or transit 
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economy.  There was certainly inter-regional trade in pre-Colombian Chile, but never 
a large enough population to make it a primary means of survival.60    
Each Araucanian family generally maintained its own farmland, without a need 
for large group labor or town-like settlements.  The need of each family for a large 
amount of land meant neighboring dwellings (rukas) were within sight, but never 
next to one another.61  The maintenance of space between individual rukas and ruka 
communities was reinforced by the belief that curses or poisoning would befall the 
families who kept their dwellings and fields too close together.62 
This settlement pattern had an important effect on Araucanian political hierarchy.  
The absence of a central village meant the absence of a central authority.  A lonko, 
usually an elder or descendent of a previous leader served as the head of a familial 
unit, but his power was limited.63  A machi or shaman was important in Araucanian 
ceremonies, but had little day-to-day influence.  In times of war, a toqui or warrior 
chief was named to make strategic decisions, but in times of peace he had little 
power.64  Although war often brought a toqui to power, it ultimately limited 
Araucanian hierarchy as conflicts over land made political organization more 
difficult.65  Lineage-based clans came together and made decisions at bi or tri-annual 
meetings called reguas or cahuines.  While some political discussion went on at these 
gatherings, their central feature was a reciprocity ceremony.  More infrequent were 
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larger gatherings of several cahuines.66  In these levos, clans traded, contracted 
marriage, performed religious ceremonies and made or organized wars.67  
The scattered settlement pattern kept the Araucanians out of the Inca Empire and 
would make their conquest by the Spanish equally difficult.68  The Spanish had found 
that the centralization of power and of settlement in indigenous empires made them 
vulnerable to political collapse over questions of succession and to demographic 
collapse due to European diseases.  In Peru for example, power was so concentrated 
in the Inca himself that the power struggle between Huascar and Atahualpa and 
Atahualpas subsequent murder sent the empire crashing down. Empires were also 
usually surrounded by jealous and angry neighbors who the Spanish enlisted as their 
allies. In Mexico the Tlaxcalans were instrumental to the fall of the Aztecs.  The lack 
of a central seat of power in Chiles south assured that regional indigenous rivalries 
(of which there were many) did not have larger implications.69    
 
Indios de Guerra 
 While Valdivia was able to found a handful of towns in the Araucanía, his 
progress was slowed by Araucanian resistance.  By the 1550s much Spanish-
Araucanian conflict was evolving into the War of Arauco, a seemingly eternal 
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struggle between the two sides that lent itself to dramatic stories (factual and 
fictitious) of combat and adventure on the eve of the Golden Age of Spanish 
literature.  Many of Valdivias contemporaries even admitted their admiration of 
Araucanian battlefield tactics, one commenting that they were so organized in combat 
that it was almost as if they had prepared against the Romans.70 Accustomed to quick 
conquests, struggles against the Araucanians became an important conundrum for 
Spanish governors, writers and soldiers alike.   
As members of Diego de Almagros expedition had reported, the Araucanians had 
developed a reputation as bellicose long before the Spanish had contact with them. 
The Inca called the Araucanians purun aukas, meaning enemy, rebel or wild.71  The 
Spanish were probably not surprised then when the Araucanians resisted Valdivias 
first attempts to push south of the Bío-Bío River.  But neither were they worried 
initially.  After all, there was no indication that the fate of the Araucanians would be 
any different from that of the Diaguitas, Atamaceños and Picunches who all 
unsuccessfully took up arms against the Spanish during the initial conquest. It soon 
became apparent however that the Araucanians had a number of circumstances in 
their favor that their northern neighbors did not.  The longer the Spanish took to 
advance, the more the Araucanians pressed these advantages.72 
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The fact that the Araucanians were mainly hunter-gatherers meant that unlike 
groups in the north, they were not dependent on crops from irrigated valleys 
vulnerable to Spanish takeover.  The souths rainy climate and multiple river 
crossings often rendered Spanish arms useless, rotting their gunpowder and 
dampening their fuses.  In the desert north there were never such problems with 
ammunition neither were there forests to hide in when the Spanish approached.  
Chiles south was full of forests.73 For the first years of contact, the Araucanians even 
avoided the catastrophic plagues that had already begun to wipe out their northern 
neighbors.74 
Although Spanish disease would eventually weaken Araucanian war making 
capacity, the arrival of the horse gave them a window of opportunity before disease 
caused them to retreat.  The first great Araucanian victory over the Spanish in 1553 
was led by Lautaro, Pedro de Valdivias former groom who understood the horses 
strategic potential.  Through theft and natural population increase the Araucanians 
soon had hundreds of their own horses.  They quickly became superb riders and 
developed saddles made of small pieces of wood and wool cushions, which were 
lighter than those of the Spanish.  This meant that Araucanian horses didnt tire as 
fast, and that the Araucanian cavalry could outrun the Spanish almost without fail.  
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The Araucanian horses burden was also lighter because the riders used little metal in 
their weapons or riding implements.75  Ironically, with Spanish estancias and 
missions moving further into the Araucanía to control the Indians, indigenous 
communities were becoming more mobile and more evasive on horseback.     
The war with the Spanish not only created a warrior class and changed the 
organization of Araucanian society.  More warriors were available with the 
appearance of a type of Indian mercenary who worked for a pre-arranged 
payment.76    Warriors began to ascend through the ranks of Araucanian society, 
something unseen in peacetime when social status was largely hereditary.  An ulmen 
could become a toqui through his war deeds.  After the arrival of the Spanish a toqui 
could become a gentoqui, or possessor of the stone hatchet, a symbol of his 
function.77  Toqui also referred to a stone hatchet. Thus, through the ritual murder of 
a Spaniard with toqui, a gentoqui retained a constant reminder of the source of his 
power and his title.  According to Guillaume Boccara, the hatchet could be 
considered as an ancestor or as a part of a petrified mythical ancestor.78  (The Inca 
used similar sacred objects (huacas) to expand their power.)  The Araucanians 
revered their ancestors, and the fact that they were present in ritual murder, integrated 
violent conflict even more into Araucanian society.  The hatchet was a tremendously 
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powerful symbol of leadership that helped re-organize Araucanian society around 
these new war chiefs.   
For many indigenous cultures, acculturation meant a break with the past.  The 
Araucanians however, ...linked the old and the new in a movement one may describe 
as a dialectic, in which the past was both preserved and restructured.   In fact, ...an  
entire society was restructured and a new equilibrium created, although this was 
accompanied by constant war against the Spanish.79 Resistance to the Spanish 
became an integral part of this changing Araucanian culture.  Horses gained a 
religious significance for their value in combat.  The scattered tribal existence was 
abandoned in order to be able to muster more quickly.80 The Araucanians also began 
to grow wheat instead of corn, for both practical and symbolic reasons.  It was part of 
the cultural incorporation process, and could be harvested before Spanish summer 
raids.81   It has also been suggested that they turned to cannibalism as a rejection of 
Christianity.82  The Araucanian use of guns and tactical adaptation was similar to that 
of the plains Indians in the United States, who like the Araucanians were not 
conquered until the nineteenth century.83  Youths learned war strategy through 
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games.84  A restructuring in almost all levels of society is uncommon among 
indigenous societies in the Spanish sphere of influence, and enabled the Araucanians 
to hold off the Spanish.85     
The relatively dense population of the Araucanía had led to some conflict among 
indigenous groups before the Spanish arrived.86  The lack of a formal justice system 
meant that conflicts were often solved by the same vendettas that were later used 
against the Spanish.  However, within Araucanian culture a system of exogamy and 
double parentage or double descent (doble filiación) assured the persistence of 
peace by containing disputes within families.87 
The Araucanians also managed to keep their alliances with other indigenous 
groups from being counter-productive, an achievement aided by a common antipathy 
for the Spanish.  Initially, the Pehuenche entered into multiple and fleeting alliances 
with Hispanic-Creole settlers, but the strain of war with the Spanish ultimately 
brought the Araucanians and Pehuenche closer. 88  Later, the Spanish would seek to 
make peace with the Araucanians through flattery, but the tactic would backfire.  
Instead of bettering the Spanish relationship with the Araucanians, these Spanish gifts 
entered the Pehuenche-Araucanian trade cycle and strengthened economic ties 
between the two indigenous groups when a spirit of cooperation was not enough.89    
Under the pressure of Spanish arms, indigenous groups responded by expanding 
an efficient and rather covert system for constructing military alliances.  Many 
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Spanish colonists also mentioned the passing of an arrow among Araucanian and 
other allied groups as a call to arms, a challenge that (the Araucanians) receive 
without wasting time or pondering reasons against it, move to make cruel war against 
their lands enemies.90  Through this challenge the news that war was on was 
quickly spread to thousands of Araucanians. 
Undoubtedly Pedro de Valdivia did not entirely appreciate the depth of these 
changes in Araucanian society, but he did recognize that adjustments would have to 
be made on his side of the Bío-Bío if the Spanish were to survive growing resistance.  
The fact that Valdivia had willingly accepted the challenge that Chile presented 
perhaps made him ideally suited to respond to it.   Valdivia had served the crown in 
Flanders and Italy, and turned down offers of spoils from the victory against the Inca 
to seek further conquests in Chile.91  Valdivias contemporaries and modern 
historians alike were at a loss to understand why Valdivia would do so, but a closer 
look will reveal that this decision made sense on multiple levels.  First of all, Valdivia 
and the members of his expedition instantly became royalty in the Kingdom of 
Chile.92  Valdivia rewarded almost all of the members of his 150-man expedition 
with encomiendas and began attempts to erase Chiles reputation as a poor and 
desolate land.93  J.H. Elliot considers these rewards disappointing and indeed they 
were according to Peruvian antecedents.94  However, as was common in other 
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Spanish colonies, these encomenderos would be the source of Chiles elite for 
centuries to come.    
Secondly, as a conqueror, Valdivia needed a challenge.95  After participating in 
such dramatic European campaigns as the Battle of Pavia, Valdivia had missed out on 
the initial conquest of Peru and was rewarded more for his loyalty in the subsequent 
civil war than his skill as a soldier.  Therefore, Valdivia gave up his encomienda and 
his silver mine in Peru in exchange for the title of Lieutenant Governor in the stalled 
conquest of Chile.  With 1,000 Indian auxiliaries, 150 Spanish soldiers and three 
Christian missionaries in tow, Valdivia arrived in Chiles central valley in 1541.96  
Valdivia thus became the first Spanish governor of Chile to seek glory in a desolate 
land against the noble savage Arauacanians.  In fact, Valdivia himself would have a 
hand in crafting both the vision of Chile and of its indigenous inhabitants that would 
become dominant throughout the colonial period and beyond.     
Valdivia was also very aware of the crowns economic needs.  The fact that the 
conqueror had rejected his Peruvian encomienda did not prevent him from rewarding 
the members of his Chilean expedition with indigenous labor and access to metals.  
Valdivia forced the Aconcagua chief Michimalongo to provide 1,200 Indians to work 
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the new colonys first significant placer mine at Marga-Marga.97  Once released from 
Spanish custody however, Michimalongo continued to torment the Spanish, leading 
the aforementioned 1541 assault of Santiago.98  This event set in motion a long 
pattern in Chile of Indian rebellion against forced labor.  
The extraction of enormous mineral wealth on the backs of the indigenous was of 
course not unique to Chile and was quickly becoming a trend across the Americas, 
aided by loopholes in measures designed to protect aborigines.  Long before they set 
foot in Chile, or in the Americas for that matter, the Spanish had developed guidelines 
for the categorization and treatment of indigenous peoples.  These guidelines began to 
be developed centuries before in the cross-cultural encounter that was the Crusades.  
To the Spanish, captive Muslims had attacked Christendom and ipso facto 
Christianity itself, and were to be treated as slaves in the context of this just war.  
But how should the Iberians treat the West Africans encountered by the Portuguese in 
the 13th century who had no exposure to Christianity?   This conundrum was 
addressed by the writings of Cardinal Henry of Susa (Hostiensis).  Hostiensis 
postulated when Christ came into the world, temporal as well as spiritual lordship 
over all its peoples passed immediately to Him.  According to his argument, those 
that did not accept Christianity were recalcitrant persons against whom a just war 
could be waged.99   
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Queen Isabella and her successors chose a more forgiving tone when it came to 
the inhabitants the Americas.  She argued that the indigenous inhabitants of the 
Americas had become vassals of the Crown and as such were free, and even had 
Columbus free the Indians he brought back to Spain with him.  However, there were 
two important exceptions to this freedom.  Indians could be legally enslaved in a just 
war where they had attacked or rejected Spanish authority and could remain slaves if 
they were already in the service of other Indians.100   
Those Indians who were not immediately enslaved did not fare much better.  
These pagans were funneled into the repartimiento system where they were 
distributed to Spanish conquerors to be cared for, put to work and instructed in the 
Christian faith.101 In many areas the repartimiento and encomienda co-existed and in 
others the latter replaced the former.  What links them in all areas however is the fact 
that neither ever became a means of protecting Indians.  Instead, encomenderos often 
abused the Indians under their care.  Many denounced the mistreatment, but there was 
little action taken in the Americas to stop it.102   
The crown and the church did at least acknowledge the problem of forced labor.  
The bull Sublimus Deus was issued in 1537 as a response to reports of Spanish 
cruelty in the Americas, but it had little immediate effect in Chile or anywhere else in 
the Indies.  The bull would however influence future debate by declaring that the 
Indians were true men and were not to be enslaved.103   
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Seeing that their contemporaries in the Caribbean and New Spain had essentially 
been given carte blanche to abuse the regions Indians, the Spanish conquerors of 
Peru employed great cruelty in their destruction of the Inca Empire.  They 
demonstrated that they too saw the Indians as inferior and impure heretics.104  The 
Spanish did not wantonly destroy everything Inca however, recognizing that they 
could usurp some of the fallen empires administrative techniques. In Peru, the 
Spanish pattern of employing conquered Indians in manual labor projects worked 
relatively seamlessly, as encomenderos became the new beneficiaries of the Inca mita 
system of labor obligations, organized into local ayllus (family groups).105   
It soon became apparent that encomenderos were doing a miserable job fulfilling 
their obligation to protect and instruct the Indians entrusted to their care, unable even 
to keep them alive.  As thousands of Indians in Peru begun to succumb to over-work 
and disease, the encomiendas could no longer be evenly distributed along ayllu lines.  
The encomenderos were forced to violate a number of encomienda regulations in 
order to keep up with labor demands, principally among them the prohibition on 
moving Indians from one place to another in their attempt to create larger 
concentrations of mineworkers.106  This trend worried the crown and prompted 
additional yet equally unsuccessful attempts to control the encomienda institution.  In 
the meantime, it was clear that even with the shell of a tribute collecting empire in 
place the Spanish could not or would not adhere to encomienda guidelines.  In the 
imperfect situation that was the conquest of far-flung Chile, encomenderos had even 
freer reign and regulations were blatantly ignored. 
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The crown had anticipated an attempt by encomenderos to resist all control to 
their authority transform themselves into a European-style hereditary nobility.107 In 
an attempt to avoid class divisions among the conquistadors, the crown made nobles 
out of very few of them.  The crown also took steps to keep encomiendas non-
hereditary, reinforcing the idea of service and reward.  He who most served the crown 
would be rewarded, in this case with an encomienda.108  Competition for 
encomiendas curbed feudalism, but still hurt crown authority in that it led to political 
infighting and in some cases civil war.   
Responding to Sublimus Deus and further reports of Spanish abuses in the Indies, 
Charles V issued the New Laws in 1542, which reinforced the royal ban on 
indigenous slavery109 and dictated that encomiendas would revert to the crown upon 
the death of their holder.110  While the New Laws did slow enslavement of Indians to 
some degree, the latter provision infuriated encomenderos. 111  Perus encomenderos 
openly defied the crown when the New Laws arrived in the Americas.  The Pizarro 
brothers and their contemporaries rebelled against and eventually killed Perus first 
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Viceroy Blasco Núñez Vela whose unenviable task was trying to rein in the siblings 
power.112 
The revolt in Peru kept the crown from paying much attention to some of the 
same encomendero defiance in Chile. As in the rest of the Americas, demand for 
indigenous labor in Chile stemmed from the Spanish distaste for manual labor, the 
small Spanish population, a shortage of African slaves, and a lack of beasts of 
burden.113  It was not impossible to get African slaves in Chile but there was much 
higher demand and more capital to purchase them in the ports of Lima and later 
Buenos Aires. 114   Interruptions in the trans-Atlantic trade and local plagues kept 
demand up in Buenos Aires while many of the slaves that made it across the Andes 
into Chile often ended up in Lima. 115  At one point, the Governor of Chile even 
declared that anyone taking an African slave from Chile to Lima would be fined 500 
pesos.116     
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  The crown did try and reduce a need for African slaves by protecting Chiles 
indigenous population, stipulating that aborigines were not to be forced to work in 
placer mines.  If Chiles Indians decided voluntarily to work in the mines the crown 
mandated that they were to be paid a percentage of the gold they extracted.  However, 
little was or could be done from Spain to see that this royal order was enforced.  In 
fact, the same order began with a statement on how important gold mining was to the 
royal treasury and a promise of royal help in aiding the extraction of the metal.117  
Therefore comes as no surprise that Chilean encomenderos treated Indians as de facto 
slaves, helping them make a fortune in placer mining.118  Since this type of mining 
involved being partially immersed in water most of the day even in the winter 
months, it was not long before local workers began succumbing to these terrible 
conditions.119  A seventeenth century Augustinian and Indian advocate claimed there 
had been as many as 300,000 Indians between La Imperial and Valdivia providing 
gold to the crown, most of whom disappeared due to plague, continued wars and 
calamities.120  To replace these workers, encomenderos repeated the  actions of their 
contemporaries in Peru and began to openly violate prohibitions against moving 
encomienda Indians, forcing them hundreds of miles from their homes to work on 
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their estancias and in their mines. 121  In one case, encomienda Indians from the trans-
Andean province of Cuyo would make a seasonal trek over the hundreds of 
kilometers between Santiago and La Serena.122   
Much of this permissiveness can be explained by the actions of Pedro de Valdivia.  
Circumstances dictated that Valdivia keep his encomenderos on the longest of 
leashes.  For example to avoid rebellion after the viceroy failed to re-supply Chile for 
years, Valdivia freed all the members of his expedition of their debts, dramatically 
tearing up the sheets upon which the debts were recorded.123  For a time, Valdivia 
even left Chile, traveling to Peru in 1548 to join the side of the Viceroy against 
rebellious encomenderos.124  Upon his return to Chile, Valdivia continued to design 
his legacy and Chiles around the strength of encomenderos and access to indigenous 
labor.  Valdivia saw enough gold extracted to keep the interest of royal authorities 
and attract reinforcements, but knew that enough had not been discovered (nor would 
it be) to compete with Peruvian precious metals.     
Although Valdivia was able carve out a uniquely Chilean legacy, no one in the 
Spanish Americas of the 16th century could escape the long shadow of Potosís silver 
mountain and it did not take long for the great irony that was Chiles economic 
relationship with Peru to present itself.  Chile owed its existence to Perus silver 
mines, but the colony constantly was pitted against the viceregal capital for resources 
and control of its future.  First of all, Potosís mountain of silver consumed mules 
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from Córdoba, coca from Cuzco and would soon attract Indian slaves from 
Southern Chile.125  While Peru provided a potential market for Chilean tallow (for 
candle making), and to a lesser extent wine, corn and wheat, 126 it also competed with 
Chile for laborers and had its own supply of wheat that drove Chilean prices down.127   
There were also security considerations in Chiles relationship to Peru.  Potosí 
silver was loaded onto ships at the Peruvian port of Arica, just north of Chile, making 
that port vulnerable to pirates.  Even as the Araucanians presented more and more 
problems, the crown could not abandon Chile and ignore the need to protect its 
precious metal and the territory from which it was extracted.   
With these developments in mind, Valdivia decided that his, and Chiles gift to 
the crown would not be riches, but suffering and sacrifice.  Valdivia could not follow 
the path of the Pizarros whose exploits brought much prestige to the crown, but 
eventually hubris caused them to rebel.  Instead, Valdivia and his encomenderos 
would make the crown proud by beating their swords into plowshares and 
establishing an indelible settlement in Chile through their hard work.  Valdivia began 
to laud the fertility of Chiles soil and hoped this new encomendero class would use 
the huge tracts of land he had granted them to develop into productive ranchers and 
farmers.  Valdivia saw the earth and the people as fertile and exploitable.  His 
language reflected a need for settlement, and not the epic descriptions of military 
glory employed by most conquerors. 
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I saw to it that the yanaconillas and Indian servants that we brought to Peru 
were put to work in the mines, and they did help us with good disposition.  
We carted them food from the city twelve leagues away, sharing what we had 
for our own sustenance and that of our children; the food we had sown and 
harvested with our own hands and work.128   
 
Valdivia was quick to realize that Chile was the end of his travels, (his wife was 
on her way to join him from Spain when he died)129 and his success there depended 
on getting others to settle around him.130  His letters as a result, painted an extremely 
idealistic portrait of Chile.131     
Valdivia placed so much emphasis on attracting settlers because he and many 
members of his expedition felt that this propaganda was essential to their very 
survival.  Geronimo de Vivar, one of Valdivias soldiers, wrote that after four years 
with no re-supply, the colonists clothing was in tatters and most had begun to wear 
beaver and sea lion pelts.  Vivar added that no mass had been held for five months as 
the Spanish had run out of wine.  The lack of re-supply also meant that the main 
focus of (colonists) was planting and growing to be able to maintain and perpetuate 
this land for His Majesty,132 which left little time for exploits on the battlefield.  
Therefore, the exploits that colonists in Chile would relate to the crown had little to 
do with glory, and everything to do with survival.  Valdivia and Vivar expressed the 
value of their labors of hunger (trabajos del hambre) rather than the usual labors 
of war (trabajos de la guerra).  Trabajos de hambre were carried out with much 
sacrifice and little glory.  As such, sacrifice replaced glory as a means of gaining 
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favor with and gifts from the crown.133   
While the Spanish did scramble to grow their own food, a lack of re-supply from 
the viceroy meant that their survival in Chile depended on economic and cultural 
exchange on the frontier that would permanently link the Spanish and Araucanians.  
The indios de servicio in the central valley had already demonstrated that without 
their help, the Spanish suffered great calamities as they were devoid of 
commerce with other kingdoms.  These calamities occurred after Michimalongos 
revolt inspired indios de servicio to literally run for the hills, where they would be out 
of the reach of encomenderos.134  While resistance in the central valley was fleeting, 
more constant resistance near the Bío-Bío meant that the Spanish would have to be 
sustained by a mixture of indios de servicio and resources from Indians and areas that 
were not under their hegemony.  This exchange of resources was not always cordial 
but brought the Spanish and Araucanians together nonetheless.  For example, the fact 
that the Araucanians had taken dozens of Spanish captives meant that not only were 
the Spanish duty bound to try and rescue the captives, but that miscegenation on both 
sides of the Bío-Bío was creating a generation of mestizo children.  These children 
would come to define the legacy of the frontier long after Lautaro and Valdivia were 
gone.135   
In addition to cultural developments, raids from both sides created a kind of 
frontier economic codependence. While the Spanish failed to subjugate the 
                                                 
133
 Lucía Invernizzi Santa Cruz, Los trabajos de la guerra y Los trabajos del hambre: Dos ejes del 
discurso narrativo de la Conquista de Chile (Valdivia, Vivar, Góngora Marmolejo), Revista Chilena 
de Literatura  36 (1990): 7-9.  
134
 Pedro Mariño de Lobera, Crónica del Reino de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 26.  
135
 As a means of demonstrating their commitment to the aforementioned rejection through 
incorporation, the Araucanians would occasionally return female Spanish captives naked below the 
waist and pregnant. Stephen E. Lewis, Myth and the History of Chiles Araucanians, Radical 
History Review, 58 (Winter 1994), 119. 
 55 
Araucanians as a whole, they did take a number of Indian captives who were to 
replace declining numbers of Picunche and Huarpe laborers.136  On the other hand, 
the Araucanians would often look forward to Spanish summer raids when they could 
seize swords, armor and gunpowder.  In desperate times, the Spanish were even 
known to trade gunpowder to the Indians for food.137  Although war was 
understandably the focus of most Spanish sources, in daily life on the frontier there 
were infinitely more moments of Araucanian and Pehuenche traders traveling down 
from the mountains, or Spanish ranchers searching for lost livestock in the foothills, 
than there were moments of epic battle.  The paths of the Araucanians and Spanish 
crossed quite often, and although they did not always get along, their relationship 
based on mutual benefit kept them coexisting for the greater part of a century.    
We should not give the impression that the Spanish stayed the course in Chile 
only because they were obligated.  Despite diminishing returns, the Spanish had not 
given up on the prospect of future gold extraction.  Even without gold, there was 
economic growth in the form of the growing Peruvian market for agricultural 
produce leading to the existence of modestly prosperous farming communities in 
the fertile valleys north of the river Bío-Bío.138    
Myth also maintained optimism about Chiles future.  In 1552 and 1553 Valdivia 
sent Gerónimo de Alderete, Francisco de Villagra and Pedro de Villagra on separate 
expeditions to find the Lost City of Caesars and the North Sea, or the Atlantic 
Ocean.139 The Villagra cousins explored a good deal of the mountains of Neuquén, 
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the region lying directly to the south of Cuyo, before they were interrupted by 
Valdivias death and had to return to Chile.  The Spanish had long heard of and 
imagined a large and rich empire in the Andes, but it took them over thirty years to 
reach Cuzco.  Couldnt the same thing happen in Chile?       
Chilean settlers also felt that there still was plenty of indigenous labor to be had 
for both metal extraction and farming.140  Chilean colonists continued to look for 
labor on the eastern slope of the Andes141 and still held out hope that the Araucanians 
could be converted into laborers on a wider scale.   Although their settlements were 
scattered they could be organized under Spanish control as Pedro de Valdivia 
demonstrated when he divided encomiendas of conquered Araucanians according to 
their own levos. Araucanian labor would now be even easier to divide, as the Indians 
had developed larger and more organized territorial divisions to defend themselves 
against the Spanish.142  The Spanish had also observed that the Araucanians even had 
at least a rudimentary labor tribute system.  Ruka construction was performed by 
teams of laborers or cullas who received a feast or mingaco as payment when the 
dwelling was completed.143  
Finally, Chilean colonists realized that a frontier existence didnt necessarily 
equate to failure or a lack of opportunity.  Often, just the opposite is the case.  While 
in Europe and American urban areas the frontier was the domain of the 
aforementioned wilde man, frontier residents in Chile and all over the Americas 
                                                 
140
 Villalobos, Tres siglos de vida fronteriza, 19. 
141
 David Rock, Argentina 1516-1987 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 12. 
142
 Zapater, La búsqueda de la paz, 89-90. 
143
 Dillehay, Araucania: Presente y Pasado. Mingaco labor was instrumental in many Spanish and 
Chilean public works projects until 1821, especially in the construction of churches.  Mingaco still 
exists in some outlying areas.  Diego de Rosales, Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes 
Indiano, Tomo I (2nd ed., Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1989), 145.   
 57 
saw it differently. 144   Whether it was elite families operating in Brazils massive 
captaincy grants, venture capitalists in colonial Georgia, or Valdivia in Chile, frontier 
denizens realized and at least tried to convince colonial authorities and European 
monarchs that the frontier could be a source of wealth and prestige and that these far-
flung territories were worth keeping.145  In some cases colonists were able to use legal 
channels to expand their influence, but in Chile frontier residents profited from the 
frontier by often unscrupulously expanding the campaign against the Araucanians.  
The expansion of military operations would allow officials to skim from soldier 
salaries and supplies and to engage in illegal slave taking raids.  
Ultimately though, it was a military balance of power which made this frontier 
exchange both necessary and possible.  This balance of power was most dramatically 
illustrated in 1553 when Pedro de Valdivia was killed by a group of Araucanians led 
by Lautaro. Armed with the euphoria of the victory over Valdivia and the knowledge 
that the Spanish would return to the south if not driven out of Chile, Lautaro led an 
Araucanian offensive in 1557. After months of northward marching, Lautaro was 
nearing Santiago when he was headed off by the Spanish and killed in a battle with 
the new governor, Francisco de Villagra.146 Lautaro had brought organization and 
confidence to his army, revamping battle tactics to focus on long campaigns rather 
than brief and regional skirmishes, and convincing his troops that the Spanish and 
their horses were separate beasts.   
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While Lautaro indeed failed to drive the Spanish out of Chile, indios rebeldes for 
generations performed ceremonies rejecting Spanish authority much like the one 
surrounding the death of Valdivia. Diego de Rosales, a 17th-century Jesuit missionary 
and historian collected accounts of the killing from Araucanians and Spaniards and 
wrote the most extensive and most accepted account of the killing.    
Hearing that Valdivia had been ambushed, fourteen cavalrymen were sent to 
assist him.  Seven were killed, their heads cut off and shown to the captured Valdivia.   
An infinite multitude had congregated...women, children and elders along 
with the troops of soldiers, that there were, they made a ring, and planted in 
the middle of the Toques, the lances, and arrows, making a great circle, the 
chiefs and ancients from all around, they called to bring out Valdivia, and in 
the middle of the wheel, they would take his life.   
 
Valdivia was felled by a blow to the head with a club. With that, his captors  
...raised their voices, and their lances over dead body, stomping the earth 
with their feet, and making it shake, to make it understood that the earth 
trembled with their bravery.  Upon this one arrived, and ripping him open 
from the throat to the chest with a knife, he reached his hand into him, and 
removed the heart by ripping it out, and while beating, and squirting blood, he 
showed it to everyone, and smearing the toquis and the arrows with blood, he 
cut it into small pieces, that all the chiefs ate, and the rest licked up the blood, 
and all of those in the group that touch a part of the body, are sworn to unite 
their arms, and to have their hearts against the Spanish.  They cut off his head 
soon after and made flutes from his thighbones and (his head) put on a stake, 
they sang a victory song around it, and had a long celebration with toasts and 
acts of joy, at seeing their nation liberated.  Later, ..they left the body for the 
birds and wild animals, and took the head and nailed it to the door of the 
house of the great Caupolicán, principal author of this trophy, and around it 
put the heads of some Spaniards, distributing others among different 
provinces, to bring devotion to them.  They even used the heads of the horses 
as trophies.  Finally, they cooked the head of Valdivia, and while all were 
intoxicated yet solemn, Caupolicán took out the head, and drank chicha from 
the skull, offering a toast to all of the chiefs greater than him.  This head kept 
watch outside of his house, as if it were a link to an ancestor, and they pass it 
down to his descendants.  (Even in times of peace the Araucanians would not 
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give this skull back to the Spanish, no matter what the offered price.)  When 
there is to be an uprising, they take it out to provoke rebellion.147 
 
The Araucanians understood that there were two levels of Spanish power, that of 
leaders and that of the collective society that supported them.  The Araucanians took 
care of the leaders through ritual murder, but could not kill Spanish society.  
Instead, they tried to dominate it.  They did this in a variety of ways.  First of all, 
when warriors returned from an expedition against the Spanish, they would often 
dress like the enemy.  ...During combat the warriors did everything possible in order 
to capture an object that would symbolize the other.148  The Araucanians also began 
to use iron, let their beards grow, and incorporate horses into their warfare and 
ceremonies.  This way, the Araucanians could assimilate the qualities of the 
Spanish and in turn be less culturally dominated by them.  Another step in this plan 
was to fully integrate lower-ranking Spanish captives into Araucanian society.  They 
were not allowed to speak Spanish, wore Araucanian clothes, were shaved and put to 
work.  Female captives were given to Araucanian men, and mestizo children were 
fully integrated into indigenous society.149  This integration was even more effective 
when we take into account the Spanish fear that American born colonists were 
descending into savagery.150  By integrating Spanish symbols into their culture, the 
Araucanians robbed them of their power.  This was one half of the process of 
rejection through incorporation.  The other was exocannibalism.151 
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According to Clifford Geertz, when a ritual incorporates a feast of some kind, 
these sensuous symbols152 of food and drink make the ritual easier to remember and 
understand.  Catherine Bell might add that Valdivias ritual murder was effective 
because it communicated on multiple sensory levels.153  There was shouting, 
stomping of the feet, the gruesome murder itself and the feasting.  Most importantly, 
all of the community was involved. 
The eating of the heart was not just a sensory experience, but a spiritual one as 
well. For the Araucanians, the heart or Piuke ...was considered the place of decision, 
will... and feelings.  This means that the best way for the Araucanians to assimilate 
the qualities of the enemy was to literally digest him.  The consumer achieved a 
symbolic gaining of the life substance of the captives body.  The making of flutes 
out of Valdivias leg bones also begins to make sense in the context of this 
incorporation of qualities.  Mapudungun is the Araucanian language.  The verb 
dungun means to both talk and to play music.  By playing the bone flutes, the soul of 
Valdivia would have been made to sing or speak, providing the Araucanians with 
more Spanish knowledge and power.  Contacting their dead through music was an 
important Araucanian practice.  Perhaps the contacting of the Spanish dead would 
have lead to greater assimilation.   
Decapitation also was involved in assimilation.  The head was a symbol of the 
enemys bravery... and the source of his prestige.  The person in possession of a 
severed head absorbed some of its qualities, as thought and perception were believed 
to reside there. As mentioned, the skull was incorporated into traditional Araucanian 
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rites as a drinking vessel.   The Araucanians would also often make a hat from the 
jawbone of a Spanish victim.  This procedure evolved from the tradition of wearing 
the jaw of and absorbing the traits of a ferocious animal.  This cap displayed a 
warriors bravery and ferocity.154   There is also the possibility that this decapitation 
was a response to a Spanish act.  Michimalongos 1541 attack on Santiago was 
stopped only by the legendary actions of Inés de Suárez, Pedro de Valdivias mistress 
and the first European woman in Chile.  Suárez demoralized the attackers by 
decapitating several of their captive chiefs, and throwing their bodies toward the 
attackers.155 
This throwing of the body resembles a deeply symbolic Araucanian gesture.  
When the Araucanians were through with the heart, head, and bones of a sacrificial 
victim, what remained of the body was flung with disdain toward his territory of 
origin.156  Once the Araucanians had incorporated all the spiritually significant parts 
of the body into their society, they had achieved what David Kertzer calls 
condensation, whereby one symbol can represent and unify a rich diversity of 
meanings.157  The throwing of the body was the last and most important meaning to 
be extracted from this singular symbol.  By throwing it, the Araucanian made it 
known that this ceremony was ultimately a rejection of Spanish power.  The fact that 
the body was thrown from whence it came suggests that this ceremony developed 
after the Spanish had arrived.  All Araucanians, despite any political rivalries, came 
from the same place.  The Araucanians would not need to incorporate uniquely 
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Araucanian qualities from the heart or skull of one of their own.  This ritual 
developed its meaning in its response to the other that came from over there.   
As a successful rite of rebellion must do, the value of Araucanian ritual killing 
went beyond the ceremony itself.  The ritual killing was part of the larger creation of 
a warrior class.    As mentioned, the rite was a sacrifice to Pillán, the Araucanian 
creator god who was said to have a great respect for warriors.  Pillán took ulmenes 
(family heads) who died fighting the Spanish to heaven, and sent the souls of these 
dead warriors to lead the living chiefs.  The pink color of the sky during sunsets was 
said to be the blood of warriors mixed with the sun.158  It appears that the cult of 
Pillán became stronger as the war continued. 
Another part of ritual murder that unified the warrior cult was the gift. As in 
Marcel Mauss example of Pacific island cultures, ...gifts are rendered, received and 
repaid both obligatorily and in ones own interest, in magnanimity, for repayments of 
services, or as challenges or pledges.159  In Araucanian warrior culture a gift usually 
functioned as a challenge.  The giving and returning of heads, bodies, captives, etc., 
created a competition among warriors of various family units.  The debt cycle could 
only be closed when a gift was returned, i.e. when another Spaniard was killed. 
However, Lautaros death demonstrated how the power of a toqui was also 
restricted by these very factors.  If a toqui were killed, there was usually no 
immediate successor, explaining why the Araucanian uprising stalled with Lautaros 
demise.  Lautaros power came directly from Valdivias blood on his toqui (hatchet) 
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and none of his lieutenants would have had such a direct connection to killing and the 
subsequent usurpation of the enemys powers.  Toquis were also regional, meaning 
that the complicated alliances that were forged in general uprisings just as easily 
could fall apart as Araucanian troops advanced through and especially out of the 
Araucanía.  Part of Lautaros defeat must also be attributed to disease.  A typhoid 
outbreak around this time killed as much as one third of the Araucanian population.  
Its effect on the battlefield was the most dramatic and the most damaging as Spanish 
soldiers witnessed Araucanians succumbing to vomiting spells as they prepared for 
battle.160     
By 1560 then, both the Spanish and Araucanians knew that they had reached a 
balance of power on the frontier and that neither would be able to emerge as a clear 
victor in the War of Arauco.161  Two important reactions to this stalemate would 
come to define the frontier for decades to come.  First of all, both sides would accept 
that they would be defined by their relationship to the frontier other.  The 
Araucanians were divided between indios de guerra and indios de paz, but the former 
were defined by their rejection of, and the latter by their negotiation within Spanish 
culture.  The Spanish recognized that without trade with the Araucanians and without 
access to their labor, they could not survive economically.  Secondly, neither side was 
willing to let the viceroy or the crown in on their little secret; that the war would not 
be won by either side.  Colonists exhorted the crown to keep sending resources 
dedicated to ending the War of Arauco, knowing full well that the crown could not 
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send a massive army to a faraway land with little economic potential.  At the same 
time they knew that the crown did not want to lose Chile and that they could count on 
at least some clothing, settlers and weapons.  Indios de guerra needed fresh Spanish 
victims in their gifting cycle and also benefited from their own raids of the very 
Spanish supplies that were meant to defeat them.  On the other hand, both indios de 
paz and repentant indios rebeldes could expect gifts every time a new Spanish 
governor arrived. By 1560 colonists had come to realize that they needed both the 




























  LABOR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER.  CHILES FRONTIER ECONOMY 









As we saw in the previous chapter, scholars of the Spanish conquest of the 
Americas have quite successfully explained what on the surface seemed to be one of 
the great incongruities of the era.  Why did the seemingly powerful Aztec and Inca 
empires fall so readily to a handful of Spanish conquerors, while groups like the 
Araucanians and Chichimecs who weaker economically, politically and 
numerically resist conquest for centuries?163 
By 1560, Spanish residents of Chile had come to the realization (although modern 
historians may express it differently) that it was not only easier to conquer 
concentrated empires, but the transition to a post-conquest society was easier if some 
of the edifices of empire were left in place.164 Again the phrase, there is only one 
Peru came to mind for Chilean colonists. This time the admonition reminded them 
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that they would have to build their political and cultural authority from the ground up 
and would experience resistance every step of the way.   
Many acknowledged that Chiles conquest had in effect ended with the death of 
its conqueror, and on both sides of the Bío-Bío adjustments were made to deal with 
this new reality.  For many, the story of the 16th century is that of the War of 
Arauco; a failed conquest and a tale of barbarous deeds from both sides.  The 16th 
century was also regarded as one of economic failure by encomenderos in Peru who 
wanted Chile to provide food so that their Indians could be freed up to work in mines.  
For them, every year the War of Arauco persisted was a year of decreased profits for 
Peru.   
Indeed, there was fighting, and there was abuse, but as Richard White reminds us, 
within a war the periods of actual armed conflict are very brief and can blur our 
attempts to understand frontier exchange.  On the Bío-Bío frontier or in Whites 
middle ground even episodes of violence are not always acts of war.  Violence was 
often inextricably bound up with commerce in that it was an option both for 
acquiring goods and for protecting them.165  What really took place then during the 
first decades of the War of Arauco was frontier acculturation through negotiation.   
This stalemate was a sobering situation, but one that Valdivia had prepared the 
colony for and one which became quite successful in defining its own rules and 
procedures during the latter half of the 16th century.  The events of the late 16th 
century would lay the groundwork for a society and an economy that would grow 
quite accustomed to frontier negotiation or the colonial pact and would resist the 
                                                 
165
 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 75. 
 67 
needs of the viceregal center. The lessons of the 16th century would allow many in the 
17th to purposefully perpetuate frontier warfare to benefit from it.   
While Lautaro and other indios rebeldes of the Araucanía deserve a good deal of 
credit for holding off the Spanish, the region offered challenges apart from 
indigenous resistance.  First of all, the region was hard to get to.166  One option for 
arriving at the front began with a walk of more than a week from Santiago to the port 
of Valparaiso, where soldiers would board a ship for Concepción.  The voyage to 
Concepción was not usually a long one, but could be plagued with bad weather and 
unfavorable winds.  Once in Concepción, the soldiers had another several-day trek to 
the front.  This process of course required ships, which were not plentiful in the 
sixteenth century.  Another option was to walk south for months from Santiago.  A 
shortage of horses and indigenous porters meant that the soldiers were usually tired 
before they reached the front, some of them even drowning while trying to ford one 
of the regions many turbid rivers.167  For a while in the 16th century there was even 
talk of moving the capital south from Santiago to be closer to the War.     
 Many of the initial adventure seekers who arrived with Valdivia had settled 
down or been killed, and it was soon up to a few hundred new and mostly unhappy 
arrivals to pursue the war. Being at the tip of the Spanish empire meant that their pay, 
provisions and food were all insufficient.  Some soldiers had actually been banished 
to Chile.  When soldiers wintered in Santiago, instead of gaining strength, many 
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succumbed to disease, while others deserted.168  Those soldiers not conscripted were 
often aspiring bureaucrats who recognized that volunteering for the War of Arauco 
was the best way to gain the governors favor. These volunteers usually were leaving 
behind lands and families, reducing their willingness to stay for a long campaign.169 
Many soldiers were in fact encomenderos from haciendas near Santiago who took 
their own indios de servicio to the front.  When they returned to Santiago in the 
winter, the Indians often fled or stayed in the south.      
Despite these difficulties, or perhaps because of them, residents of the frontier had 
scratched out a means of survival by the 1560s.  Life on the frontier represented a 
delicate balancing act that only the residents understood, and that was easily 
interrupted by newly arrived governors.  Father Juan de Torralba wrote from Santiago 
in 1569 that in the aftermath of Lautaros attack, Governor García Hurtado de 
Mendoza had returned stability to the colony and had earned the respect of the indios 
de guerra through his success against them on the battlefield.  For Torralba, the 
greatest threat to frontier stability was the revolving door that was the governorship.  
No sooner did experienced administrators and commanders like Hurtado de Mendoza 
gain the respect of colonists and Indians, than they submitted details of their exploits 
to the crown and were sailing north.  In fact, Hurtado de Mendozas success in Chile 
later helped him become the Viceroy of Peru.  Torralba argued that Hurtado de 
Mendozas successors failed to live up to his legacy and did little to protect indios 
amigos or gain the respect of indios de guerra.  According to Torralba, one of these 
incompetent replacements ignored the military advice of colonists and instead placed 
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his inexperienced associates in charge of the pacification of the Indians.  According 
to Torralba, in 1568 these inexperienced soldiers went without order or consultation 
to retake a fort and instead provoked a counterattack.   
This pattern was one that would persist for more than a century in Chile.  
Experienced governors who understood the vida fronteriza would leave, only to be 
replaced by green administrators who in their desire to pad their hoja de servicio 
(service record) would upset the balance of the frontier.  During the rest of the 16th 
century and for most of the 17th then there was a constant tension between new 
arrivals or peninsulares who wished to make a name for themselves on the frontier, 
and creoles, mestizos, and indios amigos who knew and lived on the frontier and bore 
the brunt of the cavalier attitude of many of these new governors.  As Father Torralba 
put it, incompetent governors and judges were making life impossible for poor men 
and officials who have nothing more than their jobs, disturbing their wives, homes 
and children and taking goods from merchants without paying for them.170    
 This is not to say that creole encomenderos did not have a role in angering 
Araucanians by perpetuating personal service.  By the 1560s placer mining was 
yielding diminishing returns, and indigenous labor was becoming scarce.171  Despite 
this decline in available labor however, encomenderos resisted making changes that 
would reverse it.  Albeit for disparate reasons, officials in both Peru and Chile wanted 
to limit personal service which saw Indians paying tribute to the crown through their 
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labor, rather than in specie or goods.  This practice had been banned on several 
occasions as it equated to de facto slavery.   
Officials in Peru rallied against it since it delayed the advent of Chile as a 
provider of foodstuffs.  Under personal service the profit margin in mining was 
exponentially higher than it would have been in agriculture or ranching.  As long as 
encomenderos were not obligated to pay their workers in gold, as they were legally 
bound to do, they would ignore less profitable but more stable industries.  Fewer 
Indians dedicated to agriculture in Chile meant fewer exports to Peru.  The crown of 
course did not discourage gold extraction in Chile, but this was a minor industry 
compared to what Potosí was producing.  As far as the viceroy was concerned, the 
carrera (Spanish merchant fleet) lived and died by silver and the role of other 
colonies was to support Potosí through the Pacific inshore trade.172  The viceroy 
could not help that some silver disappeared through internal transactions and 
smuggling, but he was perturbed when colonies like Chile made its extraction more 
difficult. 
Viceregal regulation of encomiendas had begun disastrously with the murder of 
Núñez de Vela, but by the 1550s new viceroys were bold enough and the situation 
was desperate enough for them to make another attempt at curbing abuse. Chilean and 
Peruvian officials alike had observed that personal service was largely responsible for 
the decline of Indian labor whether through death and disease or rebellion. Thus, in 
1557 the viceroy appointed a member of the Audiencia de Lima, Hernando de 
Santillán y Figueroa to observe and improve the treatment that Indians in Chile 
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received.  Santillán first traveled to La Serena where local and imported Indian 
workers were dying from the harsh conditions of nearby mines.  Santillán quickly 
sought to remedy this situation by declaring that Indians could not be used as beasts 
of burden, that no more than a fifth of Indians from a given encomienda could be 
used in gold washing, and that workers would get a weekly salary in the form of 
one-sixth of the ore they extracted.   Santillán also pronounced that Indians were to 
be fed and clothed properly, that no additional tribute was to be exacted, and that they 
were to attend mass.  As he left La Serena, Santillán set free all the yanaconas 
attached to encomiendas, noting that if they voluntarily consented to work in the 
mines, their Spanish employers would have to provide them with food, implements, 
and a salary amounting to one-fourth of the product of their labor.173   
As he moved south to Santiago, Santillán found conditions to be even worse than 
those in La Serena.  There the oidor observed the treatment of Indians and the local 
political climate for months and developed a set of regulations collectively called the 
Tasa de Santillán that he believed would be acceptable to both the crown and Chiles 
encomenderos.  The tasa began to phase out Indian porters, and arranged for 
domestication of draft animals.  It limited the number of months per year Indians 
could work in mines and set punishment guidelines for non-conforming 
encomenderos.  In 1558 Santillán also traveled to Concepción, Valdivia, Osorno and 
Villarrica where he established similar ordinances dealing with Araucanian 
laborers.174   
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Some portions of the Tasa of Santillán were effective.  In one gold mine for 
example, better working conditions under the tasa increased production dramatically.  
However, Chiles relative lack of mining, large scale agriculture, pastoral, and 
handicrafts economies continued to make it difficult for Indians to pay tribute with 
anything but personal service. The tasa was designed to obligate encomenderos to 
produce wheat, corn and barley. Ideally, this increased farm production would reduce 
the portions of tribute paid by personal service and would help address the colonys 
poverty which had deepened through its dedication to volatile placer mining.175 
Ultimately, whilte the Tasa de Santillán and future ordinances made provisions for 
Indians to pay their tribute in specie or farm products, they never completely 
eliminated personal service on paper or in practice.176    
Chilean encomenderos would eventually abandon placer mining as deposits were 
depleted, but they continued to resist dedicating their efforts to agriculture.  Colonists 
argued that for one, wheat production was not profitable.  With Chiles modest 
population, there was little domestic demand for grains. Also, Peru continued to have 
its own abundant and cheap supply, sabotaging the capitals need to have Chile pull 
its weight.  Encomenderos also rejected farming because their militia obligations kept 
them away from their lands for months every year.  The great irony and source of 
frustration for the colonists was that the crown wanted them to be in two places at 
once.  The same colonists that were serving on the frontier were those who were 
supposed to be providing supplies for the campaigns.  The absence of these 
landowners not only decreased production, but made their haciendas vulnerable to 
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attack, especially for those closest to the frontier.  The most vulnerable haciendas 
were of course the most important to the war effort because of the relative fertility of 
the soil and proximity to the frontier.  All of these factors made it unprofitable for 
Chile to maintain a surplus of grains, leaving the colony constantly on the verge of 
shortages.  Chile was even obligated to import wheat on a number of occasions, an 
embarrassing and very telling development for a colony with optimal farming 
conditions.177     
With gold mining fast becoming a thing of the past, and agriculture proving 
unappealing, encomenderos turned to ranching for their livelihood.  Despite the 
prospect of cattle theft, ranching was better suited to the volatile frontier.  Ranching 
provided quicker returns when peace broke out, and only saw a slight decline in times 
of war as the industry provided food and transport for soldiers.178  Ranching would 
also eventually provide profitable exports in the form of tallow and jerked beef for the 
Potosí mines.   
The fact that ranching is not labor intensive did not mean that encomenderos 
released Indians from their tribute obligations.  By the 1560s encomienda Indians 
performed almost all manual tasks in Chile, working on construction projects, and 
carrying all manner of things within and between cities.  Female Indians in particular 
often worked as domestics.179  The encomienda system was designed to protect and 
instruct Indians under Spanish care, but as we saw in chapter one, it rarely worked out 
that way as encomenderos openly violated its provisions to turn a greater profit.  
Indian porters and mineworkers especially suffered when their encomenderos 
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overworked them by greatly exceeding limits on weight of loads, hours worked, 
distance traveled, and minimum age.180   
Pedro de Valdivia and Peruvian officials shared the very unlikely notion that 
Chilean hidalgos would turn into farmers.181  The same seigniorial attitude that kept 
the colonists from farming also meant that they remained steadfast in their defense of 
personal service.  Those who had suffered through the above mentioned difficulties 
were even less willing to give up tribute through indigenous labor that was their only 
real reward.  Over time, encomenderos realized that they could have their cake and 
eat it too by playing up this sacrifice without giving up the benefits of personal 
service  Encomenderos eventually began to accept that Valdivia and the Araucanians 
had begun to turn these would be conquerors into settlers.  They would continue to 
support the aforementioned sense that economic hardship would make sacrifice their 
gift to the crown.  
This economic suffering and sense of sacrifice was not just a way of life for 
encomenderos, but became important in defining their role in the viceroyalty.  By the 
1560s, letters from Chile constantly referred to shortages and violence due 
increasingly to the War of Arauco.  This tone of suffering and sacrifice was further 
solidified after the publication of the first American epic, Alonso de Ercillas La 
Araucana.       
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As Prince Philips page, Ercilla had traveled a good deal as a young man.  He had 
accompanied the future monarch to England for his wedding with Mary Tudor, and in 
his early twenties set out for Chile.  Ercilla arrived in Chile in 1558 where he stayed 
for seventeen months.182       
 Ercilla was sent to the front and engaged in combat with the Araucanians.  
However, his closest brush with death came not in combat, but in a Spanish 
ceremony.  In a moment of confusion during a ceremony celebrating the coronation 
of the same Prince Philip, Ercilla touched his sword in the presence of Governor 
García Hurtado de Mendoza.183  Ercilla and another soldier were immediately 
sentenced to death by the governor for this gross breach of etiquette.  Fortunately for 
Ercilla, the sentence was commuted to a short prison term at the last minute.  Ercilla 
wrote in La Araucana that he had been next in line, turned over to the sharp knife 
against his throat...184 As a result of this incident, Governor Mendoza was left out of 
La Araucana entirely. 
After his run-in with the governor, it was clear to Ercilla that any further 
advancement in Chile was impossible and he returned to Spain.  It was there where 
Ercilla wrote most of La Araucana and where the epic was first published in 1569. 185    
Ercilla the soldier saw few victories for the Spanish during his brief stay in Chile, 
his epic reflecting the voice of a frustrated adventurer.  La Araucana also typified the 
sentiments of Ercillas vanquished contemporaries, and contributed to a myth of the 
                                                 
182
 Roque Esteban Scarpa, Prologo Breve, in La Araucana, by Alonso de Ercilla (Santiago: Editorial 
Andrés Bello, 1983), 7-8.   
183
 Philip II was crowned in 1555, but the news did not reach Chile until 1558. La Invención del Reino 
de Chile, 162. 
184
 Quoted from La Araucana in Prologo Breve, 7. 
185
 Collier, Ideas and Politics, 27. 
 76 
noble or barbaric savage.  Losing commanders had to elevate the status of their 
victorious foes in order to somehow explain the failure.186   
 Never has a king subjected  
 Such fierce people proud of freedom, 
 Nor has alien nation boasted 
 Eer of having trod their borders; 
 Ner has dared a neighboring country 
 Raise the sword and move against them; 
 Always were they feared, unshackled,  
 Free of laws, with necks unbending.187 
 
Ercillas experiences and impressions not only influenced his style, but also the 
content of his epic.  La Araucanas favorable treatment of Araucanian leaders may 
also have had to do with Ercillas conflicts with his own superiors.    He anticipated 
criticism in his prologue saying, ... to some people it would seem that I am 
somewhat inclined toward the Araucanians, relating their ... bravery more extensively 
than necessary when it comes to barbarians.  Ercilla explained his admiration by 
arguing that ...with pure valor and perseverance they have maintained their 
freedom... despite their limited weaponry and lack of large scale political 
organization.188  
On the other hand, Ercilla did not do injustice to the Spaniards in his account.  
Much of his deference for the Araucanians lay in the fact that they have defended 
their land against such fierce enemies as the Spanish.189  In addition, his original 
intent was not to make heroes out of his enemies, but to make sure that the 
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achievements of his fellow Spaniards did not become lost in perpetual silence.190  
The War of Arauco seemed to provide all the elements Ercilla needed to create a 
popular epic; a bloody conflict in a faraway land between two very different but 
equally matched armies, with plenty of tales of chivalry and tragedy.  Ercilla drew 
together actual events, classical literary influences and glorified language to create an 
epic that holds a permanent and important place in world literature.   
As did Valdivia before him, Ercilla understood that Spain was at the height of its 
arrogance and that the actions of a handful of soldiers against savages half a world 
away would gain little attention.  Thus he needed to cast a wider net, mixing the war 
of Arauco with the brilliant actions of Lepanto and Saint Quintín.191 Thus, La 
Araucana became a mixture of Ercillas observations and examples of sixteenth 
century literature, adopted and falsified as autobiographical by the author. Ercillas 
sense of poetic license prompted him to quote Araucanians who he probably never 
met in the context of events that happened before he arrived in Chile.  The liberties 
that Ercilla took sparked still-unresolved debates about La Araucanas usefulness as a 
historical document.192  
More important to our discussion is how Ercilla was able to bring the War of 
Arauco to life through text.  The descriptions of Araucanian bravery and military 
ability expanded Spanish interest in the Americas, while their success at stalling the 
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Spanish advance worried the crown.193 Ercilla gave future chroniclers, adventurers 
and officials a wonderful template through which to maintain the interest of royal 
officials in Spain and Peru, and keep resources headed in Chiles direction aimed at 
ending this epic struggle.  
While Valdivia used sacrifice and Ercilla heroism as their principal themes, both 
constantly referred to the desolation and desperation on the Chilean frontier.  Whether 
focusing on trabajos de la  guerra or del hambre future authors would always stress 
the pressing need for more resources, especially if their future was tied to the far-
flung colony.   
With the mixed success of Santilláns efforts, labor conditions continued to 
deteriorate and Chiles indigenous population continued its decline.  One late 16th 
century observer noted that the indigenous population of Santiago had dwindled to 
4,000 from its peak of 60,000.  Both the Council of Indies and officials within Chile 
suggested the large-scale import of African slaves to avert a crisis, but this solution 
never got beyond the planning stages.194  Gold was no longer being extracted because 
even though the Spanish were obsessed with it, they couldnt eat it.  The remaining 
encomienda Indians had to be employed in food cultivation.  There were so few 
Indian auxiliaries available to the army that the only goal of raids against the 
Araucanians became securing enough porters to conduct the next campaign.  There 
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could be no long-term strategy of conquest without a significant pool of auxiliaries.  
This scarcity existed despite the fact that indios de servicio preferred accompanying 
the army to serving more intense and longer periods of labor in placer mines or in 
agriculture.  Some observers even claimed that indios de servicio were interested in 
prolonging and even expanding the war to keep the freedom that working with the 
Spanish army offered.195 Observers also noted that those Indians who had not yet 
been reduced also tried to maintain the war and preferred death in battle to becoming 
subjects of a people who had committed so many wrongs against them without justice 
or reason.196 
Nonetheless, the Spanish continued to advance eastward and southward from 
Santiago, founding frontier cities like Chillán and Mendoza close to groups of 
unconquered peoples who could be enslaved, evangelized or both.  With the decline 
of placer mining in Chiles south, and further Spanish encroachment, more and more 
Araucanians were being shipped northward. There were already yanaconas serving 
encomenderos in La Serena by the 1550s and in the 1570s a number of Araucanians 
were shipped from the front in Chiles south, to Coquimbo and Peru.  By 1573 this 
practice was so common and so many Indians from Chile were dying in transit to 
Peru, that the king felt it necessary to remind viceregal officials that such transport 
was illegal.197  While the kings message may have been heard at least temporarily in 
Peru, the illegal movement of Araucanians continued within Chile.  In 1578 dozens of 
Indians and six principal caciques of Arauco were expelled to La Serena where 
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they were put to work in mining and agriculture.198  With the Spanish moving closer 
word soon spread among unincorporated Indians of the poor treatment that Indian 
workers received.  Hernando de Santillán observed that the prospect of personal 
service meant that native women preferred to let their offspring die (fighting the 
Spanish) rather than see them seized later for service in the mines.199  Ironically then, 
increasing Indian resistance to reducción efforts increased the likelihood that if 
captured they would not only be subject to personal service but might be enslaved as 
prisoners in a just war. 
Despite these risks, many indios de servicio believed that there most attractive 
option was rebellion.  Especially near the Bío-Bío, the presence of Araucanian indios 
de guerra often inspired revolts by Indian laborers.  Especially worrisome for Spanish 
encomenderos were nomadic mountain groups like the Pehuenche.  These mounted 
aborigines would conduct occasional raids on Spanish estancias and spirit away a 
handful of colonists or indios de servicio to the safety of rugged mountain passes.  
Often the Pehuenche were involved in larger attacks led by indios de servicio or 
Araucanians, as was the case in a 1579 attack.  In response to this joint attack, the 
future Governor of Chile Martín Ruíz de Gamboa founded the city of Chillán as a 
bulwark against the plains and mountain Indians.200 
Because of their relative autonomy as mountain dwellers, the Pehuenche also 
demonstrated to other aborigines that they could maintain some economy even in a 
Spanish controlled economy.  The Pehuenche controlled access to salt deposits in the 
cordillera and as a result, had a great deal to say in terms of how much or how little 
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jerked beef Chile exported to Peru.  Pehuenche control of mountain passes also 
increased their autonomy as the Spanish searched for Caesars and tried to improve 
ties with Buenos Aires.201  As time progressed some Araucanians produced ponchos 
for export while others maintained a pre-colonial subsistence economy.  Despite 
drastic economic changes, the vida fronteriza did provide some alternatives for indios 
de guerra and indios rebeldes.  
                                                 
201
 Sergio R. Villalobos, Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza ( Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Universidad 
Católica de Chile, 1989), 29.  Orellana.  Historia y antropología de la Isla de la Laja, 29. 
 82 
 
Figure 5.  The Araucanía  (The dotted lines represent the boundaries of Pinto 
Rodríguezs frontier commercial circuit.)202 
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Old Enemies in a New Land 
In 1578 Spains greatest enemy dropped anchor in the Chilean port of Valparaiso.  
However, Sir Francis Drake had not yet earned his fame as the scourge of the Spanish 
Empire and Valparaiso was so isolated that the unsuspecting crew of the lone Spanish 
ship in the harbor dropped a line to Drakes launch.  Drake eventually pillaged the 
port and his haul was significant for such a small settlement, but the wide and lasting 
impact of his arrival had little to do with what he took. 203  The Spanish were more 
concerned that a European enemy had penetrated the Magellan Strait, the Spanish 
Empires primary Pacific bulwark, exacerbating whatever ill might have been 
plaguing each of Spains Pacific colonies.   
In Chile the ill was the War of Arauco, and Drakes arrival made pleas for more 
troops, more resources and the legalization of indigenous slavery all the more urgent.  
Drakes landing especially resonated with the viceroy, who was charged with raising 
many of the troops and money sent to Chile.  An Indian war in Chile seemed, and 
indeed was quite distant from goings on in Lima.  However, the viceroy soon took 
greater interest in Chile when he realized that if and when the War of Arauco were 
won, the colony could be an outer wall in the Pacific, slowing European enemies as 
they followed the scent of the kings silver.204   
While the War of Arauco continued however, the appearance of English enemies 
in Chile raised the prospect of a European-indigenous alliance against the Spanish.  
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Authorities in Chile were already starting to worry about increasing pan-indigenous 
movements against them after the Pehuenche and Araucanians indios rebeldes joined 
forces in the aforementioned 1579 attack.  
 For the first forty years of Spanish colonies on the Pacific, Patagonian winds had 
been sufficient protection.  Drake proved that this was no longer the case and raised 
the possibility of Spanish settlement in the Patagonia and the Strait of Magellan.  The 
crown had believed settlement of the territory would actually attract pirates, but soon 
made an about face when it became apparent that fortifications could provide an early 
line of defense against anything from a trickle to a steady stream of pirates seeking 
Peruvian silver.  In the 1530s and 40s there had been a number of expeditions to the 
strait and Patagonia, but attempts to settle the strait were few and had for all intents 
and purposes been suspended since 1563 when the crown declared that entradas 
would need royal approval. Chilean colonists also supported a renewal of settlement 
activities on the continents tip.  Such settlements would protect the Chilean coast and 
would provide a base from which to conquer the mythical Indians of Caesars.205      
The first steps toward settlement came when Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa led an 
expedition to Tierra del Fuego from Callao in 1579.  Sarmiento de Gamboa explored 
several possible fort sites, and crossed the Atlantic to report his findings to Spain.  
Meanwhile, the 1580 re-founding of Buenos Aires prompted a renewed interest in the 
Caesars and a westward expedition led by Juan de Garay.206  As the 1580s arrived 
then, Chile was faced with growing military threats, a labor shortage and no real 
solution to deal with either one.  In 1581 Chiles Governor-elect Alonso de 
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Sotomayor would begin to appreciate Chiles predicament even before he had set foot 
in the colony. With Drakes landing fresh in his mind, Philip II ordered the outfitting 
of a twenty-one-ship fleet in Seville by July of 1581.  The plan was for the fleet to 
sail to through the Magellan Strait and establish a settlement there.  The remainder of 
the expedition would continue on to Chile where the colonys new governor would 
disembark with reinforcements for the War of Arauco.  The expedition was 
immediately beset with difficulties however, and by the time it began its Atlantic 
crossing five months late, it had already lost eighty men and four ships.  Further 
problems were to follow, prompting its leaders to abandon the Magellan Strait route 
and land at the newly re-founded port of Buenos Aires.  Sotomayor led the 
reinforcements overland to Mendoza where he they had to wait until the spring thaw 
to enter Santiago.  Sotomayor and the remaining 400 soldiers finally arrived in 
Santiago in September of 1583.  The crossing took well over two years and brought 
two hundred casualties long before the arrivals had seen any combat.207 
 Sotomayor was unimpressed with the state in which he found the colony.  
Desertion was rampant, especially among Limeños who tired of the discipline in such 
a faraway place.  (In Lima in 1570 the viceroy had solicited soldiers for the Chilean 
front, promising them silver, arms, clothes, victuals and other necessities for the 
campaign.  He got one volunteer.)208  Some even switched sides, attracted by the 
freedom of Araucanía and taking advantage of the frequent contact between groups 
on the frontier.209  
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 Sotomayor said that the soldiers who managed to stay at their posts were spoiled, 
free and licentious. Even though his reinforcements were bedraggled, naked and 
lost the incumbent soldiers expected that his arrival meant their relief and 
fulfillment of their pretensions.  While the soldiers were getting what they wanted, 
the royal coffers were bare and didnt come close to covering the salaries of royal 
officials (including Sotomayors). Supplies were thin, and the vecinos were 
consumed.  In light of such scarcity, Sotomayors first act was to send a captain to 
Lima armed with a royal cédula authorizing more reinforcements, arms, clothing, and 
money to begin as soon as possible a new campaign against the Araucanians.210 
Sotomayor also found that the Chilean encomenderos and Church officials had 
long ago taken sides in a power struggle with the governor at its center.211  A rain of 
accusations had been leveled against Sotomayors predecessor, Martín Ruíz de 
Gamboa after he had tried to restrict encomendero power through his own tasa.  Ruíz 
de Gamboaa last year had been an ineffective one as he spent most of it imprisoned 
or on trial in Santiago defending himself against his political enemies who welcomed 
Sotomayor with open arms.  The incoming governor soon found himself caught up in 
the battle between opposing encomenderos, taking back a number of repartimientos 
Ruíz de Gamboa had given, and repealing the Tasa de Gamboa.212    
If the Sotomayor reinforcements were insufficient, there was still hope that a 
fortification of the Strait of Magellan would cover up the Chilean chink in the 
viceregal armor.  Sarmiento de Gamboa returned to South America in 1584, creating 
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two settlements on the Strait of Magellan, Nombre de Jesús and Rei don Felipe.213  A 
total of 277 people were left to settle Nombre de Jesus; 251 men, 13 married women, 
and 11 children. Geographically, cutting off access to the Strait made good sense, but 
weather doomed the experiment. Along with the cold came the famous Tierra del 
Fuego wind, making navigation and re-supply in particular extremely difficult. 
On Sarmientos first support expedition to Nombre de Jesús a sudden storm 
obligated the crew of his ship to cast off and leave their anchor behind.  Sarmiento 
was forced to sail on to Brazil, leaving several families who planned to be relocated 
standing on the beach.  This was the last time Sarmiento would see Nombre de Jesús. 
Once in Brazil Sarmiento tried to return, but was shipwrecked off of Bahía, surviving 
only by holding onto a floating board with his African slave and a priest.  After this 
failure, Sarmiento set off to Spain to appeal for help for the colonists in person, and to 
ask why none of his written petitions had been answered.  On this voyage however, 
Sarmiento was captured by the English.  The ransom for his return to Spain was not 
paid until 1589.  He died in Spain three years later.  Meanwhile, the hundreds of 
settlers in Tierra del Fuego were completely abandoned.  Only fifteen men and three 
women eventually survived the harsh Antarctic winters. 214   
This disaster revealed that while the viceroy may have been understandably 
concerned about pirates, the real threat to colonists in Chile was not European 
enemies, but starvation.  We remember for example that Valdivias newly founded 
Santiago was almost abandoned after Michimalongos 1541 revolt left the Spanish 
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without Indian allies.  Also, it was not uncommon for Spanish frontier soldiers to 
trade gunpowder to the Araucanians for food.  In general, when the Spanish were 
without Indian help, they fared as badly as the residents of Nombre de Jesus who saw 
little help from the straits sparse and scattered native population.  The irony here is 
that while thousands were killed on both sides of the War of Arauco, without the 
economic and cultural exchange of the vida fronteriza the Spanish may have 
disappeared from Chile anyway. 
In the meantime, colonists further north may also have been feeling figuratively 
abandoned if not literally.  Governor Sotomayor pleaded with the crown to remedy 
the fact that the army was in rags and lacked powder, which threatened his ability to 
mount even a brief summer campaign.  (They did manage one, but with little to show 
for it.)  There was more bad news with the revelation that Chiles economy brought in 
no more than 22,000 pesos yearly and that the treasury was in debt for more than 
300,000.215  In the same year a plot by a number of destitute soldiers was uncovered 
in which they had planned to take over forts at Angol, Bio Bío, Chillán and even 
Santiago, collecting all the discontented soldiers along the way and marching over 
Andes to return to Spain.  The conspirators were executed.216   
Without outside support, colonists turned to myth to improve their situation.217 In 
1586 the Governor of Tucumán, Juan Ramírez de Velasco proposed a small 
investigation to determine whether there was in fact a dazzling city called Linlín 
led by a powerful Inca with 200,000 Indians and 30,000 Spaniards as his 
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subjects.218  Ramírez de Velasco believed that if Linlín could be found, its residents 
would end their support of the Araucanians and could provide Spanish settlers with 
provisions, curing the ills of both Sotomayor and Sarmiento de Gamboa.219   
By the time another Englishman Thomas Cavendish, who had been with Drake on 
his expedition, landed near Valparaiso in 1587 Chile had made little progress against 
its indigenous enemies and was still ill-prepared to meet this sea borne threat.220  
Again, the viceroy sent troops to respond to the pirate landing, and again Governor 
Sotomayor regarded the reinforcements as insufficient.  It was perhaps very fitting 
then that the captains of the ships carrying the pirate-hunting troops were instructed to 
avoid all contact with enemy ships, as the transport vessels werent outfitted for 
combat.221   
As a next step, Sotomayor sent his brother Luis to Spain, hoping that a first-hand 
account could express the urgency of the need to end the War of Arauco and that his 
brother would bring the resources that would make it possible.  However, in 1587 
Spanish ships were hard to come by as most of them preparing to invade England.  
Luis de Sotomayor would have to wait at least a year for the stunning events of 1588 
to play out before his petition would be heard.   
Interestingly enough, the rout of the Spanish Armada in the English Channel did 
not cripple the crowns ability to support its American colonies.  Fearing that the 
English would press their advantage and try to take Spanish possessions in the 
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Americas, the Spanish scrambled to ready ships for the Indies.  In June of 1589 Luis 
de Sotomayor arrived in Panama with seven hundred men that were destined for the 
Chilean front.  Here the story took a surprising twist.  Accompanying Sotomayor was 
none other than García Hurtado de Mendoza the former Governor of Chile who had 
just been named Viceroy of Peru and Marquis of Cañete.  Surely if anyone would 
assure that these troops made it to the front, it would be a former Governor of Chile 
and someone who had faced the Araucanians personally.  Instead, the marquis had the 
seven hundred auxiliaries turn right around and accompany the millions of pesos of 
silver that were being readied for shipment to Spain.  Instead of 700 soldiers, among 
them veterans of European campaigns, Chile would get two hundred conscripts from 
in and around Panama.  The marquis explained to the cabildo of Santiago that he 
understood Chiles situation and as such had sent two hundred select and well 
equipped soldiers who when joining those already on the front would be more than 
enough to conquer and populate the Araucanía.222   
There are a number of reasons why the marquis might have shorted Chile five 
hundred soldiers.  First of all, the crown could ill afford another economic disaster 
like the defeat of the armada and as such all hands were needed to protect the 1589 
silver fleet.  Secondly, the marquis had been in close quarters with many Chilean 
officials and perhaps believed that like Alonso de Ercilla, they were exaggerating the 
merits of the Araucanians.  According to one historian, the marquis thought he knew 
Chile better than anyone and believed that the colony needed much less than its 
officials were asking for.223  Thirdly, the marquis had proposed that the Indians on 
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Chiles coastal islands be removed and sent to work in Santiago and La Serena.224  
This plan would address both Chiles labor shortage and pirate threat, and the viceroy 
wanted to give it time to work.  Finally, the marquis may have been protecting his 
legacy.  Governor García Hurtado de Mendoza was left out of La Araucana because 
of the punishment he had levied on Ercilla.  Hurtado de Mendoza had responded to 
this omission by commissioning his own version of the conquest, a stilted account 
called Arauco Domado (Araucania tamed) in which he was the hero and conqueror of 
the Araucanians.225  Whatever his motives, the marquis had showed little urgency in 
meeting Chiles needs and reinforced the colonys low rank on the viceregal list of 
priorities.  Future viceroys would show even more indifference to Chiles plight, 
prompting authorities in Chile to respond with even more exaggerated claims about 
the threats they faced from their enemies and royal neglect. 
Disappointing as it was, Chilean colonists were not shocked by the indifference of 
the viceroy and as the last decade of the century arrived they settled even deeper into 
the relative stability of the vida fronteriza or what other authors call the colonial 
pact.  Both Spanish colonists and indios rebeldes had acknowledged that a clear 
victory was impossible in the short term, and the Spanish even began to talk peace 
rather than conquest.226  Spanish missionaries were also able to establish themselves 
in the region by the 1590s, a development that would have been impossible in 
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wartime.  By 1590 the Dominicans, Mercedarians, and Franciscans had at least two-
dozen missionaries divided among the principal settlements in the Araucanía.227   
The Araucanians had even made admirers out of two Jesuit missionaries who had 
set out to evangelize the Indians in 1595. Fathers Aguilera and Vega wrote that the 
Indians spoke of their conditions and Spanish abuses clearly and reasonably.  The 
Jesuits for their part were able to communicate to the Araucanians that they came 
seeking neither gold nor silver and were instead interested in furthering the 
evangelization of the Indians by limiting Spanish abuses.228  The colonial government 
recognized the confidence that the Jesuits had among the Araucanians, and began to 
use the priests as mediators.   
Despite the relative tranquility that existed in the region, illegal slave taking and 
indigenous abuse in general were still proving a disruptive force.  Governor Martín 
García Oñez de Loyola gave orders that peaceful Indians were not to be abused and 
even enlisted the help of the above-mentioned Jesuits to smooth over this bad 
treatment.229  But by the 1590s the illegal transport of Indian slaves had been 
disrupting the regions indigenous population for twenty years.  Eugene Korth called 
the Araucanía of the late 16th century a clearinghouse for the deportation of slaves to 
the mines and encomiendas of Santiago, La Serena, and Peru.  By the 1590s 
reduced Indians were being crowded into hulls in a fashion that resembled Negro 
slavers in Valdivia and sent to Valparaiso and points north.230 Making matters worse 
was the fact that more domestic labor was soon needed when the Audiencia of Lima 
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eliminated import tariffs on Chiles most important farm products like wheat, flour, 
fruits, and bacon.231   
The new threat of European pirates did little to slow slave-taking trends.  When 
the viceroy sent a ship to Arauco to watch for European enemies in 1592 the sailors 
offered to help should any skirmishes with the Indians arise.  Sure enough the sailors 
were soon off to join a Spanish raid in which a number of Indian prisoners were 
taken.  There is no direct evidence that the captives were taken to Peru, but previous 
trends would suggest that they were likely sold into slavery there.232  The implicit 
message to the viceroy was that if Lima didnt take pirate threats seriously (the ship 
was a response to Cavendishs arrival five years earlier), neither would Chilean 
colonists.  They would instead use the late and insufficient reinforcements to take 
more indigenous slaves. 
Governor Oñez de Loyola took his post in 1593 and brought an impressive 
résumé.  He was the nephew of Saint Ignatius, was married to an Inca princess, and 
had defeated and executed the leader of a major indigenous rebellion in Peru.  It stood 
to reason then, that he had big plans for Chile. Oñez de Loyola was one of the few 
governors of Chile to strongly speak out against the practice of enslaving Indian 
prisoners of war. The governor denounced growing slave export, arguing that the 
shipment of Indian slaves from Valdivia was becoming quite regular.233  Many of 
these slaves had even come to the Spanish as allies and instead were placed in 
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irons.234  Oñez de Loyola also criticized his eventual successor for branding indios de 
guerra on the face and sending some of them to Arica where his brother had a 
vineyard.235  Oñez de Loyola also commissioned a report on the mutilation of 
indigenous slaves to prevent their escape.  The Spanish would regularly cut off the 
front of a slaves foot and or cut a nerve that connected the foot to the leg, meaning 
that the affected person could only walk by dragging his foot.236  
Oñez de Loyola also heard complaints about how miscegenation through the 
capture of Araucanian women continued to be a source of ire along the frontier. Fray 
Agustín de Cisneros, the Bishop of La Imperial wrote to Oñez de Loyola that many 
soldiers, carry off female Indians for immoral purposes.237 Prostitution and 
concubinage often accompany armies, and with the number of young female Indians 
captured by the Spanish there is no reason to expect that things were any different 
along the Chilean frontier.238  In all fairness to the Spanish however, we must 
remember the scores of Spanish women who had been and continued to be captured 
by the Araucanians and Pehuenches.239 
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Oñez de Loyola even tried to reduce the power of the seemingly untouchable 
encomenderos, denouncing a petition made by a number of Santiago vecinos to attach 
encomienda Indians to an hacienda and to make the encomienda hereditary.  The 
petition even asked that this perpetuity be transferable from one encomendero to 
another. According to Oñez de Loyola, this would open the door for the 
depopulation of Chiles southern cities since new Indian laborers would be much 
more valuable.240  
Oñez de Loyola helped reveal that while slave taking raids were supposed to 
secure southern cities against attack by Indians, they were instead making them more 
vulnerable.  As Santiago and other cities in the north demanded more labor, southern 
interests began to ship out the same Indians who had fed and supported the army on 
their campaigns.  While their food and supplies diminished, the Army of Arauco was 
called upon to conduct additional raids, leaving them ill prepared to deal with any 
Indian attacks. 
 
Oñez de Loyola Disrupts the Colonial Pact 
Oñez de Loyola also proved determined to get the viceroys help against English 
pirates.  After learning that Richard Hawkins had anchored his Dainty in Valparaiso 
harbor in 1594, Oñez de Loyola sent an emissary to the Audiencia of Lima rather than 
the stingy Hurtado de Mendoza to ask for help.  The audiencia eventually sent 300 
more conscripts from Tierra Firme and Panama along with 40,000 pesos, but not 
without a new mandate from the viceroy stating that the Governor of Chile could not 
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recruit the colonys vecinos and moradores for the war effort.241  This measure 
effectively nullified any help the reinforcements brought, as Chile depended on the 
temporary manpower and extra financial contributions from vecinos to keep the front 
supplied during frequent difficult periods.  From the perspective of officials in Chile, 
the viceroy had tied them up in knots by not providing them with the resources they 
needed or even allowing them to gather them on their own.  Without excusing illegal 
slave-taking raids, we see that Chilean colonists were increasingly limited in their 
ability to keep the War of Arauco economically and strategically viable through legal 
means. 
Undeterred, Oñez de Loyola sent another emissary to Spain in 1595.  The dying 
Philip II could not attend to his affairs and the Council of Indies could offer little 
more than a plan and a promise of future assistance.242 Hurtado de Mendozas 
successor Luis de Velasco proved no more willing to fortify Chile against pirate 
threats.  He maintained that the best way to deal with pirate landings was with local 
militias that could be quickly gathered to drive them off, even though Hawkins had 
already proved this strategy to be obsolete.243  Like his predecessors, Velasco 
continued to argue that the difficult Magellan run combined with the problems of re-
supplying on a desolate Chilean coast would provide sufficient natural protection for 
Chile and Peru against European enemies.244   
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Despite being turned away by the crown and viceroy, Oñez de Loyola was 
determined to bring more stability to Chile.  He wanted to make strides against indios 
rebeldes, improve the treatment of indios reducidos as we have seen, and release a 
number of illegally taken indigenous slaves.  While the second of these measures 
reduced tensions to some degree, further encroachment into the Araucanía made the 
indios rebeldes nervous and the release of captives was regarded as a sign of 
weakness.  The colonial pact was kept stable by an equal power relationship 
between the Spanish and indios rebeldes, so in 1598 when the Araucanian lonko 
Pelantaro correctly observed that the Oñez de Loyola had overextended Spanish 
forces he attacked.245  
Governor Oñez de Loyola himself had taken the point in the Spanish push into the 
Araucanía and he and his men ventured into the Valley of Curalaba in 1598.  Some 
authors say he was ambushed, some say his attackers only happened upon him, but all 
agree that he was killed by a small group of Araucanians who left only one Spaniard 
alive.  Most also concur that Oñez de Loyola was decapitated, his head becoming the 
inspiration for the subsequent assault.246 
Although this was a most brutal act, its effectiveness in rallying the Araucanians 
was undeniable. As we saw in chapter one, the Araucanians would absorb the traits of 
the enemy and the head was a symbol of the enemys bravery... and the source of his 
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prestige. 247  As a result, the governors assassin, Pelantaro, became the recognized 
leader of the assault.248 
The soldier-poet Diego Arias de Saavedra was one of the Spanish defenders of 
Chillán during the Pelantaro-led attack and described it in his poem, Purén Indómito 
(Purén Untamed).249   
 The din, the rumble the horrific scream, 
  the mob, bedlam, the clamors 
  the barbarous shouting,   
 without end the fears increase: 
  no one defends their miserable house 
  against the perfidious traitors,250  
 they flee unarmed and naked,  
 of fright and fear deaf and dumb.251  
 
After the assault, Arias de Saavedra and a few fellow soldiers set out in pursuit of 
the attackers, eventually finding them waiting in ambush with stones and arrows 
ready. 
Twas so terrible and vigorous the stoning that, not being of such great 
strength nor of such fine refuge the helmet, my head was cut to pieces; it was 
my cursed luck to be senseless for a good hour, without being able to walk 
straight, nor be useful for more than an hour.252 
 
As mentioned in chapter one, the Spanish presence had led to the development of 
the lonko system by which a temporary alliance among scattered Araucanian and 
even Pehuenche and Conco (Chiloés aborigines) groups was rapidly formed.  In both 
this case and in that of the Pueblo Revolt in New Mexico, the Spanish overlooked the 
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potential of scattered groups to ally.  In Chile, the lonko system and smoldering 
resentment of the Spaniards253 were able to turn hundreds of small kin groups into a 
6,000-man army that between 1598 and 1602 forced the Spanish to abandon not only 
Chillán, but Osorno, Valdivia, Villarrica, La Imperial, Santa Cruz, and Arauco.254  
According to one author, this so-called Disaster of Curalaba meant the deaths of 
more than three thousand Spaniards and the capture of more than five hundred 
women and scores of children and priests.255   
The Disaster of Curalaba revealed two important lessons.  One, that the colonial 
pact had become instrumental in governing the conduct of colonists and Araucanians 
alike.  Two, that if the norms of the pact were broken there would be violent 
consequences.  The Araucanians knew there was little they could do about their 
declining population, and legal status, but after 1598 they were confident that they 
could fend off territorial incursions that violated the colonial pact.   
By 1598 Spanish governors and missionaries had learned that reputation went a 
long way among the Araucanians, and that any incursions outside of Spanish 
settlements had to be made very delicately.  Governor Loyola and Spanish Jesuits 
alike entered the Araucanía in the 1590s with the great fervor of reformers and tipped 
the balance of power that was the colonial pact.  Both had good intentions, but the 
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Jesuits had already made the Araucanians feel invaded when Loyola wandered into 
the Valley of Curalaba and provided Pelantaro with the perfect opportunity to make a 
name for himself and restore the fatherland as he put it.  Pelantaro later would boast 
that he would not stop until he had driven all Spaniards out of Chile or had Spanish 
women making chicha and dressing in blankets.  He knew full well however that 
the Spanish would not disappear and that he in fact needed them to bolster his power.  
His murder of Loyola had turned him into a gentoqui and converted his rivals like 
Aganamón into his lieutenants.  This is best revealed by the fact that a decade later 
during the Defensive War he would make peace with the Spanish.  In chapter three 
we will see that during the Defensive War, the best way to gain recognition on the 
frontier was by to bring hundreds of Araucanians to be catechized.  Pelantaro 















                                                 
256
 Diego de Rosales, Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano, Tomo II (2nd ed., 










The Spanish never put their (shoulder) into the reducción nor conversion 
with as much endeavor as they had in getting the enslaved Indians to work,  
our entire attention (was) upon capturing slaves and selling them while we 
informed his Majesty that we had achieved a great deal in his Royal Service, 
calling vices virtues and greed piety and procuring that all the provinces 
(in Chile) were angry and in revolt.257 
 
 
While the Pelantaro-led assault of 1598 was catastrophic for Chile, news of the 
event caused barely a ripple in Peru where the murdered Governor Loyola had been 
nothing short of a hero.  One of the most dramatic reactions came not from the 
government, but from a group of Limas prominent women.  They showed concern 
for the plight of the hundreds of Chilean women taken captive during the assault, 
some of whom may have been relatives or acquaintances.258  These Limeñas collected 
alms to clothe any of the forgotten and helpless captives who they hoped would be 
freed.259   The new viceroy Luis de Velasco quickly promised three hundred men, but 
left it up to Loyolas replacement to find them and take them to Chile.  The new 
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governor Francisco de Quiñones only managed to scare up 130 volunteers despite 
promises that they would be paid and allowed to return to Peru whenever they 
wished.  Like Pedro de Valdivia and other governors before him, Quiñones would 
remind the crown of how he had sacrificed by spending money out of his own pocket 
to get the troops to Chile.260    
The crown finally managed to send 500 reinforcements through Buenos Aires in 
1601, but they reached Mendoza in such poor shape that they had to be outfitted with 
proper clothing while before they could cross into Chile in the spring.261 
Chiles colonists were still trying to put down the Araucanian assault of the 
previous year when the captain of the Dutch ship Fidelity, Baltasar Cordes, led the 
remnants of a larger Dutch expedition in an attack on Castro, Chiloés principal 
port.262   
Most of the Indians of Chiloé were reduced, but just before the Dutch arrived 
they joined the general uprising.  According to the account of Diego de Rosales, it 
was the Chiloé Indians who solicited Dutch assistance with their own plan to attack 
Castro.  As Cordes and thirty musketeers approached Castro they revealed the 
Indians plan to Spanish officials in the hope that the colonists would re-supply them 
in exchange for the information.  The Spanish accepted the deal and provided the 
Dutch with gunpowder and ammunition.  However, when the Spanish sent envoys to 
plan an attack on the Indians, Cordes sprung a trap and had them killed.  Cordes and 
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his men then advanced on Castro, sacked it, killed Spanish men who had found 
refuge in a church, killed the local priest, usando de humanidad con las mujeres.263   
Spanish reinforcements from Osorno eventually drove the Dutch out of Castro 
and killed thirty of the Indian leaders who had assisted them.  Captured or deserting 
Dutch sailors were interviewed ad nauseum about the plans for their voyage, which 
meant that officials in Chile and Peru were well aware of Dutch motives.  This Dutch 
threat from the south is quite ironic when we consider that Magellans motivation for 
finding the strait that bears his name was an alternate route to the East Indies.  This 
Spanish sponsored expedition had only paved the way for a century of Dutch and 
English navigation of the route when Spanish attention shifted to American gold and 
silver.264   
 While the attack on Castro was a blow to the entire viceroyalty, there were signs 
that it would not be easy for the Dutch to gain a toehold or even establish trading 
relationships in Chile. First of all, the attack on Chiloé was essentially an afterthought 
and an act of desperation.  While the goal of the five-vessel expedition of 
contrabandists under Jacob Mahu was to explore and trade in the South Sea, they 
did not come close to reaching the Pacific intact.  Mahu himself died off the coast of 
Africa, and the expedition only went downhill from there.  The ships became 
separated, and a number of them were lost or had turned back by the time Cordes 
landed in Chiloé.265  Secondly, there was no guarantee that the Indians of Chile would 
ally with the Dutch or even give them free passage for that matter.  Three- dozen 
members of Mahus scattered expedition landed in Arauco six months before the 
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Castro attack.  After what seemed as a welcome banquet, the inebriated Dutch were 
slaughtered by their Araucanian hosts.266   In fact, the Dutch did not necessarily have 
major territorial aspirations in Chile.  The Dutch saw Chile and the islands off its 
coast mostly as a stopping-off point on their way to Callao or the Moluccas, or a base 
from which to search for the mythical other southern continent.267  
However, the lack of major Dutch territorial aspirations did not stop skittish 
Chilean officials from ruminating about a Dutch takeover of the entire continent, 
which would begin when they were able to dislodge the Spanish from Chile.  For 
Chilean colonists the fact remained that their European and domestic enemies had, 
however temporarily, formed an alliance.  Although little thought was ever given to 
Chiloé in the rest of the colony, this example of a potential alliance would remain in 
the minds and in the missives of Chilean officials for most of the century and would 
govern much of the colonial-viceregal-imperial relationship and discussion of 
resources, which was just as Chile wanted it.268 The viceroys of Peru consistently 
showed a lukewarm commitment to the War of Arauco, (especially after 1598) but 
this time their silver lifeblood could be threatened by a Dutch outpost in the 
Araucanía, and they had to act.  For the viceroys, the  failure to win War of Arauco 
meant a failure to establish Chile as the aforementioned outer wall of the Pacific 
against pirates.269   
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Colonists were very aware of the fact that whereas the destruction of seven 
Spanish settlements by the Araucanians warranted only 300 ragtag reinforcements, 
the appearance of a severely depleted Dutch fleet prompted Viceroy Velasco to gather 
eight armed vessels at Callao and send three of them south to search for more 
possible breaches of the Strait.  Velasco then complained to the crown that these eight 
ships were not sufficient and would need more resources from Spain to defend Peru 
against the Dutch or other foreigners.270   
The story of the early 17th century then became one of how to deal with the 
combined Dutch-Araucanian threat and what this meant for the vida fronteriza.  It 
took the events of 1598-1600 (most importantly the appearance of the Dutch of 
course) for the crown to decide that instability on the Chilean frontier had lasted long 
enough and now posed a very real threat to Peruvian silver.  The crown would now 
sponsor a series of experimental ways to end the War of Arauco including the 
creation of a permanent army, the establishment of a Defensive War and the 
legalization of indigenous slavery.  While these experiments were important in 
revealing the commitment of the crown and viceroy to protecting their silver, to 
residents of Chile they were a lesson in how the War of Arauco and fear of pirates 
could become a permanent source of resources for a flagging frontier economy.  
Ultimately the crown failed to realize how important the vida fronteriza had become 
to Chile.  Therefore, attempts by Spanish officials to erase or move the frontier 
instead became a means by which colonists and aborigines could to solidify its 
importance through permanent war.    
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While Viceroy Velasco initially reacted quickly to the Dutch attack, scaring up 
reinforcements and appealing to the crown for help, further action would have to wait 
for Philip III to get up to speed after the recent death of his father. When Phillip III 
did respond, very little was done to protect Chile from pirates.  The crown suggested 
that the Callao to Valparaiso supply run be carried out in the winter months thinking 
that pirates would not brave the Strait in winter, but Chile was essentially back to 
square one, relying on the no longer impenetrable barrier of the Strait for its 
protection.  There were simply no available ships in the Pacific fleet to provide 
permanent defense.  Therefore, future Chilean colonists knew that they would never 
be adequately protected from Spains European enemies.  However, this didnt 
prevent them from squeezing future viceroys for fortifications and troops now that the 
English and Dutch had done them the favor of getting Limas attention. 
As the 17th century wore on, it became apparent that Chile would need to be able 
to frighten the crown to secure ever limited resources. The 1588 defeat of the Spanish 
Armada and the 1598 death of Philip II were the most recognized but not the only 
indicators that the primacy of Hapsburg Spain was on the verge of a sharp decline.  
The bankruptcy of the royal treasury in 1596 signaled that Philip IIs grand imperial 
ventures would at the very least have to be put on hold and that prospects for any 
further expansion looked bleak.271  Begrudgingly acknowledging Spains weakness, 
Philip II had allowed Archduke Albert of the Netherlands to at least nominally rule 
the Low Countries, and had made peace with Charles IV.272  All of this meant that 
toward the end of the 16th century, the Spanish American Empire closed in on 
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itself.273  It was no accident that the 17th century spawned the tale of Don Quixote, 
where what began as a glorious crusade ended in humiliation.274   
 Chile also sank rather deeply into this century of disillusionment, not for mere 
economic reasons, but also because of the strategic and psychological effects of the 
Disaster of Curalaba. The assault of 1598 was a watershed event in the War of 
Arauco.  The Spanish had managed to extract some mineral wealth from the south, 
but their tenuous settlements were now gone.  Previous images of glorious battles 
between two noble armies had yielded to those depicting a bloody stalemate between 
two tired forces.  This significant defeat helped the Spanish crown and Chilean 
colonists alike reflect on why the conquest was failing. 
Although La Araucana is set apart from other colonial accounts because of its 
epic style and rhyme scheme, Alonso de Ercilla was by no means the only author to 
poeticize the Araucanian war.  Some decades later, the soldier-poet  Diego Arias de 
Saavedra used La Araucana as a model for his own epic entitled, Purén Indomito.  
Although the two epics contain many similarities, the tone of Purén Indomito reminds 
us that the scenes in La Araucana represent only a brief period in the long and painful 
war of Arauco.  Much of what Arias de Saavedra writes reflects the disillusion 
following the 1598 assault.  Ercillas vision of an epic struggle between the 
worshipers of God and Pillán,275 turned into a divisive power struggle within a 
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Spanish society that was ...losing sight of Christian virtue.  In Purén Indomito, 
...war is wretched, cruel, terrifying; Gods punishment for the sins of the Spanish.276 
The frustration with the stalemate was also expressed in the account of Alonso 
González de Nájera.  González de Nájera was a Spanish soldier who arrived in the 
aftermath of the 1598 rebellion, was wounded, and commissioned to write an account 
of what he observed.277  His Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile includes tales 
of cannibalism and Araucanian bloodlust, images undoubtedly influenced by the fact 
that his own page was killed and eaten by the Araucanians. Referring to Araucanian 
victory celebrations, González de Nájera said, ...there is great joy in the victory, 
especially if they take with them the severed heads of Spaniards or prisoners, that for 
them back on their land, and among their own, is more than a Roman triumph.278  
Although the translated title of his account is Disillusion and Remedy of the War 
in Chile,279 González de Nájera saw no easy way to end this war.  He said quite 
frankly that the Spanish should give up the illusion of ending the conflict through 
dialogue, Because even though making peace (something that is incredibly difficult) 
is possible, given the means and the forces necessary to do it, it will never be that the 
Indians maintain it, nor that war will cease until the end of time. González de Nájera 
showed his frustration at the broken promises and trickery of the Araucanians, but 
also realized that the Spanish gave them two options; resistance enslavement.  The 
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Spanish soldier mentioned that despite their brutal actions, he refuses to call them 
barbarians, impressed with their deftness in negotiating truces to their favor. 280    
After 1598 the more critical tone of Franciscan missionaries in Chile was 
beginning to take precedence over that of their Jesuits colleagues who had tried to 
point out the merits Araucanian culture and politics.  The Franciscan Pedro de Sosa, 
in his Memorial del peligroso estado espiritual y temporal del Reino de Chile, 
(Memoir of the perilous spiritual and temporal state of the Kingdom of Chile) talked 
of his frustration with the Araucanians and argued that their violence, and their habit 
of killing missionaries in particular, had much to with their struggles.   
The Araucanians are rebels, they flee the Spanish and make war on the 
Christian Indians, wasting the fruit of so many years of hard work.  The rebel 
Indians have been offered peace and good treatment as given to friendly 
Indians, but as they are barbarians and live without government, republic or 
law, they do as they please.  Being impossible to put them in reducciones, 
there remains no other solution than to make war on them.  Saint Augustine 
would have approved it, and the gospel calls a mercenary the pastor that sees 
the wolf and leaves the sheep.281   
 
Father Sosa added that missionaries could not continue to allow these Araucanian 
wolves to continue to prevent the reduced sheep from hearing the word.  
Christian martyrs did not help the spread of the gospel.  Father Sosa mentioned that 
Saint Paul, upon hearing that many wanted him dead, asked to be given soldiers for 
his protection.  Sosa believed that his contemporaries should have done the same.282   
Even the election of a decorated soldier and enthusiastic diplomat as Chiles new 
governor failed to bring Chile out of the post-Curalaba doldrums.  New governor 
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Alonso de Ribera did all he could to get the colony back on its feet.  He set up a mill 
near Santiago to provide blankets and other materials for surviving soldiers.  He also 
had cart making operations set up in Concepción and Santiago to make sure that these 
new domestically generated supplies could get to the front.283   
But Ribera was never able to enlist the help of Santiago merchants to turn the 
economy around.  Tired of supporting a losing cause, the merchants had begun to 
move away from supplying soldiers in the Araucanía and had were increasingly 
involved in export to Potosí.284  Ribera tried to get them re-involved, but a 1604 
Santiago flood left vecinos both unwilling and now unable to help.285  Ribera also 
sought more help from the viceroy and crown, and even sent a recruiter to Lima to 
round up the troops that the viceroy couldnt deliver.286   
Riberas recruiter had a difficult task ahead, as the Disaster of Curalaba left 
Chile in dire need of any and all resources for the front.  According to one estimate 
the Spanish troops were outnumbered at least twenty to one, a ratio that was 
increasing yearly as casualties outpaced reinforcements.287 Even when they werent in 
battle Spanish soldiers suffered.  In one extreme case, the starving inhabitants of a 
Spanish fort were forced to use their dead as bait to attract dogs to kill and eat.288   
This climate of pessimism within the colony and the kingdom combined with 
events in Chile prompted Philip III to take a step that would have been unthinkable a 
half-century earlier during the up swell of the conquest.  In 1604 the crown decided 
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that Chile would have the only permanent and professional army in the Indies, funded 
yearly by the treasury of the Viceroyalty of Peru.  This permanent army on the Bío-
Bío was the only exception to Spains military strategy in its other American 
territories which followed the presidio-fuerte-milicia model.289  Chile had never 
solidified its frontier with a line of presidios or a series of advancing forts.  Its 
tenuous settlements had already been abandoned on a number of occasions and the 
crown felt that a professional army needed to replace the frequently overrun vecino-
based militia.  The Dutch attack on Chiloé of course further convinced the crown to 
make this drastic decision.  
This Army of Arauco would be a force of 2,000 and would receive a yearly 
situado (salary or payment) of 212,000 ducats.290  Governor Ribera brought a portion 
of this new situado with him on his way to Chile and had more than 1,000 new troops 
from Spain and New Spain at his disposal the year he took office.291      
Not surprisingly, there were difficulties in raising enough troops to fill the armys 
2,000 spots.  However, it was now abundantly clear that the abandonment of this 
remote outpost of empire (Chile) seemed an impossible option, not least because of 
its strategic position controlling the straits of Magellan.292  While the Army of 
Araucos principle task was securing Chile against the indios rebeldes, colonists were 
well aware that they had the Dutch to thank for the decision to establish the 
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permanent force.293  In the meantime a miniature war of Flanders was in the 
making, 294 a long and grueling European campaign of which Ribera was a veteran.   
Ribera welcomed the reinforcements, but pointed out that he could not pay them.  
He had only received a portion of the promised situado from Lima and Viceroy 
Hurtado de Mendoza had prohibited colonists in Chile from covering the 
difference.295  Ribera might have been even more concerned about this salary 
shortage if he had thought he was getting professional soldiers.  He called his new 
troops poorly disciplined and said that the ranks were marked by confusion and 
barbarism and hardly resembled a Spanish military unit.296  Alonso González de 
Nájera, who had recently been a part of this confusion and barbarism, agreed. He 
argued that if the Spanish were to win the war, royal officials would have to stop 
punishing Limas miscreants by sending them to serve on the Chilean frontier.297     
These complaints revealed some important truths about Chile and the future of the 
Army of Arauco.  As one historian put it, the establishment of the situado was a true 
recognition of the absence of real revenue in Chile.298  There was no real wage 
economy in Chile until the crown established the Army of Arauco, and even then 
much of the situado arrived not in specie but in supplies.299  In other words, if Chile 
could have paid for its own war, the crown would have obligated the colony to do so. 
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Also, administrative snafus, embezzlement, and economic dry spells in Lima would 
make it unlikely that Chile would ever receive the soldiers and the resources it was 
supposed to in consecutive years.300  So at the beginning of the 17th century, Chile 
had few resources of its own, but would sporadically receive a large chunk of money 
and hundreds of soldiers from Peru or from Spain via Buenos Aires.301  These factors 
would prompt Chilean officials to exaggerate and even provoke threats to scare Lima 
into rushing the situado and reinforcements to them. 
Poorly disciplined troops and a lack of resources began to turn the Army of 
Arauco into something very different than what the crown had envisioned.  While the 
permanent army was supposed to end the Araucanian threat, what it really did was to 
bring more unscrupulous entrepreneurs to Chile.  There they could now count on a 
situado to skim from and could maintain a more permanent presence in the Araucanía 
where they would be in constant contact with potential indigenous slaves.  Among the 
thieves, rapists and murders that ended up in the ranks of the Army of Arauco was a 
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woman disguised as a man.  After escaping a convent in the Spanish town of her birth 
and hiding for two years under the noses of her family and neighbors disguised as a 
young man, Catalina de Erauso made her way to Sanlúcar where she paid her way 
onto a ship bound for Panama.302 According to her manuscript, Erauso herself arrived 
in Chile with a questionable background, not as a suspected woman, but as a rabble-
rouser who was prompted to join the army after killing a man in Peru.303   In about 
1603 Erauso made her way from Lima to Concepción where she and her fellow 
soldiers were well received due to the lack of people that there were in Chile.304  
Erauso served for fifteen years in Indian wars in Peru and Chile.305 Some documents 
place Erauso in a battle for the port of Valdivia, a battle that the Spanish ultimately 
lost, but after which she gained the title of alférez.306  She led her company for six 
months after the death of her captain, but any possibilities for her own ascension to 
captain were lost after she lynched a traitorous Captain of Indians.307  Later, she 
was injured in a mounted assault on the Purén Valley.308   
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 The War of Arauco was not only an important part of Erausos life, but was very 
useful to her picaresque narrative.309  The popularity of La Araucana meant that for 
peninsular Spaniards, the Chilean frontier attracted only cruel adventurers who 
fled dark pasts and knights abused by their bad fortune.310  Such cruel adventurers 
were thrust into the rugged world of the South American frontier311 where a 
Spanish audience could imagine them engaged in frequent duels and other illicit 
activities.  Erauso supported this notion when she stated, we always had our 
weapons in hand, because of the great invasion of the Indians.312  Erausos 
experience in Chile demonstrates how widespread the frontiers reputation had 
become, and how this reputation could translate in reward to those who (even 
questionably) served or had served there.313   
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Beyond the questionable skill of the Spanish infantry, a change in Araucanian 
tactics also limited the effectiveness of the army.  Improved Araucanian 
horsemanship allowed them to abandon their fortified war in favor of more mobile, 
more flexible, and smaller scale raids called malones or malocas.314  The Spanish 
responded with more raids of their own, partly because they did not have the 
resources for a sustained campaign and partly because concern shifted from capturing 
territory to taking prisoners. These factors would turn the Army of Arauco, designed 
for a few sustained and decisive campaigns, into a slave-hunting machine which 
would eventually conduct hundreds of smaller raids.315   
Before turning to slave-taking raids on a larger scale, Chilean residents had to 
address the fact that indigenous slavery was illegal in the Americas.  For years 
colonists in Chile had pushed for the legalization of indigenous slavery, but after the 
attack of 1598 petitions became more frequent and more detailed.  The Council of 
Indies became an advocate for permitting the practice in Chile and outlined four 
important benefits that enslaving prisoners of war might bring to the colony. First, the 
soldiers in the War of Arauco would be certain of spoils. Second the new slaves 
would lessen the personal service burden of indios amigos.316  Third, the council 
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theorized that the freed indios amigos could return to farming where they would 
alleviate Chiles food shortages.  Finally, captive Indians could be Christianized, a 
great spiritual good.317  After extensive debate and at the urging of Chiles 
governors, in 1608 the king legalized indigenous slavery.318  
Although the crown had now legalized enslavement of indigenous prisoners of 
war, and sent an army to the Chilean frontier, Philip III was still willing to listen to 
less violent and more cost effective proposals for ending the War of Arauco, like the 
one introduced by the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia.  Father Valdivia began working to end 
personal service and enslavement in Chile in 1605.  Part of his strategy involved 
building support of the viceroy against Chilean governors who permitted slave raids 
that interfered with his plans for peace with and with his evangelization of rebel 
Araucanians.319 Since Valdivia had met several past Viceroys of New Spain in Lima 
he most likely knew the ins and outs of failed aggressive pacification efforts on the 
Chichimec frontier, and wanted to try something different in Chile.  Father Valdivia 
was also inspired by inroads being made without the help of an army by his Jesuit 
brethren in Paraguay among the Guaraní.  Father Valdivia also recognized that slave 
raids had destabilized and defeated peace efforts on all three frontiers.320  
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Undaunted by the order of 1608, Valdivia pushed a plan that became known as 
the Defensive War.  The Army of Arauco would remain in place, but all new 
campaigns would be suspended and resources would be dedicated to fortifying 
existing forts north of the Bío-Bío River.  Maintaining the army in the region would 
keep the Spanish from looking weak and would prevent assaults from indios rebeldes, 
but the suspension of campaigns would allow for more missionary work and would 
build trust between the Jesuits and Araucanians.  The king liked the plan because it 
required no significant spending or troop increases, and addressed the perennial 
problems of mistreatment of indios de paz and personal service.  He decided in 1610 
that defensive warfare ought to be tried for a period of three or four years.321   
In 1612 the viceroy ordered the cessation of offensive warfare, and gave 
Valdivia exceptional powers for an ecclesiastic and a religious one at that, naming 
him Visitor General of Chile.  The viceroy also informed the Governor of Chile and 
the audiencia that Father Valdivia was not subject to their authority.  The viceroy 
named the Bío-Bío River as the frontier and decreed that no Spanish infantryman was 
to cross it under the penalty of death.  The Defensive War also meant forbidding non-
violent contact, particularly trade and romantic relationships between Spanish soldiers 
and Araucanian women.  Finally, the viceroy suspended the polemical 1608 slavery 
decree.322       
The king armed Father Valdivia with another cédula addressed to the Chiefs of 
Araucanía in which he said,  I have been informed that the occasion and causes that 
you have had for rebelling and continuing the war for so many years have been some 
                                                 
321
 Ibid., 122-23. 
322
 Ibid., 130-31. 
 119 
humiliations and poor treatments that you received from the Spanish during which 
time you were living peacefully.  The king added that such abuses were against his 
will and that of his predecessors, who all had wished that the Indians be treated, like 
free men, as you are no lesser than the rest of my Spanish vassals.  The king assured 
the Indians they could trust Father Valdivia and go to him for what they needed.323 
Father Valdivia set out to revindicate the Indian in Chile after the 1598 attack. 
Like his Jesuit predecessors, Valdivia believed that the Araucanians were 
misunderstood and ready to be converted.  He even excused the 1612 killing of two 
Jesuits by the Araucanian Anganamón as an accident and claimed that there was no 
danger among the Araucanians. Valdivia believed that the kidnapping of Jesuits could 
actually help evangelization efforts, arguing as prisoners their work would bear fruit, 
making the Indians understand the will of the Crown.324  A fellow Jesuit supported 
Valdivias claims, adding that the abuses committed against the Araucanians were 
rarely discussed.325   
Father Valdivia did not enter into this project blindly however and knew that there 
were chiefs he would have a hard time bringing into the fold. Valdivia believed that 
the most bellicose and the key to the war was the Ilicura Regua, led by the elderly 
chief Untablame.  Aware of the enormity of his project Father Valdivia enlisted the 
help of both political and ecclesiastic authorities and took Governor Alonso de 
Ribera with him on his 1612 Araucanian peacemaking journey, later dubbed the 
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Parley of Paicaví.326 The parley ranged deep into the Araucanía and over several 
days the Spanish talked to and made peace with leaders from dozens of separate 
groups. During the parley there were prisoner exchanges and disarmament 
agreements.   
The parley revealed the surprising civility that existed between these two groups 
who had committed such atrocities on one other.  One particular Araucanian group 
sent a procession of over seventy men to the parley, dressed in an elaborate and 
traditional manner, with the front fifteen in the procession carrying canelo 
branches.327  One of the defining moments of the Parley of Paicaví for Valdivia was 
seeing Untablame at the front of the procession of the seventy-three peace offering 
chiefs.328   Father Valdivia added that while he was among Untablames people no 
weapon had been touched, nor have we seen any of their sentinels, nor have we lost a 
single horse.  Instead, (the) Indians of the land of war came to trade and 
communicate with us, selling us strawberries, lima beans and potatoes.329  
Valdivias Defensive War would last much longer than the three or four years the 
king had imagined, but its success was limited largely by the same factors that made 
it necessary in the first place.  Many colonists believed that a defensive war would 
provide very little defense.  Residents of towns in or near the Araucanía expected 
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threats, but denizens north of the Bío-Bío were concerned that a lack of campaigns 
would allow indios rebeldes to gather strength and mount a major offensive.  The 
town of Mendoza was not even threatened in the chaos after 1598, but residents 
became worried a decade later with rumors that groups on the eastern slope of the 
cordillera had allied with the Araucanians. 330   Even in Coquimbo, 1000 kilometers to 
the north of the front, nothing (was) talked about but the war.331  One official added 
that the 1612 death of Valdivias contemporaries was not as a misunderstanding, but 
evidence of Chiles dangerous state.332   
Any new projects dealing with the War of Arauco had to address labor needs and 
the excesses of personal service. The Defensive War was no exception.  Before going 
on to design the Defensive War, Father Valdivia had lived near the town of Mendoza 
where he proselytized among the Huarpe for years, calling them the most miserable 
and absent-minded people I have seen in my life.333  Long after Valdivia had left the 
region and set out to vindicate the Araucanians, the demographic catastrophe among 
the Huarpe continued and was even exacerbated when Spanish raids against the 
Araucanians were discontinued under Valdivias plan.   
In 1613 the cabildo of Mendoza asked for licencias for 1,000 African slaves in 
order to relieve the few aborigines that remain.334 That same year the Viceroy of 
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Peru supported the import of African slaves to reduce the personal service burden 
on Indians in Chile.335  Also in 1613, Juan Fernández de Castillo and other residents 
of La Serena asked for both indigenous prisoners of war and African slaves claiming 
that war and disease had decimated the towns population.  The petitioners argued the 
entire colony would benefit by removing these captives 150 leagues away from the 
front where they could work extracting gold and copper and actually recover some of 
the money lost on the war they had prosecuted.  The petitioners did not stop there, 
asking that in addition to the indigenous captives 1,000 African slaves be imported 
through Buenos Aires to serve the vecinos and residents of La Serena.336       
As we saw in chapter one however, simply asking for African slaves did not mean 
they would ever arrive in Chile, and the labor shortage continued.337  Unable to count 
on African slaves, colonists sought domestic sources of labor on both sides of the 
Bío-Bío.  So without African slaves and with the continuing disappearance of groups 
north of the Bío-Bío, the only source for labor remained the Araucanians who were 
now off limits, and other groups like the Pehuenche and Puelche who were relatively 
secure in the cordillera.338   
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Valdivias plan had reduced spending burdens for the king and viceroy, but the 
Defensive War was not an economic plan.  Chile had become so dependent on 
personal service that the instead of stopping the practice, the Defensive War merely 
increased demand for indigenous labor and encouraged more raids.  In only the first 
fourteen months of the Defensive War four slave-taking raids penetrated the Bío-Bío 
frontier.339  The fact that raids continued made Valdivias attempts to gain the trust of 
the Araucanians nearly impossible.   
Another factor complicating the Defensive War was the reappearance of Spains 
European rivals off the coast of Chile.  The misfortunes of the Mahu expedition in 
1600 and a truce between Spain and Dutch rebels had kept the South Sea fairly quiet.  
This tranquility was ruptured in 1615 when the viceroy wrote that pirates had been 
spotted near Brazil.  He also sent an expedition to the abandoned port of Valdivia to 
investigate a report that the Dutch had taken it.  The expedition found nothing and the 
viceroy admitted that such accounts were often inaccurate, but the worst possible 
course of action was ignoring them.340  In the same letter however, the viceroy added 
that the only place he expected to encounter and confront pirates was off the coast of 
Callao and that the length of the Pacific coast and a lack of resources meant that he 
would have to leave everything south of Callao defenseless against (pirate) 
invasion.  The viceroy admitted that even the port of Arica could not be protected, 
despite the fact that most silver destined for Callao was loaded there.341     
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Appropriately, a new wave of Dutch ships was arriving in the Pacific as the 
viceroy was writing of the threat they presented.  Only a month after the viceroys 
patrol had returned to Callao, Chiles governor wrote that Spanish sailors had seen 
five enemy ships anchored off Chiles coastal island of Santa María.342  The sailors 
had indeed spotted the fleet of Joris von Speilbergen who raided up and down the 
Pacific coast from 1614-17.  Speilbergen stopped at the islands of Mocha and Santa 
María before sacking a Valparaiso deserted in anticipation of the Dutch invasion.  
Spielbergen then went north and in what seemed like an attempt to prove the 
viceroys point, landed in Arica and encountered no resistance.  Fortunately for the 
Spanish, the silver fleet had recently left, but Spielbergen set off in hot pursuit of the 
metal bearing ships.343       
Although he stopped only briefly in Chile, what Speilbergen did next did have 
important consequences for the colony.  Nearing Callao, Speilbergen planned to 
capture the incoming viceroy as he too was approaching the port from the 
northeast.344  The attempt was foiled when the Spanish were alerted to the presence of 
the Dutch fleet, but after nearly being captured himself, the new viceroy would be 
much less apt to continue defensive experiments like Valdivias.   
Since his administration was almost ended by Dutch privateers before it began, 
the viceroy Francisco de Borja y Aragón was understandably more active in 
addressing threats from European enemies in the South Sea.345  The viceroy fortified 
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Callao, renewed patrols from the Armada del Mar del Sur and even addressed the 
possibility of European and Indian alliances in Chile.346  
To his credit, Borja did not abandon the Defensive War.  He sent reinforcements 
to Concepción above the Bío-Bío, when they could have gone to Valdivia or Arauco, 
violating the frontier.  He also continued the campaign against personal service.  The 
viceroy sent a special envoy to help Governor Lope de Ulloa y Lemos combat forced 
labor and explained that although Chiles vecinos wouldnt like being stripped of 
personal service, they would eventually understand that his motives were the right 
ones.347   
At the same time, Borja wasnt nearly the supporter of Father Valdivia that his 
predecessor had been. He argued that while the Defensive War had brought less 
armed conflict, he didnt think it had changed the conduct or beliefs of Araucanians.  
Although the Dutch did not attempt to take any territory in Chile, their meeting with 
Anganamón inspired him to again join with Pelantaro in an assault against the 
Spanish.348 The attack killed a number of indios amigos and prompted many Spanish 
soldiers to defect, where among the enemy they expected to live more comfortably 
and hoped that eventually they could leave Chile by sea or by crossing the Andes.  If 
these soldiers believed they would live more comfortably among the enemy, it comes 
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as no surprise that governor Ribera complained to the king in same year a about lack 
of reinforcements.  Defection and scarcity were compounded by a shipwreck off 
Valparaiso in which much gunpowder was lost.349 The viceroy noted that the calm of 
the Defensive war was giving Anganamón time to gather gold and other gifts to give 
to the Dutch in the event of their promised return.350  
The viceroy also argued that the best way to put pressure on indios de guerra was 
through the establishment of new settlements.351  Many residents in Chile agreed, and 
were worried that the Dutch would take advantage of the lull during the Defensive 
War to populate the Araucanía.  Colonists noted that although the Spielbergen 
expedition was in Chile only briefly, the Dutch brought carpenters along.352  
Carpenters were of course commonplace on any long voyage, but to skittish Chilean 
authorities their presence meant plans for settlement.  
While Father Valdivia had differences of opinion with the viceroy, Borja did not 
directly interfere with his work.  The same cannot be said for the governors of Chile 
who served during the Defensive War.  No governor liked yielding so much authority 
to Valdivia, much less when the Jesuits drew 12,000 ducats from the Army of 
Araucos situado for their mission of peace.353  Valdivia especially butted heads with 
Governor Ribera, who had accompanied the Jesuit to his early parleys. Ribera refused 
to sign Valdivias relación, claiming that the priest had made several agreements 
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without his knowledge or consent (which he technically didnt need) and later cited 
the governor as a witness to them.354   
According to the declaration of Captain Luis Góngora Marmolejo, it was not only 
governors who found Father Valdivias tactics heavy-handed.  A former Spanish 
captive had come to Góngora in tears, claiming that Valdivia had become angry with 
her for declaring the truth about her experience.  Góngora had also been told by a 
number of caciques that Valdivia had success in pacifying indios de guerra not with 
his words but because he spoke them with lance in hand.355  Finally, Anganamón 
claimed that his aforementioned murder of three Jesuits was revenge for the flight of 
a handful of Araucanian women to a Spanish fort and their subsequent baptism.356  
This reveals that for some Araucanians, the spiritual conquest of the Defensive War 
was more disruptive and more intrusive than the sporadic military conquest of 
previous decades.  
Even if Valdivia had not come off as intrusive, there is little evidence that he 
could have accounted for the individual will of all Araucanians leaders, especially 
with a limited Spanish presence in Araucanian territory.  Although the toqui system 
allowed quick alliances to be formed and aid the parley process, each Araucanian 
regua still operated independently. Jealousy, rivalry and ambition had just as much 
impact in Araucanian culture as it did in Spanish.  For example, Araucanian captives 
loyal to Anganamón testified that much of his motivation for his attacks was not a 
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hatred of the Spanish, but jealousy of Pelantaros prominence.  When Anganamón 
decided to conduct a raid and interrupt the peace of the Defensive War he was aware 
that most Araucanians wanted to maintain the truce.  Therefore, there was no 
incorporation ceremony before or after the attack, and its leaders communicated in 
secret.357   
This secrecy was necessary because the Spanish would frequently pay for 
information.  We have seen that indigenous alliances were often fleeting, and one 
Spanish official reported that he paid two Indians for informing him that indios de 
guerra on the other side of the cordillera had carried out two large juntas and were 
preparing an attack.358  All this meant that the same Jesuit attempts to gain the trust of 
some groups raised the ire of others.  With colonists anxious to return to offensive 
war, and pockets of indios rebeldes still springing up, the odds were stacking against 
Valdivia and his Jesuit contemporaries.   
To be fair to the Jesuit, there was little hope that a defensive war could regulate 
all aspects of the well-entrenched vida fronteriza, especially when violence was such 
an expected part of this interaction.  For years residents of the frontier had been 
expecting and adjusting to the pillaging and captive taking that occurred with lance 
in hand.  As James F. Brooks points out in the context of the American Southwest, 
only focusing on the corrosive effects of frontier violence diffuses its major 
contributions to inter-cultural trade, alliances, and communities among groups often 
antagonistic to Spanish modernizing strategies.359  This statement also applies to 
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Araucanian society where captive Spanish soldiers became integral to inter-group 
relationships and ethnogenisis.360  The sons of Araucanian men and Spanish women 
made up much of the Araucanian hierarchy and were afforded a unique status by the 
Spanish.  Araucanians and mountain groups like the Pehuenche also benefited 
materially from their raids, taking Spanish horses and weapons.361  One author wrote 
of a case where a group of Araucanians had captured so many Spanish arms and 
horses that from a distance they looked like Spanish cavalry. In one case, a Spanish 
company had to abruptly retreat when they realized that the party they were 
approaching was not a stray Spanish unit, but a group of well-equipped 
Araucanians.362  
Spanish raids not only garnered slaves but also Araucanian crops that helped the 
Spanish weather frequent shortages.  These raids also brought more relationships 
between Spanish soldiers and Araucanian women, whether they were captives or free 
women who maintained relationships with Spanish soldiers from nearby forts or 
encampments.  Both the Spanish and the Araucanians tried to avoid rampant 
miscegenation, usually to no avail.  Dozens of Spanish raids were principally attempts 
to rescue Spanish women and girls, but after living among and often forming 
Araucanian families, many refused to go with the Spanish.  The Jesuit Alonso de 
Ovalle referred to this situation when he lamented seeing violated the living 
temples of God, and the blood of those old Spaniards and Christians, mixed with that 
of those gentile barbarians who,  have had enough mestizo children that they 
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already represent an entire generation.  363 Despite these reactions to miscegenation, 
individuals could do little to stop its growth, set in motion by the fact that only a 
quarter of Chiles early colonists were women.364     
The Defensive Wars imposition of the Bío-Bío border also interrupted more 
traditional trade, especially in towns like Chillán that lay to the north of the river.  We 
saw in chapter two that authorities founded Chillán to restrict indigenous alliances.  
However, its location between Pehuenche and Araucanian territory also had made it a 
trading center. Every summer, groups would travel to Chillán to trade blankets and 
shirts they had made in exchange for animal skins, and stones.365  Francisco Núñez de 
Pineda related his memories of trade fairs in his native Chillán. 
In the old days, (when I was) a boy, these Puelches366 continued coming to our 
lands to attend their expositions of stones that they had brought, their pelts of 
striped tigers,  pine nuts, hazel nuts, and other things.  Some arrived from the state 
of Arauco, that old and grand place, where through free trade and negotiation the 
Araucanians bought everything.  The Puelches also brought some poisonous 
arrows when they had wars with others and these they sold to our Indian friends 
to rub on their lances against their enemies.367 
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Despite setbacks, Valdivia had outlasted his critics and was still moving forward 
in his campaign against indigenous slavery, gaining the release of hundreds of 
indigenous captives taken illegally during the Defensive War.  Father Valdivia 
conducted mass baptisms of Araucanians during his peace parleys, and the relative 
calm allowed an expansion of the ranching economy and a resurgence of 
agriculture.368  However, a conflict with the Jesuit provincial in Paraguay caused 
Valdivia to return to Spain rather abruptly in 1619.  The Defensive War continued 
despite Valdivias absence, but his successors, although quite capable inherited a 
project that began to decline with the departure of its architect.369  Valdivias 
departure did not change his legacy however. Valdivia had used the frontier as a 
source of tremendous authority and lasting fame, as did his predecessors and as would 
missionaries and soldiers yet to arrive. 
In Valdivias absence, the imagination of colonists and the purse strings of the 
crown were somewhat freer.  The crown would once again support expeditions to the 
mythical city of Caesars in the Patagonia, this time to investigate the claim that rebel 
Araucanians were being secretly backed a runaway Inca community there.  Little 
activity had come in the search for the city since 1604 when the future Buenos Aires 
governor Hernandriás led an expedition that turned up little.370  However, in 1620 his 
son-in-law, Jerónimo Luis de Cabrera, led a larger expedition from his own 
encomienda near Córdova in search of Caesars.371        
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Cabrera left Río Cuarto, a settlement south of Córdova with 160 soldiers, arms, 
and supplies, carried by ox carts and on horseback.372  The expedition moved south 
across the pampa, eventually turning inland at the Negro river.  Their progress was 
slowed by difficult terrain as they approached the eastern slope of the Andes, when 
Cabrera left his carts and sent thirty men forward on horseback.373 
A Chilean-born sergeant volunteered to lead this smaller party as his curiosity was 
piqued by the fact that even though no Spaniard had ever set foot on this eastern side 
of the cordillera, they had come across Indians who showed them Spanish lance 
wounds and spoke the language of Chile.374 The party crossed the cordillera and 
came close to the abandoned Chilean cities of Osorno and Villarrica.  From there the 
party returned to give word of their findings to the main expedition.  Cabrera was 
intrigued and began to consider that this route to Chile could be used to take the 
cities that the Indians had abandoned and finish the war.375  By this point however, 
the expeditions leaders decided to turn back, believing that they had become over-
extended and reminding themselves that they had not come to finish the Chilean 
war, but to discover the Caesars.376 
                                                 
372
 Declaration given by Captain Pedro Pérez to Pedro de Torres, Royal Scribe, Córdova, 21 July, 
1625. B.N. Biblioteca Medina, Manuscript Volume 128, pieza 2309, foja 255. 
373Juan Francisco Jiménez, Encomenderos arruinados, incas fugitivos, beliches y corsario holandeses 
Anuario IEHS 13 (1998):182-184. 
374
 Shields, The Legend of the Caesars, l.  The members of the Cabrera expedition commented on how 
much contact the regions indigenous groups had with each other. First of all, there was little 
geographic distance between cultures.  The expedition began to the south of Córdova using Pampa 
Indians as guides, and later had the help of Puelche to guide them through the mountains.  Abandoned 
by the Puelche, they continued a few miles further and encountered the Huilliche.  A few soldiers who 
had been sent off to find missing horses reported back that they had come across houses, which 
probably belonged to the Araucanians.  Declaration given by Antonio Márques, Córdova, 23 July, 
1625, B.N. Biblioteca Medina, Manuscript Volume 128, pieza 2309, foja 282. 
375
 B.N.  Manuscritos Medina.  Tomo 129: Pieza 2317.  Carta del Licenciado don Alonso Pérez de 




Although jealousy and lack of resources prevented Buenos Aires and Santiago 
from cooperating on the War of Arauco and Caesars, this expedition had an impact in 
both colonies.377  First of all, it raised the possibility that the War of Arauco could be 
prosecuted from the south and east.  This hurt the Defensive Wars cause as the line 
of forts on the Bío-Bío was now revealed to be less effective as both a point from 
which to launch offensives and a bulwark against indigenous movement.  Instead of 
finding Caesars, this expedition raised more questions about where it might be and 
provided an impetus for further exploration. In Córdova, where the expedition 
originated, Caesars was thought to be on the other side of the mountains in Chilean 
territory,378 while in Chile, Caesars was envisioned as tucked away somewhere deep 
in Tierra del Fuego.  This phenomenon seems to suggest colonists kept the mythical 
city as far away as possible, on a permanent frontier that would lead to further 
expeditions and more funds.  The surprising closeness between the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans again raised the possibility that a string of settlements in the Patagonia 
could warn Lima of European enemies approaching by sea.379 
On cue, a Spanish-Dutch truce ended in 1621 and the Dutch West India Company 
was chartered with belligerent commerce in mind.  The modest aspirations of the 
Dutch in the Pacific were now a thing of the past, and expeditions would be armed 
and were not prohibited from stealing the enemys most prized possessions in lieu of 
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a forced sale.380 Although the Dutch never came close to dislodging the Spanish 
from the Americas, pamphleteers in the Low Countries inspired sailors to try.  Just as 
the truce was ending, the first Dutch translation of La Araucana was also published.  
While in Spain interest waned in Ercillas epic as the crown tired of the War of 
Arauco, the text and everything Araucanian was just beginning to capture the Dutch 
imagination as the invincible spirit of the Chilean warriorshad obvious appeal to a 
patriotic Netherlander.381  Dutch authors warned that if the United Provinces were 
defeated by the Spanish, the Dutch would soon replace the Indians as laborers in the 
mines of Potosí. Others contributed to renewed hostilities by arguing that a Dutch 
victory in the Americas would drive the Spanish out of the Low Countries.382  
Important for Chile was the fact that the perception of the Indian-as-ally still 
retained considerable currency within the Dutch imagination.  The backers of the so-
called Nassau Fleet that arrived in the Pacific in 1624 were counting on a Dutch-
Indian alliance to ignite a full-scale revolt in the Americas that would oust the 
Spanish decisively from the New World. The ten ship, 1,500 man fleet carried with 
it all sorts of letters of alliance to convince Indians to rebel. 383    
The Nassau fleet sailed along Chiles coast, but did not stop in the colony nor was 
it even observed before the Dutch attacked Callao.384 Even though the Dutch avoided 
Chile, there would be repercussions for the colony. Chiles governor said in a 1624 
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letter to the king, if (the Dutch) were to take Valdivia, it would mean the destruction 
of these coasts of Peru, Panama and Mexico.  To prevent such a (takeover) this port 
must be populated.385  The viceroy reiterated this threat in a letter to the king, adding 
that Indians had taken over Valdivia, making it easier for the crowns European 
enemies to gain a foothold there and interrupt both inter-colonial and transatlantic 
commerce.  The viceroy also opined that the fortification of the port was crucial but 
that the cost of such a project was prohibitive.386 
Since the port of Valdivia lay well below the Bío-Bío, the Nassau fleet also 
contributed to the demise of Father Valdivias project.   Even though it was clear the 
Defensive War was on its last legs, outgoing viceroy Borja warned his successor not 
to give into requests from Chile to return to offensive war.  He was convinced that the 
War of Arauco had lasted for seventy years largely because of mistreatment of indios 
de servicio, and that the offensive war would simply be an excuse to a return to 
banditry. Instead of taking territory, raids robbed and took slaves and made 
evangelization efforts impossible.387  
Governors of Chile responded with the Council of Indies argument that the only 
way to motivate soldiers was with the spoils, namely Indian captives, of the 
offensive war. Governor Luis Fernández de Córdova claimed that since captive 
taking was suspended during the Defensive War, many soldiers who had constantly 
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put their lives in danger for the crown were granted tiny and unprofitable 
encomiendas and ended up penniless.388  
On April 13, 1625 the incoming viceroy officially ended the Defensive War by 
ordering, all Indians taken in the War (of Arauco) be declared and possessed as 
slaves.389 The Defensive War had succeeded in pacifying some previously 
unincorporated groups, and lasted much longer than anticipated, but it failed largely 
because the permanence of the vida fronteriza caused the Araucanians and the 
Spanish to disregard the new restrictions on crossing the Bío-Bío.390  The expedition 
to Caesars discovered new territory, but rather than defining the frontier, it opened 
more possibilities for frontier interaction.  The Army of Arauco brought much needed 
resources to Chile, but it was inadequately supplied and insufficiently prepared for 
the exigencies of a fluid conflict.  The reappearance of pirates also confirmed the 
importance of sending resources to the frontier, as the Dutch actively if 
unsuccessfully sought alliances with Araucanians.  Therefore, the crowns frontier 
experiments of the early 17th century only served to reveal that a set of unwritten rules 
for the vida fronteriza had gotten in the way of their success.  By the mid-seventeenth 
century these rules became more formalized and actually made the viceroys job more 
difficult. Continued pirate threats meant that the viceroy had to continue sending 
resources to the frontier even if he knew they were being used inappropriately by 
soldiers and government officials alike.     
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PROFITEERING ON THE FRONTIER: THE POVERTY OF THE VIDA 




We walked the nine or ten leagues to Concepción and we all were on 
foot,there were more than two thousand five hundred of us, all crying and 
having a difficult time, and there were many stillbirths on that road, the mothers 




The momentum of the vida fronteriza had sunk the Defensive War, and with the 
era of experiments over, colonists and Araucanians alike became all the more 
dedicated to permanent war.  The story here is of that of colonists taking advantage of 
the vida fronterizas formalized econonomy, its cultural interaction, and its steady 
flow of resources from the viceroy.  Colonists were confident that these resources 
would keep coming when the Dutch takeover of the port of Valdivia reminded the 
viceroy that he had to keep sending resources even if he was being bilked.  With 
excessive profiteering in the mid-17th-century tension increased between frontier 
residents (creoles, missionaries and indios amigos) who wanted to hold the colonial 
pact together, and outsiders peninsular Spaniards and indios de guerra) who gained 
no advantage from holding the pact together.  Both groups wanted to maintain the 
attention of and funding from the viceroy, but for disparate motives.  
Chilean officials began to see their 17th century task as one of keeping the War of 
Arauco alive despite predictions from viceroys that the Army of Arauco would finish 
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off the indios rebeldes in less than a decade.  These officials needed the War of 
Arauco to take slaves and to skim from the situado and discovered the best way to 
hold the viceroy to his yearly commitments was by reporting on and playing up 
threats to Potosí silver.  (Which after all was a threat to Chile as well since this is 
where the situado came from.)  Chiles colonists not only sent constant warnings 
regarding threats from Araucanians, the city of Caesars and Europeans, but also 
looked for and played up any signs of what would be a disastrous alliance between 
any of these enemies.   
The principal motive for keeping the War of Arauco alive was its access to 
Araucanian prisoners of war.  We saw that enslaving prisoners of war was 
temporarily banned during the Defensive War, but few bans ever really put a dent in 
this practice.  Earlier in the century the viceroy had issued a less than effective ban on 
the practice in response to reports that indigenous slaves taken in Chile were living in 
Callao, Los Reyes and other parts of Peru, some of them being branded on the face.  
But even two years after the ban, Alonso González de Nájera wrote that on his way 
back to Spain he witnessed Araucanian prisoners of war being sold publicly in the 
viceregal capital of Los Reyes.392  On one occasion, the Governor of Chile, Alonso 
García de Ramón boasted that when thirty caciques reneged on a peace settlement, he 
had twenty of them killed, and sent the remaining ten to clean the viceroys 
stables.393 One author of the period estimated that well over 1,000 slaves were taken 
during García Ramóns term, most of which came after the ineffective ban.394      
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With the temporary ban on indigenous slavery lifted in 1625, Governor Luis 
Fernández de Córdova wasted little time in organizing a number of raids.  The 
governor claimed that a number of Indians offered peace when they heard that 
offensive war had returned.  When the same reduced Indians did not adhere to the 
conditions of peace, the governor led a rare wintertime attack on the offending 
groups, eager to display his zeal.  Fernández de Córdova added that he was also able 
to procure the return of a number of Spanish captives, some of whom were held for 
more than twenty-five years and who provided valuable intelligence about the enemy.   
Despite his initial slave taking-enthusiasm, the governor also expressed 
reservations about offensive war, claiming that all this success had earned him more 
enemies.395  Fernández de Córdova believed that with the will of God and His 
Majesty he would defeat these infidels but wondered whether he could continue to 
depend on resources from the crown as the war intensified.  Much of this concern 
came from his mistrust of the viceroys who he said, weakened the hand of the 
governors here (in Chile) with their conflicting orders.  As evidence, the governor 
added that more than eighteen months had passed since the last reinforcements 
arrived and asked for some reinforcements of 800 to 1,000 well-armed men, most of 
whom would be married.  He also requested that the crown help him rebuild Chiles 
destroyed settlements and conclude this war because almost from (Chiles) 
discovery our enemies have proved to be equal or superior to European soldiers.  If 
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we are not especially vigilant, every day our forces are diminished as theirs grow and 
the prospect of building more towns and forts becomes all the more difficult.396     
Viceregal reluctance to aid Chile probably had to do with the fact that many 
viceroys benefited from the spoils of the War of Arauco.  A lack of other resources in 
Chile would make more colonists turn to indigenous slave export to Lima, and solve 
Perus (and the viceroys) labor problems.  The Bishop of Santiago Francisco de 
Salcedo wrote that Indians from the War of Arauco were sent to the daughters of the 
Viceroy Marques de Guadalcazar in Lima.397 The marquis successor argued that 
Chile would be more secure if indios rebeldes could be removed from the colony, 
where they could not escape and easily return to torment the Spanish.  He added that 
in Lima (quite conveniently for the viceroy) the slaves could be better instructed and 
informed and prepared for a possible return to Chile as indios amigos.398   
While the viceroy and some encomenderos and soldiers in Chile continued to 
argue that the offensive war would make Chile safer, events put a damper on this 
theory. With no reinforcements, Chiles vecinos were obliged to perform the dual 
roles of soldier and head of household.  With the vecinos away at war, city 
infrastructure projects and the vecinos own families and family farms would be 
neglected, and war making ability and supply chains would be weakened. 399  
Governor Fernández de Córdova claimed that rumors about European enemies 
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(later substantiated) were making unpaid soldiers even more restless and that he 
personally had to put down two potential mutinies.400     
Fernández de Córdovas fears that these raids would produce more enemies 
proved justified when the toqui Lientur led a significant raid against Chillán in 1628.  
The governor described the attack as coming from behind the cordillera and added 
that the Indians captured two Spanish Moors and some indios amigos.401 A punitive 
expedition was organized against the offenders who Fernández de Córdova called 
Puelches, adding that they came under the guise of being friendly. Not only had the 
Puelches accompanied the Aucaes (or Araucanians) during the raid, but they gave 
them food and supplies.  The punitive expedition eventually caught up to these 
Puelches in rough terrain, killing or capturing more than 140 of them.  For entering 
in this alliance with the rebel Araucanians, Fernández de Córdova said that the 
Puelches were to be considered just as much our enemies as the others, but did add 
that their skill as archers could make them valuable indios amigos if reduced.402   
The return of offensive war also meant more ritual murders of Spanish soldiers.  
Captain Francisco Núñez de Pineda was captured in the raid on Chillán and believed 
that as the son of a Maestro de Campo, his days were numbered.  Instead, Núñez de 
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Pineda was sold to a captor who spared his life, but was forced to witness the death of 
a fellow soldier. 
Putapichun had commanded the unfortunate Spaniard to start gathering sticks 
from the ground.  The captive had begun to gather sticks, and with each one 
repeated the name of a brave Spaniard.  The captive was new to the war and 
thus was not aware of which Spaniards were known among the Mapuche.  
Thus Putapichun had prompted him, naming Pinedas father, Alvaro 
Maltincampo first.  After the speech, when the captive had collected a number 
of sticks, Putapichun had him drop the sticks into a hole one by one, again 
repeating the names of brave Spaniards.  When he had dropped all twelve of 
his sticks into the hole, they told him to cover it with dirt.  While he was doing 
this, he was given a heavy blow to the head, that dashed his brains out with 
the hatchet or the studded club,  that was used as the insignia that they call 
toqui.    
 
Putapichun went on to explain the reasons behind the ritual.  
 
Our goal is none other than to exalt our names, and affix the toquis and 
ancient insignias of our dear nation with the blood of opinionated Spaniards, 
and solicit an effort to expel them from our lands.  Today it seems that our 
Pillán... is favorable and propitious, as good fortune has followed us in the 
two raids we have made,...We (make this) sacrifice to our Pillán for the great 
successes he has brought us.403 
 
We see in this example that despite the brief period of peace under Father 
Valdivias watch, the Araucanians too had returned to offensive war.  Through the 
burying of sticks we see in this ceremony a rejection of Spanish reputational 
power.404  We have seen throughout how powerful the reputation of a militarily 
successful Spanish governor or commander could become.  In this case the 
Araucanians used the reputation of Núñez de Pinedas father as a way to reject 
Spanish authority in the midst of increased Spanish raids.  The Spanish captive had to 
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recognize the power of the now deceased Alvaro Núñez de Pineda and other 
Araucanian antagonists and subsequently bury them in effigy.  The Araucanians may 
have believed that only a Spaniard could bury these reputations.   
At the same time Chillán was being attacked, threats from outside the colony 
continued.  In 1628, 500 well mounted Serranos (an Indian group with territory east 
of Buenos Aires), raided Buenos Aires armed with lances, bows and arrows, bolas 
and slings.405  Also, the recent Dutch takeover of Bahia prompted the viceroy to 
worry about the European enemies infesting Peru and Chile.  He added that with 
this growing threat, the situado needed to be sent on time.406  Again on cue, in 1628 
Alonso Pérez de Salazar warned the king of rumors that seven or eight ships were 
approaching the Magellan Strait.407  In 1629 the Governor of Buenos Aires warned of 
Dutch plans to invade South Americas interior by sailing up a number of its rivers in 
forty flat-hulled ships that were being readied in Flanders.408 
In general then, indigenous assaults and pirate threats continued to erode any 
progress made toward peaceful solutions to the War of Arauco.  Governor Fernández 
de Córdova realized that he would have to act decisively to keep the recently renewed 
offensive war from getting out of hand and assuring that only indios rebeldes were 
enslaved.  Captain Domingo de Eraso had warned that while indios rebeldes could be 
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controlled by war, the more difficult task was treating indios de paz with respect and 
eliminating their personal service obligations.  Otherwise a war against the indios 
rebeldes would be unreasonable and unjustified.409    Sure enough, in order to cover 
up the illegal sale of indios amigos, some soldiers had already begun to falsify 
documents and much worse, brand them.  To try and end the branding of non-slaves, 
Fernández de Córdova ordered that any soldier participating in said practice would be 
banished to the island of Chiloé for four years.  He also mandated that all slaves 
legally caught in war were to be branded within three months of their captivity and 
their ages were to be recorded.410 However, another example demonstrates how rare it 
was for both personal service and illegal slave taking to be combated simultaneously. 
Fernández de Córdova apparently was able to restrict illegal slave taking only after 
winking at other forms of abuse.  An official in Mendoza complained that with 
Fernández de Córdovas permission, encomenderos were violating the crowns 1622 
order (and the 1542 New Laws) by moving Huarpes in collars and restraints across 
the cordillera from the province of Cuyo into Santiago.411  The Bishop of Santiago 
compared Chiles Indians to the Israelites and wrote of the sad plight of a number of 
Huarpes who to escaped their encomenderos in Santiago only to freeze to death in 
mountain caves while trying to return to their families.  According to the bishop, the 
encomenderos were also neglecting their obligation to catechize the Indians working 
for them and as a result many Huarpes did not even know how to make the sign of the 
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cross.  The bishop resolved that future violators of the 1622 order would be subject to 
a fine and excommunication.412    
Discussions in Spain gave little hope that a peaceful solution to slave taking and 
the war in general was at hand.  While twenty years earlier the Council of Indies had 
rallied support for the Defensive War, it was now the kings War Council that led a 
discussion of what was to be done in Chile.  In the wake of the attack on Chillán, the 
council recommended that 300 soldiers for Chile be sent with the new Governor of 
Buenos Aires.413   
Concerns about Chiles safety were also increased by the viceroys response to 
threats.  In a 1629 letter the Viceroy Luis Fernández de Cabrera gave perhaps one of 
the most honest, but for Chile one of the most discouraging assessments of his ability 
to protect his Pacific coast.  Instead of building settlements in the Strait of Magellan 
or even something as simple as a series of watchtowers along the coast of Chile, the 
viceroy proposed that more resources be dedicated to gathering intelligence on ships 
leaving European ports.  He added that no matter what steps were taken, European 
enemies would still be very much able to reach Callao without being spotted and that 
there was little he could do to prevent a very small number of (enemies) from 
sacking and burning Arica, Pisco, Paita and Guayaquil and every other coastal 
settlement.   He added that these coastal cities were not on par with those in Europe 
but instead were no more than settlements of reed houses with a few built of 
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boards.  This meant that in the event of an invasion the vecinos could easily gather 
up their belongings and flee inland.414   
Despite the offensive wars obvious problems and excesses, few favored peaceful 
solutions when all signs indicated that more threats were to come and that the viceroy 
could not protect Chile.  These threats merely became an excuse to conduct more 
raids and demand more resources from the crown.  Rather than making Chile safer, 
the offensive war and a more consistent situado merely increased embezzlement and 
caused a major revolt of indios amigos.  
When the Defensive War ended, slave taking went from being a nuisance to being 
a principal economic activity.  Governors of Chile split their time between raids and 
peace parleys, but none of them harbored any illusions about ending the War of 
Arauco quickly.  With this in mind, the king and viceroy complained that the situado 
was being wasted, but could not eliminate it because of sporadic but very real pirate 
threats. In this era of political and military uncertainty, governors and officials took 
more risks, engaged in more abuse, and embezzled more money from the situado as 
they didnt know when indigenous slavery would be outlawed again or whether the 
next years situado would even arrive at all.  Despite a 1655 rebellion caused by 
gubernatorial excess, illegal slave raids and embezzlement continued because the 
conditions that created them didnt change.  This pattern was only interrupted when 
an earthquake in Peru interrupted Limas demand for Chilean slaves and instead 
created a demand for Chilean wheat cultivated by local, stable, and even paid 
laborers; not unlike the encomienda labor system that Pedro de Valdivia had 
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envisioned 150 years earlier. Since indigenous slave taking never really ceased, the 
Spanish were ready to conduct large-scale raids only five years after they were 
legalized.  The kings War Council boasted that the army under Governor Francisco 
Laso de Vega captured four hundred Indians in three separate raids between 1631 and 
1633.415  The increased slave taking also meant that officials who lost ground against 
indios rebeldes were vilified. Governor Angel Peredo was accused of putting his 
successors in a bind by returning Indian captives to their homes.  Critics saw Peredos 
policy of tolerance as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to rebel.416  Anger 
against Peredo grew when he did not deliver the compensation promised to the 
owners of returned slaves.417   Meanwhile, a 1634 royal cédula reiterating the ban on 
personal service made indigenous war captives more valuable, as they could be 
forced to work without compensation.418   We see then that indigenous slavery had 
become so important to Chile that Peredos attempts to restrict it were regarded as a 
threat not only to the security of the colony but to its economy as well.  
While many continue to argue that offensive war would make Chile safer, all 
indications were that it was making the colony more volatile.  For one, offensive war 
brought new indigenous alliances against the Spanish.   It was precisely because of 
slave taking raids that groups like the Tehuelches later gave up their neutrality and 
allied with Araucanian indios rebeldes.419  While the threat of offensive war 
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prompted some Indians to seek peace, others fought harder when they got wind of the 
treatment that captured indios rebeldes received.  Also, practices like facial branding 
produced more mistrust among both the indios amigos and rebeldes and in some 
cases led to the branding of Spanish captives out of revenge.420  The viceroy 
suggested in 1633 that this practice be discontinued in favor of slightly less inhumane 
hand branding,421 but the practice dragged on as any decision on an outright ban was 
left to the king.422 Finally, removing indios rebeldes from Chile merely expanded the 
War of Arauco beyond the Araucanía. On at least two occasions captive Indians took 
over the very ships that were to remove them from the colony, once in Valparaiso and 
once in Coquimbo.423   
Just as Governor Alonso García Ramón had warned decades earlier, soldiers and 
officials on the Spanish side were doing more trading of indigenous slaves and less 
fighting and governing.  Certain governors were contributing to this trend, attempting 
to boost soldier morale by eliminating the quinto on sales of enslaved war captives.424    
According to one 1640 letter from a member of the Audiencia de Chile, there was 
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also a vibrant black market slave trade between the indios amigos who often captured 
the slaves, and the war ministers and soldiers who bought them.  While some of 
these transactions were legal, very rarely were they reported or were required taxes 
paid.  This oidor was also annoyed that in cash-strapped Chile, the indios amigos 
were both collecting a salary as soldiers and making money in this racket.425   
 While some indios amigos were making a profit in this trade, other indios amigos 
and indios de paz were being victimized by Spanish soldiers who were now less 
discriminating about whether they were raiding friend or foe.426   The Jesuit Diego de 
Rosales worked frequently among the Puelche, and argued that they were often 
attacked by the Araucanians and Spanish alike, as they were not warlike, and did not 
have arms other than arrows.  In typically paternalistic tone he added that they were 
easier to capture because they were more humble, and less courageous.427   
Finally, slave raiding was given even more impetus when the Portuguese 
revolution of 1640 interrupted the activities of Portuguese African slave traders and 
raised prices for Chiles indigenous slaves.  Costs shot up from 250 pesos per slave to 
600 and 700 pesos during this period.428   
The prevalence of slave taking raids meant that for the first time since the 
conquest of Chile, there was little talk of a major offensive and quick end to the War 
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of Arauco.  Governor Francisco Laso de Vega (1629-39) was one of the last in his 
office to brag to the king that he could pacify the Araucanians by the end of his 
administration.  Instead, all he left his successor Francisco López de Zúñiga were 
exaggerated accounts of his campaigns. Another ex-governor explained that the Army 
of Araucos activities had become limited to disorganized raids, where they would 
fall upon the first group of Indians they found, take prisoners and flee toward Spanish 
territory.  Instead of increasing Spanish control of the region, these Spanish hit and 
run techniques emboldened the Indians and weakened the morale of Spanish 
soldiers.429 López de Zúñiga saw little hope for ending this cycle, arguing that 
without more supplies, more troops, a larger situado and settlement, it would be 
impossible to reduce the indios rebeldes.  He believed that with Chiles limited 
resources the armed subjection of Indians would absolutely impossible.430      
If the Araucanians could not be defeated militarily and had outlasted the 
Defensive War, the only thing left to try was a mixture of dialogue and military 
campaigns. A series of rather anomalous parleys was initiated.  These were peace 
missions, but the uncertainty of the vida fronteriza required that they be initiated by 
hundreds of well-armed troops.  These troops were usually accompanied by the 
Governor of Chile who upon reaching a strategic spot within the Araucanía would 
send out emissaries to spread the word that he wanted to negotiate.431 
As their unorthodox composition would suggest, these parleys had mixed results.  
Without fail, scores of Araucanian, Puelche and Pehuenche reguas would arrive 
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peacefully to the Spanish camp, promise to come out of hiding and live near 
colonists, and leave with gifts in hand.  Some of these promises were kept, but just as 
many were fleeting; broken by indios rebeldes seeking further gifts or greedy 
colonists seeking slaves.432 While some groups broke peace agreements made at these 
parleys, others never entered into them and many didnt even know that the parleys 
were being held.433   
The parleys could also create more problems than they solved by muddling 
Spanish understandings of friend and foe and interrupting indigenous daily life.434  In 
one example, to avoid confusion over neighboring indios amigos and indios rebeldes, 
the Spanish declared that anyone on the rebel side of a local river could be 
enslaved.  However, this border was an arbitrary one and on the friendly side there 
was nothing to eat.  Two indio amigo caciques complained that Spanish soldiers 
enslaved their people simply because they had crossed the river in search of food. 
Diego de Rosales explained this to the governor, who to his credit nullified the border 
declaration.435   
Another element working against peaceful groups like was the fact that the only 
arena for dialog with Spanish officials was through these peace parleys.  Since the 
ostensible goal of these gatherings was to draw up Spanish-indio rebelde truces, 
attendance at a peace parley was bound to label indios amigos as rebeldes.   In one 
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such example, the Puelches came to the parleys not to offer peace, which the Puelches 
had never broken, but to acknowledge the king, as his vassals.436 
The parleys were instituted because of Spanish weakness, and in many ways they 
reinforced Spanish limitations by revealing the extent of Araucanian autonomy.  For 
example, while the Spanish believed that their incursions were forcing indios rebeldes 
to seek peace, historians argue that it was really the indigenous who were inviting the 
Spanish to participate in their internal parleys.437  The Spanish believed that God had 
interceded in their favor by causing the 1640 eruption of Villarrica Volcano and 
frightening the rebeldes into seeking peace at the Parley of Quillín in 1641. Dozens of 
rebelde groups did participate in the parley, but only because they were animists 
and pragmatists and as such were moved both by the eruption and by their need for 
food.438 
While the Indians that attended these parleys were technically capitulating to the 
crowns authority, in reality they gave up very little.  The Indians knew that 
governors came and went, and each one would have a parley of his own.  A common 
tactic of indios amigos was to agree to live on a reducción near the Spanish long 
enough to organize a raid on them and flee to the mountains. The offending indios 
amigos knew the mountains could sustain them only as long as it took for a new 
governor to arrive, to whom they would make an offer of peace. The governor would 
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demand they come out of the mountains, and the process would begin all over 
again.439 
Indios rebeldes gained power and material benefits through their participation in 
parleys.  These meetings were occasions not only for discussions of peace, but also 
for trade. The Indians would not only receive gifts in exchange for their offers of 
peace,440 but would sometimes sell their desperately needed ponchos and blankets to 
Spanish soldiers who were constantly complaining that they were shoeless and 
naked.441  This trend had mixed benefits for the Spanish.  While this exchange 
motivated indios rebeldes to participate in the parleys, it also created wider indio 
rebelde alliances through the gifting cycle.442  
A description of a 1646 parley called by incoming Governor Martín de Mujíca 
reveals a great deal about the mixed benefits of these meetings and how they merely 
served to reinforce the balance of power on the frontier.  First of all, it was the 
Spanish who approached the Araucanians about a peace deal, but it was the 
Araucanians who accepted Spanish terms.  The principal chiefs (caciques 
principales) who attended the parley agreed that their subjects would be catechized, 
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that the enemies of the Spanish would be their enemies, and that they would 
immediately notify the Spanish if another cacique tried to initiate a rebellion by 
passing the arrow.  Not notifying the Spanish of such a call to arms would be 
punishable by death.   
However, the principal chiefs were allowed celebrate the ceremony in their own 
manner, making sure of course that the process enhanced their power.  First of all, the 
chiefs literally buried the hatchet, breaking a toqui in half, giving half to the governor 
and interring the other half.  Next, the chiefs planted a canelo branch on top of the 
buried toqui.443  The chiefs had buried their war-making capability but had replaced it 
with a powerful symbol of peace.  We see that although the Spanish may have 
declared victory when their conditions were accepted, for Araucanian leaders 
recognition by the Spanish whether through war or diplomacy was usually beneficial. 
While some Araucanians and many colonists may have been content with this 
cycle of parleys, the viceroy spoke out against them as he recognized that they were a 
veiled protest against a lack of resources from Lima.  He argued that while the 
Spanish were involved in peace negotiations they should have been capturing 
territory and Indians and dividing them into encomiendas.  The viceroy added that 
Indians who had not been encomendados would always have peace on their own 
terms, and would be able to conserve their territory and some autonomy.  He also 
explained that without Indian or African laborers and without gold or silver, Chile 
could not attract new colonists.444  
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The Governor of Chile and the Viceroy of Peru had been at odds before, but this 
new impasse was more serious as Lima could refuse (at least until the crown heard 
about it) to send Chiles situado.  Without the situado, the Chile of the 1630s and 40s 
would have still been in the post 1598 doldrums.  The situado was supposed to be a 
temporary measure to help Chile end the War of Arauco, but instead had extended the 
war by supporting other commercial and illicit activities.445  The king thought about 
suspending the situado on a number of occasions as the war drew on but the 
incessant complaints of the Governors of Chile and the re-appearance of pirates 
assured that it kept coming.446   
Despite Dutch past designs on Chiles port of Valdivia, and intelligence that 
indicated they were still interested in it, a lack of resources made Chilean Governor 
Luis Merlo de la Fuente resist recontructing the town.447 Merlo de la Fuente was 
concerned about the Dutch threat, but pointed out that there were a thousand good 
ports between Chiloé and Panama from which the Dutch could continue their East 
Indies trade.  He added that if they were to gain a foothold in the Pacific, they could 
attack anywhere from New Spain to Chile without warning.448     
In 1640 the outgoing viceroy explained his reluctance to carry out the long 
overdue repopulation of Valdivia.  The viceroy did argue that Valdivia could be an 
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important supply point in the War of Arauco, but added that if European enemies 
wanted a fortification in the South Sea, they would have attempted to establish one 
already.  The viceroy theorized that European enemies would be more interested in 
ports like Buenos Aires (also under his jurisdiction) that would be easier for them to 
re-supply.449  Plans were even made to prevent a land invasion from Buenos Aires, 
and the Governor of Chile was warned to be on the lookout for the western prong of 
the attack that would leave the Dutch in control of Potosís silver.450    In an 
embarrassing twist for the viceroy, at the very time he was dismissing European 
intentions to establish themselves in a Pacific port, the Dutch were planning their 
takeover and settlement of Valdivia. 
The Dutch West India Company had expanded its influence in Brazil to conduct 
raids on Spanish ships and territory in the Caribbean, but occupation was expensive.  
A takeover of Peruvian silver at its source would have been more cost effective.  
Thus, a streamlined version of previous South Sea expeditions was sent to Chile in 
1642.  The viceroy was half-right, as the Dutch governor of Brazil, Prince Maurits, 
hoped to establish a foothold (on the coast of Chile not in Buenos Aires) and launch 
attacks on the mineral-rich interior.451  The Dutch also hoped that allying with the 
Araucanians could offset their lack of manpower.  It was precisely the stiff 
Araucanian resistance to Spanish rule that made the Chileans the best hope for an 
American ally.  The leader of the Nassau fleet had also played up the possibility of a 
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Dutch-indigenous alliance, claiming that la Mocha residents were excited to see that 
Dutch guns would be used against the Spanish.  The Dutch went so far as to identify 
Araucanians as fellow freedom fighters.  The leader of the 1642 expedition, Hendrick 
Brouwer detailed that he wanted to ally with the freedom-loving and Spanish-
loathing warriors depicted in La Araucana.452   
Brouwers expedition took on supplies at Recife and landed just north of Chiloé 
in May of 1643.  There two hundred Dutch musketeers defeated Spanish resistance 
and took on some provisions, but lost their element of surprise.453  The desperate and 
outnumbered Spanish called local Indians to their aid, but the Dutch soon advanced 
on Castro, sacking it and partially destroying a Jesuit church.  There they left a 
message in Latin that accused the Spanish of being cowards for fleeing and signed it, 
Victor (olandii), cola España.454 
After receiving word from Chiloé, the governor scrambled to defend Concepción, 
digging miles of trenches and erecting a small fort.455 Concepción was spared 
however, as the Dutch would only go as far north as Valdivia where they met no 
Spanish resistance.  Brouwer died of natural causes during the voyage, but the 
expeditions new leader Elias Herckmans landed (in Valdivia) with two companies 
of troops and delivered an excellent harangue and oration to a crowd of about three 
hundred Araucanians.  Herckmans explained the Dutch purpose in the South Pacific, 
presented Letters of Credentials from the Prince of Orange, and distributed gifts in 
his name.  In another speech to an audience of 1,200 Herckmans reminded the 
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Araucanians that the Dutch had also fought the Spanish for 80 years, and trade 
agreements were made.456 The Araucanian Manqueante in turn agreed to ally with the 
Europeans against the Spanish and offered the Dutch his lands, people, arms, rich 
gold mines and women.  He even sent his son to live among the Dutch as proof of 
his trustworthiness.457   
The Dutch takeover of an abandoned port may not have seemed like much, but in 
the context of the state of the American colonies it was disastrous. The recent 
Portuguese War of Independence had already weakened the Spanish position in 
America, as the Spanish no longer had an ally in Brazil. The Viceroy of Peru 
expressed his concerns about Dutch power in the Americas to his contemporary, the 
Viceroy of New Spain.  The letter sent from Lima again raised the possibility that the 
Dutch and Portuguese could push inward from the River Plate and the Dutch from 
Chile.  Of interest to the Viceroy of New Spain was the possibility that once the 
Dutch became established in Valdivia or another port in Chile, Acapulco would be 
threatened, as it was an ideal port for a return voyage from China.458     
 The situation was even graver from Chiles perspective.  The possibility of an 
alliance between indios rebeldes and European enemies had kept Chilean officials on 
edge for decades, and now that it had occurred, the colonys position was painted as 
all the more precarious and requiring additional resources.  In a 1643 letter, the 
governor claimed that the presence of the Dutch was a watershed moment for Indians 
in the region, whether they were at peace or enemigos.  The aucaes or indios 
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rebeldes had become extremely bold while those on reducciones were insolent 
and encomendados were content.  The governor added that without His Majestys 
help, things could get very dangerous in Chile.  He argued that if the Dutch were only 
intent on using Chile as a stopover for their journey to the Philippines, they would not 
have pillaged Chiloé.459  The governor added that the Chiloé landing was more 
evidence that the Dutch wanted to infest Chile and asked the king for 1,000 men.460   
A little more than a week later, the governor sent another letter to the viceroy 
detailing how quickly Spains sea and land enemies had formed an alliance.  The 
Indians of Villarrica, Valdivia, Osorno, Mariquina and Toltén had all befriended 
the Dutch who had announced that they would help them drive the Spanish out of 
Chile.  The Dutch were even winning over indios reducidos, making the governor 
fear that the Dutch were providing just the spark these groups needed to try and free 
themselves of Spanish oppression.461  To prevent this alliance from spreading any 
further, the governor sent Spanish and Indian messengers to warn that the Dutch were 
there for gold, and that local Indians would soon be forced to work in Dutch mines.462 
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These messengers were sent with instructions to give the Indians whatever they 
wanted to keep them in obedience to His Majesty.463  Ironically then, these groups 
were being asked to trust the Spanish, who had already forced them to work rather 
than the Dutch, who might do so. 
The viceroy, who had proved reluctant to fortify Valdivia, was now obligated to 
send troops to root out the Dutch there.  Since scouts from Concepción had reported 
that the Dutch were nowhere to be seen, the viceroy could confidently send his 
twenty-two ship fleet to take the port.464  The fleet arrived off the coast of Valdivia in 
1645, with much fanfare and of course found nothing.  Herckmans had wished to stay 
in Valdivia and had even sent to Brazil for reinforcements, but the Dutch colony had 
suffered the same fate of Nombre de Jesus and Rei Don Felipe.  A breakdown in 
dialogue with the Araucanians meant that without the same frontier exchange that 
allowed Spanish survival, hunger forced a Dutch departure.465  The only task for the 
huge Spanish force was the capture of a handful of Dutch deserters.466 
In fact, by 1645 Dutch pretensions in the Spanish South Sea had ended almost 
as quickly as they had begun. The Spanish had no way of knowing this however, and 
seven hundred of the viceroys reinforcements stayed behind in Valdivia.  The 
expedition of reconquest had cost 348,000 pesos, with maintenance of a Valdivia 
garrison projected to cost 20,000 annually.  Added to other expenses such as the 
fortification of Callao, soldier pay, and ship building we see that the Dutch pirates 
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and privateers had thus cost their enemies much more than they themselves 
realized.467  Despite the costs however, the viceroy announced that Valdivia now 
protected Chile from both European and Indian enemies.468 
This was especially important after the testimony of Dutch stragglers.  One such 
deserter, Antonio Juan, confirmed the worst Spanish fears by testifying that the Dutch 
had brought carpenters, ironsmiths, and a multitude of tools useful in construction and 
farming.  They also brought a number of small arms, which Antonio Juan believed 
were to arm the Indians that befriended (us) to fight against the Spanish and drive 
them out of the Kingdom (of Chile.)469   
Other witnesses claimed that the Dutch had told caciques in Valdivia that they 
would soon return with twelve to fourteen ships, two thousand soldiers and a 
thousand African slaves, to relieve the Indians (of any forced labor.)470  The Dutch 
had also expressed that next time they would not only settle Valdivia, but would try to 
take Concepción as well.471   
With Valdivia fortified, the viceroy believed that the main remaining obstacle in 
the protection of the Pacific coast was a lack of cooperation from the same Chilean 
colonists who so often appealed to him for help.  The viceroy was especially 
frustrated when the Governor Marqués de Baides was unable to rendezvous his 
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overland forces with the seven hundred soldiers who had come by sea.472  The 
viceroy was also upset by the governors claim that the fortification of Valdivia 
would require another situado when officials were wasteful and even pernicious 
with the first one.  The viceroy even added that the Army of Chile didnt want the war 
to end!  To this end he argued, army officials had persuaded the governor that a land-
based fortification of Valdivia would have been impossible even with two armies; one 
leading the attack, and another defending the frontier.  At the very least, the viceroy 
wanted the governor to inform him of any sightings of the Dutch as he determined to 
sit on his silver shipment until the coast was clear.  Chile was becoming central to the 
viceroyaltys economic livelihood.  As he sent more resources sent to Chile, the 
viceroy moved to exert more authority over his colony, becoming increasingly critical 
of the prodigal colonys spending.473   
The viceroy hoped that the new governor, Martín de Mujica would be able to 
walk the eight of ten leagues (to Valdivia from the interior)  that so many 
Spaniards with fewer troops had walked, and would show that such a trek was not 
impossible.474  The viceroy claimed that he wanted the new governor to have 
sufficient resources and sent him three hundred troops, even though Mujíca had 
requested 1,000.  In the same breath that he mentioned reinforcements for Chile the 
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viceroy proposed other ways to protect silver, such as bringing it overland to Callao 
instead of through Arica.475    
Chile would have to wait almost thirty years for the appearance of its next 
European enemy.476 In Chiles first 150 years the colony saw fewer than ten 
significant landings of European enemies on its coast, and only of handful of these 
could be called attacks. Drake and others found very few objects of value on Chiles 
under-populated coast, and potential settlers found the climate and the lack of 
supplies prohibitive.  These factors only encouraged the English and Dutch to keep 
sailing northward and westward toward their real reward; Perus silver and the 
Orients spices.    
Despite this, we have seen that officials in Chile were convinced for most of the 
17th century that a larger scale European invasion of their distant colony was 
imminent.  While officials in Chile were not averse to manipulating the viceroy, there 
was very real counter-reformation hatred between the Dutch and Spanish colonists.  
When the Spanish retook Valdivia they exhumed the heretic Brouwers body and 
burned it.477   Whether fears in Chile were genuine or were the equivalent of crying 
wolf, they did prompt the viceroy to act.  The very real threat from Chiles War of 
Arauco, combined with the potential threat from European enemies kept attention and 
resources directed toward this peripheral colony, even at the expense of other parts of 
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the viceroyalty.478  Therefore, even though Chile had kept its situado, Santiago and 
Lima were back to square one, with Chile calling the viceroy stingy and the viceroy 
pointing to Chiles wastefulness.  
Unfortunately for the viceroy, Chiles wastefulness actually spiked after, and to 
some extent as a result of the scare of Dutch colonization efforts.  Not only were 
officials being wasteful with the situado but the viceroy had begun investigating 
embezzlement of its funds and goods only a decade after it began to arrive.  This 
skimming from the situado and other forms of corruption continued in the 1640s 
when governors and soldiers behaved as though the reinforcement of Valdivia was a 
victory for Chile and a license to continue to profit, often illicitly from the War of 
Arauco.  Some soldiers sold clothes destined for the army in local markets and others 
doubled as horse thieves.479 Governor Mujíca (1646-48) was forced to found fort 
Nacimiento on the other side of the Bío-Bío to keep soldiers away from the equine 
inhabitants of haciendas outside of Concepción.480   
Despite some advances through parleys, Spanish soldiers continued to participate 
in illegal raids and were increasingly aided by governors.  By the time Antonio de 
Acuña y Cabrera was named governor in 1650, illegal slave taking was significantly 
affecting Chiles fragile peace, angering both indios rebeldes and more importantly 
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indios amigos, the armys foot soldiers.481  Bishop Dionysio of Concepción noticed 
that the Spanish used offensive war as a carte blanche to commit abuses, selling free 
Indians with little fear of God.  Many Indian slaves had appealed to the bishop for 
help, arguing that they had never been rebels and didnt understand why the 
Spanish had deprived them of their freedom. 482 
Acuña would have been hard-pressed to turn this illegal activity around.  The 
veedor Francisco de la Fuente Villalobos warned that illegal slave raids were 
spreading to cordillera Indians who once captured were shipped out from Valdivia.  
The veedor warned that such practices threatened to turn back the conquest, provoke 
an Indian rebellion, and render meaningless the deaths of 26,000 Spaniards in the 
War of Araucos 100 years.483     
Villalobos praised the new governor for cracking down on rampant slave export 
in 1651.484  Diego de Rosales was also an early supporter of Acuña when the 
governor returned forty-four illegally taken Puelches to their lands.485   Despite early 
attempts to restrict it however, Acuñas nepotistic impulses seem to have compelled 
him to expand the illegal slave trade, with disastrous results.486   
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Acuña first found himself in hot water after he appointed his inexperienced 
relatives to important army posts.  Juan de Salazar, Acuñas brother-in-law and newly 
appointed Maestro de Campo General, angered a group of indios amigos in the first 
months of his command by leading them into an obvious indio de guerra ambush, 
threatening those who balked with the gallows.487 Both Juan and brother José 
obligated indios amigos to transport the wine and other items that they sold in their 
pulperías, providing no compensation or even any food for jobs that often lasted over 
a month.488  The Salazars soon expanded their malfeasance to include illegal slave 
taking.  One witness claimed that slaves were given to José and Juan in exchange for 
promotions.489  Another testified that Juan beat a Spanish soldier to death when the 
latter refused to falsely testify that he had taken an Indian girl in war.  In fact, Salazar 
had ordered the soldier to steal her from a group of indios amigos.490 
Especially critical of this family racket was Diego de Rosales, who had inherited 
the Defensive War from Luis de Valdivia, and continued his missionary work in the 
Araucanía even after the project ended.  His efforts against the enslavement of indios 
amigos developed into a very personal feud with the Acuña-Salazar family. One 
witness to the conflict said that Acuña became furious when his raids were interfered 
with and that José de Salazar referred to Rosales as a cuckold.  Rosales in turn was 
upset because this abuse would not only erode his work, like it had Luis de 
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Valdivias, but would drive more and more groups into alliances against the Spanish 
as word spread of this deception on the part of army officers.491 
Even without the help of his relatives however, Acuña would have managed to get 
himself into hot water.  He was accused of permitting abuse and illegal enslavement 
of indios de paz, and in one case of personally inflicting a beating on an important 
cacique.492  Acuña was at best slow to respond to accusations of abuse by his soldiers, 
and ignored altogether complaints about the actions of his relatives. The governor 
was in fact reprimanded in a 1656 royal cédula for permitting illegal slave taking.493 
Often Acuña would order officers to conduct illegal raids, even leaving written 
instructions for their sale.494  In one such case, Acuña ordered Captain Luis Ponce de 
León to raid a group of indios de paz.  The survivors of this raid went to the governor 
directly to try and reach an agreement for the sake of peace throughout the land.  
Governor Acuña had the emissaries followed back to their settlements and ordered 
them raided again.  Acuñas involvement in these events did not go un-rewarded.  
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Juan de la Roa sent the governor 100 slaves who were later freed when the Audiencia 
de Chile put de la Roa on trail.495  
Acuña also took advantage of indigenous desperation in famine and wartime and 
greatly expanded the relatively new practice of uzanza.496 Most common during times 
of scarcity, Indians had begun to take the extreme step of renting a son or daughter 
to feed the rest of the family.497  Uzanza was declared illegal on several occasions and 
even made punishable by death, but these bans did not stop the practice.498   
An uzanza agreement was only supposed to last for a given time but Juan de 
Salazar and other officials could and did issue false certificates stating that soldiers 
had taken uzanza Indians in war.  These certificates allowed the Indians to be taken to 
Concepción and shipped to other places.499  Governor Acuña had little to say about 
this fraud, as he too falsified these certificates.500  He also relaxed the restrictions on 
settlement of reduced Indians, allowing them to live closer to Santiago so that his 
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wife could carry out more uzanza trades. 501 Francisco de Pineda y Bascuñán said he 
personally expressed his doubts to the governor about removing these Indians from 
under (the control of) our arms, but that Acuña responded by angrily ordering that 
he leave the room.502  Other critics claimed that this relaxation of settlement rules had 
made Chile vulnerable to an indigenous assault.503    
Acuñas worst offense and most foolhardy strategy was the enslavement of indios 
amigos.   We have already discussed the overall military value of indios amigos, but 
these troops were also very important in slave-taking raids. Indios amigos had taken 
hundreds of Indian captives in the 1640s alone, and as mentioned were very willing to 
sell them to the Spanish at a low rate or even better turn them over to the Spanish 
directly.  Acuñas strategy to enslave indios amigos would in essence involve killing 
the goose that laid golden eggs. 
Despite evidence to the contrary then, Acuña persisted in his belief that indios 
amigos were useless as allies but as enemies they would help he and his cohorts 
make themselves very rich.504  His strategy was to pocket the salaries of indios 
amigos, and when they tired of mistreatment and rebelled he could collect again when 
they were captured and sold as slaves.  To get them to turn against the Spanish, 
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Acuña left a number of companies of indios amigos without supplies or payment for 
their service.505   
The violations of Acuñas family were even more excessive than those of 
previous governors in that their intent was to enslave the very indios amigos who 
allied with the Spanish, had brought some order to the frontier.  The results of this 
excess were catastrophic for the entire colony.506  Acuñas critics like Diego de 
Rosales and Francisco Núñez de Pineda would not have denied that they had 
benefited from the vida fronteriza themselves.  Rosaless conversion efforts were 
aided by his understanding and use of fluid alliances between frontier indigenous 
groups.  Núñez de Pineda converted his captivity narrative and service on the frontier 
into fame and a high ranking position within the army.  However, both warned that 
Acuñas attempt to benefit from the vida fronteriza by purposefully interrupting the 
colonial pact would have only disastrous consequences, much like Loyolas 
expansion efforts did in 1598. Núñez de Pineda even informed the governor of a 
warning from various groups of indios amigos.  The aborigines communicated to 
Núñez de Pineda that if the poor treatment under Acuñas government continued, 
they would have no choice but to revolt.507  
One indio amigo leader bent over backwards to try and keep a rebellion from 
happening.  Antonio de Chicaguala headed a contingent of indios amigos near Boroa 
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and had close contact with the Salazar brothers who often sought, but usually ignored 
his counsel.  Chicaguala had warned Juan de Salazar that indios amigos were angered 
by his abuse, and even scolded other groups of indios amigos for supporting an armed 
rebellion.508  Despite the constant warnings from the most reputable of sources, greed 
prompted Acuña and his family to keep the colony on the road to disaster.  
The disaster came in the form of the largest Indian uprising in Chiles 17th 
century.  Unlike the assaults of columns of indios de guerra led by Lautaro or 
Pelantaro in years past, this 1655 attack was a coordinated uprising of indios de 
servicio that stretched from the Maule to Toltén Rivers with involvement from toquis 
only coming in the planning stages.509  The pattern of Spanish abuse and climate of 
mistrust had become so universal and was ignored so long by Acuña that thirty 
thousand subjected Indians rebelled against the Spanish, with 8,000 of them taking 
up arms.510 The assault forced the evacuation of the governors estancia, its more than 
2,000 residents forced to flee dozens of miles under the cover of darkness to 
Concepción.  The rebellion reached as far north as Huasco and Copiapó,511 cost the 
Spanish fourteen of their forts and presidios, the governors ranch, an important 
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stable, 200,000 head of cattle, 512 and 8,000 horses.  Hundreds of Spanish women and 
children were captured.513    
Acuña did little to put down the rebellion that he had caused.  In fact, witnesses 
claimed that Acuña was in such a hurry to abandon his estancia that the Jesuits in the 
adjacent mission were left defenseless and could take nothing with them when they 
evacuated.514  Witnesses recounted that the stress of the exodus from the estancia 
caused a number of stillbirths, as well as the deaths of adults due to heat exhaustion 
or fatigue.515  By the time they reached Concepción the refugees anger with Acuña 
had reached a boiling point, so much so that the authors of this account preferred not 
to record the offensive language being used toward the governor.  The refugees 
joined 4,000 other residents of Concepción, and together hunkered down in the city 
center to fend off the assault.516  It was under the stress of this siege that a revolt by 
colonists against Acuña emerged.   
On Feb 20, 1655 angry residents and members of Concepcións cabildo 
overpowered an army company, took their weapons and shouting, long live the 
King, death to the bad governor and entered Governor Acuñas residence with 
swords drawn.  Governor Acuña got wind of this mob in the nick of time, narrowly 
escaping through a back door and into the nearby Jesuit monastery. One observer 
noted that there was so much anger directed at Acuña by this multitude that it was a 
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wonder he wasnt killed and described how Acuña sought refuge among the Jesuits 
until another governor was named. 517   Acuñas cleric brother-in-law, and an 
unpopular oidor were also sought by the mob, and they too found refuge in 
Concepción churches.  The mob was quieted when Acuña complied with the Jesuit 
demand that he submit his resignation.  Acuña was then placed in irons and verbally 
abused by the conspirators.    The Concepción cabildo elected its own Governor, the 
armys Veedor General Francisco de la Fuente Villalobos, and triumphantly paraded 
him about on their shoulders.518  
This was the first time in Chiles one hundred year existence that a governor had 
ever been deposed, an act that under the regimen of laws and ideas of that era, 
almost equivalent to sacrilege, and one which was immediately condemned by the 
Audiencia de Chile.  However, the viceroy ultimately sided with the mob, and 
stripped Acuña of his post and replaced him with Pedro Porter Cassanate.  The 
viceroy based his decision on the dire events with His Majestys arms that took 
place during his government and the damages caused by the little experience and 
abundant greed of his brothers-in-law in that armys most important posts.519  
There were a number of causes for this massive uprising, but most agreed that the 
Indians rebelled in hatred of Antonio de Acuña, his wife and brothers-in-law 
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because of the mistreatment that they received from them in word and deed.520 The 
very strategy that was designed to make Acuña rich then instead led to his ouster and 
proved a financial disaster for him and the rest of the colony.  Slaves were actually 
lost to the Spanish during this uprising when many of their owners were killed or 
enslaved themselves.521   
The 1655 rebellion was merely the latest reminder of the fact that while the 
enslavement of prisoners of war was permitted as a means to end the interminable 
War of Arauco, it provoked abuse by governors and soldiers alike.  These colonists 
sought to keep the war under control but very much alive so that they could continue 
to profit from the sales of legitimately and illegally taken slaves alike.   
This rebellion, combined with a devastating earthquake in 1647, left the Chilean 
economy in a dire state.  The viceroy of course did not blame colonists for the 
earthquake, but after spending so much on Valdivia only a decade earlier, Lima was 
in no mood to hear more bad news from Chile.  The financial and territorial losses 
from the rebellion were bad enough, but further details about the events leading up to 
the uprising surely infuriated the viceroy.522  The illegal slave trade had been brisk 
enough for the Salazars to share the profits with a handful of others, principally their 
sister, María de Salazar.  According to Father Rosales, María bought slaves and sent 
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them to be sold in Lima.523  María paid for the slaves with goods from her personal 
fortune, goods that were undoubtedly meant for the army.524  
This was an especially unfortunate time for the viceroy because Spains European 
enemies were making more difficulties for them in the Caribbean, which of course 
endangered Perus silver shipment.  What had been a Spanish lake was becoming a 
European one as the Dutch took Curaçao and Tortuga islands, the French Martinique 
and Guadalupe and the English claimed Barbados, St. Christopher, Antigua, and 
capped off the period by capturing Jamaica in 1655.525  These events were added to 
the unnerving news that the English had even bigger plans in the Spanish Americas.  
A plan by Simón de Casseres, presented to Oliver Cromwell in 1655 called for a 
double front attack on Panama from the Pacific and Caribbean, a plan that included 
details on how and where the Pacific leg would be re-supplied in Chile.526  Therefore, 
the 1655 rebellion became another excuse for officials in Chile to ask for resources, 
especially those who could claim they had no hand in provoking it.   
After 1655, threats from pirates and Araucanians were now assumed.  Officials in 
Chile needed to do very little try and convince the viceroy that funds were needed, 
and the number of colonists who skimmed from the situado and committed excesses 
under the guise of just war only increased.  The War of Arauco, which had began as 
                                                 
523
 Considering the amount of money the viceroy sent in the yearly situado, it is surprising that no 
viceroy took an active role in prohibiting the sales of Chilean slaves in Lima, sales that were so 
obviously prolonging the War of Arauco. 
524
 BN.  Manuscritos Medina.  Tomo 143, Pieza 2706.  Información sumaria que está mandada haver 
sobre la pérdida y alzamiento general del Reino de Chile, en la causa que sigue el genreal Martín Ruíz 
de Gamboa al gobernador de Chile, don Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera y el Maestre de Campo don Juan 
de Salazar y Solís Henríquez, tomada al padre Diego de Rosales, Rector de la Compañía de Jesús, en la 
ciudad de la Concepción en 3 de Jul(?)io de 1656.  Fojas 293v.-294. 
525
 J.H. Elliot, Spain and America in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in The Cambridge 
History of Latin America: Volume I, Leslie Bethell, ed.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 333-34. 
526
 Gabriel Guarda, O.S.B.  Flandes Indiano: Las Fortificaciones del Reino de Chile 1541-1826  
(Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1990), 9. 
 176 

















































 CONCLUSION: AN EARTHQUAKE RATTLES PERU AND SENDS 




The revolt of 1655 was clearly shocking enough to bring major changes to Chile, 
especially when it came to indigenous slavery.  However, the most shocking 
outgrowth of 1655 remains how little in fact changed. The Bishop of Concepción, 
Fray Dionysio wrote in 1659 that while he agreed that the fear of being enslaved and 
taken out of Chile made many rebel Indians seek peace, he also saw that the raids 
were taking a toll on the Spanish. Just as Governor Fernández de Córdova had 
warned thirty years before, the raids had began to tire Spanish horses and soldiers and 
consumed tremendous amounts of scarce resources, especially when governors went 
along. 527  The viceroy reminded the king in 1662 that these raids were a distraction to 
the overall war effort and that soldiers greed had even caused the Spanish to lose 
battles. 528   
  The revolt of 1655 was caused by rampant slave taking raids but produced an 
acute labor shortage in Chile.  In 1659 the audiencia asked the king for African 
slaves, claiming that the devastating earthquake of 1647 coupled with the 1655 revolt 
had made feeding soldiers increasingly difficult.529  Fray Dioniso also noticed that so 
many women and children were being sold out of Chile that the colony was being 
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depopulated.  He argued that without the raids, more yanaconas would remain in 
Chile and feel safe enough to stay on their haciendas and Chile would return to the 
days when it had enough wine, bread, meat and legumes to sustain this and six other 
armies.530  
Although it was widely recognized that abuse of the local indigenous population 
had led to the revolt of 1655, there was not an accompanying shift in sympathy to 
their cause.  If anything, it became more difficult for officials in Chile to curb abuse 
by soldiers and encomenderos.  If military tactics and labor needs did not change after 
1655, neither did the political attacks on critics of Indian abuse.  In one case, Chiles 
Protector General de Indios, Antonio Ramírez de Laguna was subjected to a 
defamation campaign and actually brought to trail on spurious charges by vindictive 
and powerful encomenderos who thought he was doing his job too well.531  Ramírez 
de Laguna had previously rebuked at least three of his accusers for having their 
Indians work as slaves.  This of course infuriated the encomenderos one of whom 
stopped by to provoke Ramírez de Laguna while he was under house arrest, and to 
inform him that he would be testifying against him.532  Ramírez de Laguna was called 
a womanizer, was accused of bribery and of running an illegal pulpería, the profits 
from which he supposedly added to an imagined and vast hidden fortune.533  
If little change came within Chile, the events of 1655 did at least prompt the 
crown to restrict, if not ban this indigenous slave trade.  Letters from Fray Dionysio 
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and other Chilean ecclesiastics and government officials influenced the kings 1662 
order that all Chilean Indians sold to Peru be returned to Chile.  In his cédula he 
shared Bishop Dionysios belief that these Indians could be divided among 
encomenderos in Chile and return abundance to the colony.534   
As was to be expected, this extraordinary decision by the king brought no 
shortage of responses by those affected in Chile and Peru.  The Viceroy of Peru, 
Diego de Benavides asked that the order be delayed until the king could hear more 
from Chile and Peru. The viceroy provided the king with a summary of the wide 
range of arguments he had gathered.  Some were against freeing the slaves because 
they were too valuable in prisoner exchanges and as laborers. Many argued that the 
Indians killed and captured colonists and that without punishment and as they were 
sin fe ni ley ni palabra (without faith, law or the word of God) were sure to attack 
again.  Others argued that Chiles aborigines outnumbered Spanish colonists and 
therefore selling Indian slaves to other colonies would mitigate the population 
discrepancy.  Some pointed out that a number of Araucanians had behaved badly in 
Peru, and if returned among their own people this would continue or get worse.  
Finally there were those who argued that enslavement was justified because those 
captured were evangelized.535   
Other voices supported the kings decision to free the slaves, arguing that sending 
slaves to Lima and slavery in general was an excessive punishment which none of the 
Spanish subjects of the rebel provinces of Europe had endured.  Still others felt the 
king didnt go far enough and should have banned slave taking in Chile altogether.  
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They pointed out that the Spanish had unjustly conducted multiple raids against 
indios amigos and had led to an Indian conspiracy. 536  Ultimately however the 
viceroy suspended the 1662 decree, because he needed the slaves in Peru.  Historian 
Eugene Korth argued that a reversal or even an interruption in slave supply from 
Chile would have caused a serious economic crisis in Peru.537 
The decision of the viceroy protected and emboldened Chilean slavers, who 
needed little motivation to engage in the trade in the first place.  Governors also must 
have known that the crown would not take the viceroys insubordination lying down 
and would soon issue more restrictions if not a complete ban.  Therefore, despite the 
lessons of 1655, and still suffering its effects, governors took advantage of the 
potential rewards to be had from slave raids while they were still legal.  In fact, the 
extent of Antonio de Acuñas slave taking and corruption was surpassed less than a 
decade later by another governor, Francisco de Meneses.   
One of the most serious accusations leveled by the audiencia against governor 
Meneses in their intense 1660s feud was that he ordered slave-taking raids against 
groups of indios amigos, selling many of them himself for at least 400 pesos each.  
The oidores feared that this practice would provoke a second general uprising, 
which they would have considered not unjustified. In the same letter, the authors 
claimed that the governors right hand man had suddenly become quite wealthy, 
acquiring riches that included a number of illegally taken Indian slaves.538  In another 
letter, the audiencia members wrote that the peace parleys that Governor Meneses 
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boasted of setting up were actually designed to bring potential slaves to him.  The 
judges also claimed that many Indians that made war on the Spanish at this time did 
so because the Spanish had enslaved their family members, and that Meneses had cut 
off any possibility of a peaceful resolution by denying them access to the politically 
persecuted Protector General de Indios.539 
The Bishop of Santiago added that Meneses committed abuses of, and within the 
encomienda system.  According to the bishop, Meneses asked for the titles of all the 
encomenderos in Chile, declared the encomiendas vacant and then reissued the 
titles for a fee.  In six months Meneses made 40,000 pesos through this scheme, and 
the bishop estimated that when the transactions were finished the governor would 
pocket close to 100,000. 540    
The bishop was also concerned about the plight of encomienda Indians 
themselves.  He said that the encomenderos continued to enslave their Indians, 
despite his constant admonitions that even included the reading of a royal cédula 
banning personal service from the pulpit.  The bishop added that no religious or 
secular authority had been able to stop Meneses and the encomenderos, and he feared 
that they would die excommunicated, a prediction that came true in Menesess 
case.541   
Through embezzlement, corruption and slave sales Meneses greatly contributed to 
what one author calls the passion for luxury among the creole elite of the late 17th 
century.  One of the main beneficiaries of this wealth was the Flores-Lisperguer 
                                                 
539
 A.G.I.  Chile 55.  Letter to V.M. from Audiencia de Chile.  Santiago, Feb. 10, 1666.  foja 2v.-3 
540
 A.G.I.  Chile,126.  Expediente de la actuación del Gobernador de Chile.  1663-1665.  Fr. D(iego?), 
Obispo de Santiago de Chile.  Letter to S.M. Santiago. 9 August, 1664. 
541
 Ibid.  Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile: Tomo V. (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 
1999), 56-58. 
 182 
family of the central valley.  Descendants of a member of Pedro de Valdivias 
original expedition, the Flores-Lisperguers expanded their considerable fortune 
through abuse of indigenous servants and were suspected in the murders of a number 
of their political rivals.  Meneses intervened on behalf of Catalina Flores when the 
audiencia accused her of the murder of a number of her indigenous and African 
slaves, allowing the family to continue the business of expanding its fortune.  
However, Meneses showed his true colors when he tried to take over the family estate 
upon Floress death citing the fact that she was under investigation.542  Thanks largely 
to governors like Meneses, while other colonies started with a boom and fizzled, 
Chile began with a whimper but turned its frontier conflict into gain at the expense of 
its indigenous inhabitants and the royal treasury.   
   Another wrinkle in Menesess seemingly endless tale of malfeasance was an 
accusation that he was in fact a spy for the English.  The captured officer of an 
otherwise uneventful English expedition, Carlos Henríquez Clerque, claimed that he 
had met Meneses in Flanders and that the King of England was fond of him.543   
Another captive testified that Henríquez had not made plans to meet up with anyone 
in Chile, but that he had heard him say during the voyage that he had a powerful 
brother-in-law in Peru and that with all his connections he and his men would be 
showered with gifts upon his arrival in Chile.544  Henríquez later declared that he 
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didnt know whether Meneses was a spy or even if he had corresponded with the 
King of England.  However, Henríquez did confirm the presence of English spies in 
the viceroyalty.545    Menesess long and embarrassing administration came to an end 
in 1670, but he was simply replaced by an equally unscrupulous slave taking 
governor, Juan de Henríquez.546 Diego de Rosales, who witnessed Governor Acuñas 
abuses twenty years earlier, continued to write the king about illegal slave taking still 
occurring in 1672 and asked the king to put a stop to it.  Rosales detailed that under 
Henríquez the Spanish continued to call peace parleys whose purpose was actually 
to take more slaves.  Rosales also claimed that Spanish officers continued to enslave 
indios de paz.  In one of the more dramatic of these cases, the Spanish enslaved the 
indio amigo Mtumpillán had three hundred of his people.  When Mtumpillán 
threatened to go to the governor about this, that very night four masked men entered 
his house and killed him as he slept in his bed.547   
The crown did respond to Rosaless complaints, but a 1674 royal ban on slavery 
and personal service in both Chile and Tucumán was just as ineffective as previous 
prohibitions.548  Even after the ban, Henríquez was accused of calling impromptu war 
councils in Concepción and declaring raids as part of a just war against the Indians, 
despite the fact that they had no authority to do so.  The viceroy added that no 
governor had never consulted him or the Audiencia of Chile before calling such 
meetings, and that uzanza was also still regularly practiced.549  Henríquez took his 
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noncompliance to such an extreme that his participation in slave taking raids actually 
led to his impeachment.550   
While levels of corruption and abuse of viceregal resources had reached new 
heights, the return of European enemies in the Pacific once again made it impossible 
for Peru to rid itself of the Chilean lamprey by discontinuing or restricting the 
situado.   The Spanish had reestablished themselves in Valdivia after the events of the 
1640s, but viceroy Diego de Benavides noted that the soldiers there were mostly 
involved in fighting Indians and rarely saw the pirates who were the principal reason 
for the (re)population of Valdivia.551  This attitude could probably be described as 
nervous rather than disappointed, as the viceroy did expect pirates to come.  His state 
of alert was increased in 1669 when the English crowns failure to control Caribbean 
piracy led the Spanish crown to warn its colonies that the peace with England was 
not understood in the Indies and that they should be wary of attacks.552  The viceroy 
wrote that Chilean ports from Concepción to Valparaiso were ready for an attack but 
mentioned no specifics.  Most his preparations centered around defending Callao. 
Chile was again reduced to a lookout role, where their poor intelligence and 
skittishness resulted in multiple false alarms.553 
In 1671 reports reached the viceroy that twelve ships had been spotted off the 
coast of Valdivia and Lima moved to warn Quito, Panama, Guatemala and the 
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Viceroy of New Spain.554  The viceroy was right to be alarmed, as in the same year 
Henry Morgan sacked Panama.  A month after the warning went out however, the 
viceroy updated that there was only in fact one ship, which turned out to be piloted by 
the Englishman John Narborough.555  Narborough landed peacefully in Valdivia in 
1671 after exploring the Magellan Strait for a month.556  Just to be on the safe side 
however, the viceroy sent his own scouts to Chile, who found little evidence of more 
threats.557  While the perturbed viceroy tried to figure out how one ship became 
twelve, officials interrogated the aforementioned Henríquez Clerque and his four 
fellow crewmen, left behind in Valdivia after English-Spanish talks went sour and 
Narborough sailed off.558  
Therefore, even though the Narborough expeditions activity in the Spanish 
Pacific was minimal after these declarations the whole viceroyalty was in fact put 
into a panic over possible spying connections among internationally mobile Spanish 
officials.559  By this point it was not only Spanish officials but Araucanians and 
other indigenous groups in Chile who were perpetuating the permanent war to play up 
the pirate threat.  Indios de guerra could spread rumors inventing or exaggerating 
pirate landings quite readily, as the Spanish often did not have access to certain 
coastal areas.  The indios de guerra did so to increase their reward for seeking peace, 
to keep the Spanish off guard, or to exact a measure of revenge on the Spanish as 
seemed to be the case in a 1670 report.  The aforementioned erroneous twelve-ship 
                                                 
554
 A.G.I.  Lima 72.  V. to S.M., Lima, 24 January, 1671. 
555
 A.G.I.  Lima 72.  V. to S.M., Lima, 14 February, 1671.   
556
 Barclay, The Lure of Peru, 104. 
557
 Ibid., 115-16. 
558
 The audiencia of Lima also investigated after the king expressed concern at the damage and 
expense that resulted from such an inaccurate report.  A.G.I. Lima 73. Real Audiencia de Lima a 
S.M., Lima, 8 April 1673.    
559
 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 133-34. 
 186 
report was eventually traced to an eight-month-old rumor spread by enslaved indios 
de guerra.  Those who testified about the twelve ships added that the fictitious 
landing in Chiloé had provoked much excitement as these moros huincas (white 
Moors) would liberate them from the slavery the Spanish pretended to impose upon 
them.560  
Paid indigenous informants, while technically allied with the Spanish, were not 
above exaggerating or inventing indigenous-pirate alliances to keep themselves 
employed.  Cristobal Talgui Pillán was one such informant who reported that the 
English had populated two islands 160 leagues from Chiloé, toward the Magellan 
Strait.  Talgui Pillán added that the English had two forts, artillery, sheep and goats, 
had planted wheat, and were building a large ship whose wood was brought by 
Indians loyal to them.561  On one island the English were said to have built a stone 
wall and on the other a mill.  In a final embellishment, Talgui Pillán described the 
settlers as blond-haired and blue eyed.562  
Somewhat distrustful of the information but at the same time intrigued, the 
viceroy sent an expedition to try and find these supposed settlements.  Talgui Pillán 
was to guide the group of forty Spanish soldiers and thirty Indians in seven canoes, 
and was given instructions not to return until he had found the settlements he had 
testified to viewing.  The expedition proved unsuccessful, prompting the viceroy to 
express his doubts about Talgui Pilláns story.  The viceroy argued that had the 
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English managed to bring over two hundred settlers to these outposts as Talgui Pillán 
had claimed, the news would have been all over Europe and confirmed by the English 
court.  Having received no such confirmation, the viceroy began to refer to Talgui 
Pilláns claims as fictions and falsehoods. The viceroy later received information 
from captured English sailors who claimed that no such settlements ever existed. 563    
The fact remained that the viceroy, albeit suspicious of the information he was 
getting from informants in Chile, was still very detached from his southern colony 
and had to relay these less than reliable reports to the crown.   If the viceroys best 
information was based on rumors and hearsay, his task of enforcing the crowns 
wishes was not becoming any easier. 
Ironically, it was only after one of the few real pirate attacks on Chile that the fear 
of these invaders abated.  In 1680 and 1686, near the end of the heyday of pirates in 
the Americas, English buccaneers attacked La Serena after sailing southward from 
Panama.  In the first attack the town was pillaged and burned, as the residents were 
caught off guard thinking that the South Sea Armada had chased off the 
buccaneers.564  The second attack, the last significant pirate activity in Chile was 
repelled by the Spanish infantry, a rather insignificant battle that nonetheless was 
celebrated throughout (Chile) as a great (and rare at that time) victory for the 
Spanish army.565  Colonists would not soon have another chance to repeat this 
victory however, as the upcoming War of Spanish Succession would occupy most 
European mariners and vessels.   
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As conditions in Lima had much to do with Chilean attempts to prolong the War 
of Arauco, it is appropriate that events in the viceregal capital interrupted this trend.  
A massive earthquake in October of 1687 heavily damaged Lima and left Peru unable 
to feed itself.  A wheat blight that followed the earthquake rendered the Peruvian 
harvest insignificant for several years.566  As a result, wheat prices in Chile almost 
immediately tripled in response to the new demand.  Although the colony struggled to 
retool its agriculture, Chile eventually would become Perus Sicily, providing the 
viceregal capital with its wheat for much of the 18th century.567 
Economic viability of course brought changes to Chiles southern frontier where 
much of the wheat was grown.  Chiles tallow century would soon come to an 
end.568  In the 17th century Chiles main exports were fat, beef and hides to the mines 
of Potosí, while in the 18th exports shifted to wheat and cereals to Lima.  The 
economy became centered on the more sedentary haciendas instead of the more 
mobile grazing patterns of estancias.  Decreasing mobility meant a decrease in all 
kinds of raiding from both sides of the Bío-Bío.  The profitability of wheat export 
also put a dent in raids as the illegal export of slaves was no longer such an attractive 
activity. 569    
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Also, for the first time since a permanent army was established in Chile in 1604, 
significant military cutbacks were made to fund mission activity and to provide wheat 
to Lima.570  The War of Arauco was no longer Chiles first priority. 
Missionary activity had been scant in Chile since the end of the Defensive War.  
Franciscans and Jesuits worked mostly with indios reducidos and stayed close to or 
within Spanish settlements or forts.  The missionaries lacked the funds and support 
required to establish new and independent missions, and secular and religious 
authorities alike were hesitant to send missionaries far into Araucanian territory after 
the murder of three Jesuits in 1612.571  After decades of failed military attempts to 
end the conquest the king was ready to make another attempt at a spiritual conquest 
of Chile.  In 1692, new governor Tomás Marín de Poveda was given instructions to 
establish new missions in Araucanian territory.572  In the next twenty years the Jesuits 
alone founded six new missions.  Before Marín de Povedas government it had taken 
more than fifty years to establish as many. 
Finally, this new landscape brought changes to frontier political relationships.  
While the 17th century was one of raids, the 18th was dominated by parleys.573  This is 
not to say that conflict was eliminated.574  Some colonists took advantage of the new 
relative calm to take more slaves, while some indigenous groups used it to gather 
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strength for attacks.575  Demand for indigenous labor did not disappear, and 
populations continued to decline through abuse and disease.576  Overall however, a 
more sedentary frontier meant that new energy could be dedicated to cultivating 
stable relationships, cultivating wheat, and cultivating local labor pools to harvest it.  
Wheat exports profit margin even decreased the need for tribute through personal 
service.  In the 17th century Chiles indigenous laborers were lucrative exports, while 
in the 18th they produced them.   
 While acculturation on the frontier became less and less violent during the 18th 
and 19th centuries, Valdivias concept of the poverty and sacrifice of the frontier still 
is a useful one in Chile.  Today the idea not only applies to the Araucanía and its 
unique history, but has become important as a tool for establishing Chiles sense of 
nationhood.  In a 2002 article, one of Chiles most eminent historians Cristián 
Gazmuri, summarized what he believed to be the most important historical 
antecedents of the modern Chilean mentality.  The second antecedent he mentioned 
was Chiles poverty.  He claimed that Chile was the poorest Iberian-American colony 
and that the crown maintained an interest in the colony only because it was wealthy 
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Perus southern door, which had to be defended against corsairs and against the 
ambition of European powers.  Gazmuri added that this poverty not only contributed 
to Chiles mentality, but continues to be reflected in a national architecture that 
maintains a rustic quality from cities to farmhouses.577  
What began as a failed conquest by a group of experienced soldiers evolved into a 
frontier pact that affected not only Chiles south and central valley, but the entire 
Viceroyalty of Peru.  Throughout the late 16th century the residents of both sides of 
the frontier honed their ability to take advantage of this balance of power, until in 
1598 when the rules of the colonial pact became crystallized when they were 
dramatically broken.  The war could not be left only simmering if there were attempts 
to take territory like there were in the 1590s.  In the 17th century this simmering 
conflict attracted even more resources from the viceroy with the sporadic appearance 
of European pirates near the frontier.  By the early 1600s the Araucanians and 
Spanish had solidified a formula that could maintain the focus of the viceroy on this 
otherwise forgotten colony.  This formula involved was keeping the War of Arauco 
alive and exaggerating its threat to the viceroy.  By the late 17th century, this formula 
had become so successful that abuse of the situado actually was getting in the way of 
the war effort, especially in the aftermath of the 1655 revolt.  This cycle of 
profiteering eroded when after the Lima earthquake of 1687, stability became more 
profitable than the ebb and flow of raids, trading and peace treaties that had defined 
the War of Arauco.  
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This project would have been impossible without the scores of enlightening 
studies by historians and anthropologists alike that have helped us understand the 
events and relationships that created Chiles frontier.  Scholars have exhaustively 
evaluated the role of the multitudes of both local and global actors that determined the 
frontiers development.  In that regard, the contribution of this study is a better 
understanding of how these factors interacted, and how residents of Chile acted not 
only as participants in the cross cultural exchange that was the vida fronteriza, but 
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